



From Brazil to Britain: the vicissitudes of participatory budgeting: 
the importance of context
Jamieson Malik, G.
 
This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of Westminster. 
© Mrs Gemma Jamieson Malik, 2016.
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
          
    
FROM BRAZIL TO BRITAIN: THE VICISSITUDES OF PARTICIPATORY 
BUDGETING.  
 THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT.   
GEMMA JAMIESON MALIK 
      
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 
University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
      
 1
April 2016 
     
    
Abstract 
This project asks: How was it that a participatory practice, originating in the 
demands of social movements in Brazil, came to fit within the prevailing neoliberal 
orthodoxy? It explores changes within both neoliberalism and the practice of 
Participatory Budgeting (PB) itself. It examines PB’s Brazilian origins and the ways in 
which the process, initially emerging from protest movements, became a formal 
institutional process and a feature of Brazil’s new democracy, post authoritarian 
rule. It then explores developments in the process itself within Brazil, before 
examining its translation to the UK. PB in the UK is explored through an 
examination of the political climate into which it came to be deployed (i.e. Blair’s 
New Labour) and two concrete examples of the process (in Manton, 
Nottinghamshire and Tower Hamlets, London). It focuses on the way in which the 
discursive environment of operation (the context) impacts upon PB in terms of both 
its form and its potential. These explorations raise important questions about the 
roles and relationships of, and between, the state and the citizen in contemporary 
representative democracy. Arguing that context matters, it demonstrates ways in 
which an increase in participation may have a positive democratic impact, but this 
is not a given; an increase in participation may serve to either enhance or diminish 
democracy. This work makes use of policy analysis and field word. It uses the 
discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe as a theoretical guide and asks what can be 
 2
learnt about PB’s journey, state/citizen roles and relationships, and the relationship 
between participation and democracy by using this particular theoretical lens. 
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There was a noticeable surge in the number of democracies towards the end of the 
twentieth century.  Democracy spread from some 60 countries in 1985 to more 
than 140 in 2003, mostly in developing countries (UNDP, 2002). Increasingly, at the 
turn of the century, the challenge facing many countries was to develop institutions 
and processes that were more responsive to the needs of their citizens, especially 
the poor (ibid). For some there was an attitude of triumphalism regarding the 
spread of democracy, while for others there was, a feeling of fear and dismay 
(Gaventa, 2006), and a caution of hubris from those who did not accept the 
superiority of democracy in its current manifestations (e.g. Mouffe, 2000; 2005; 
2009). 
More recently, there has been mounting concern at the deficits of democracy in its 
current dominant liberal representative form, and an increasing sense that 
democracy is in crisis. Despite varying contemporary theories and models of 
democracy, common to almost all is the idea that participation can act as a 
panacea to the deficits of democracy as experienced by modern pluralist societies. 
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There are many different types of democracy. The current phase, the ‘third wave’  1
of democracy and democratization, is characterised by a particular brand of 
democracy:- liberal or neoliberal democracy (Huntington, 1991). It is this form that 
has become dominant and, in some quarters, has achieved a status of 
unquestionable common sense.  Some of the most common and prominent ways 
of addressing the deficits of democracy, and thereby ‘deepen democracy’, have 
involved the implementation of a governance agenda and an increase in 
participation. Participation is seen by many as a central feature of good 
governance; a good in and of itself in terms of deepening democracy, and as a way 
to realise other goods associated with good governance, including greater 
transparency of government, greater accountability and responsiveness to the 
electorate, and improved efficiency with regard to policy formulation, 
implementation and realisation. 
The ‘deepening democracy’ debate has evolved from discussing 
whether and how citizens should engage in the political process, to 
analysing how to ensure inclusiveness of participation and deepen 
citizen engagement in decision-making processes.......... Some theorists 
emphasise inclusion through participation in the democratic process, 
while others focus more on the quality of the dialogue that occurs 
between citizens and public actors.(GSRDRC, n.d.) 
 Events such as the Arab Spring and the growing influence of digital media have lead some to start 1
speculating about a fourth wave of democracy, N. Howard and M. Hussain (2013) for example. The 
existence and nature of a fourth wave remain debatable and its possible occurrence was/is after the 
main time period of concern to this project.
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This project will argue that we need a clearer understanding of the various types 
and kinds of participation in order to understand the ways in which it may enhance 
democracy. The result of empirical analysis, this project draws out three distinct 
types of participation: transformation, inclusion and insertion. Ultimately it argues 
that what is often considered inclusion would actually be better understood as a 
form of insertion.  In illustrating the way in which participation may either enhance 
or diminish democracy, the project reveals the need for more attention and work 
around the kinds and types of participation available in order to understand which 
will have the potential to make a positive impact on democracy. 
The Question 
This project attempts to answer one central question:  How was it that a 
participatory practice originating in radical left-wing social movements came to fit 
within a Third Way neoliberal orthodoxy?  The simple answer is that it was due to 
changes in both the practice and the prevailing orthodoxy.  What is interesting, 
however, is why and how these changes occurred and what this story can tell us 
about both participation itself and its relationship with representative democracy.   
The Hypothesis 
This project takes a relatively uncontroversial hypothesis: participatory practices are 
predicated upon the discursive environment of their operation. In short, context 
matters. This is not to say that there are no other determining factors; participatory 
practices are overdetermined. This project tests the above hypothesis and looks to 
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explore the ways in which the discursive environment, in which participatory 
practices operate, affects them. This exploration, particularly in terms of ‘how’ and 
‘why’ context matters, provides important insights into the different forms 
participation may take. It illustrates the way in which the same participatory 
practice may be used to increase very different forms of participation. This leads to 
more general reflection on different kinds and types of participation in both theory 
and practice. Exploring the consequences of the impact that context has on 
participatory practice raises important questions regarding the relationship 
between participation and representative democracy. There are now a diverse 
range of participatory practices; this project makes use of Participatory Budgeting 
(PB) as an example of such practices in order to test the hypothesis that context 
matters. 
Why Participatory Budgeting? 
The story of Participatory Budgeting is well known (Baiocchi and Ganuza 2014). 
Emerging out of the demands of the social movements of the 1970s and 1980s; 
today it has spread across the globe and become part of mainstream policy and 
practice; advocated by local governments, national governments and assorted 
international organisations (including the World Bank). Participatory Budgeting (PB) 
is a political process, made famous by Lula and the Workers Party (PT) in Brazil, 
which involves citizens in decisions regarding public budgets. It has spread across 
Brazil to Europe, and is now practiced in China and the US, with mounting interest 
in Africa and India. Many grand claims have been made on behalf of PB, these 
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include its description as a radical new political practice of the left, the greatest and 
most powerful form of participation currently being practiced, and the most 
effective way to address deficits in democracy i.e. the way to deepen democracy. 
Today, the focus tends to be on PB as a policy innovation rather than as part of a 
democratic movement. The bulk of this literature focuses on issues of institutional 
design and policy diffusion .  A return to the environment from which PB emerged 2
suggests that what made PB appear so empowering, emancipatory and radical has 
as much, if not more, to do with the context from which PB emerged than it does 
with the formal institution of PB based on the Porto Alegre model, which most of 
the literature (policy and academic) takes to be the exemplar of PB. 
Which Contexts? 
This project is concerned with two specific contexts: 
1. The context from which Participatory Budgeting emerged in Brazil and 
2. The context in which it was introduced into the UK. 
There is a rich and detailed literature on transitions to democracy (often from 
authoritarian rule). The majority of this literature comes from Development Studies 
and tends to be country specific (e.g. Weber, 2014).  There is also a rich and in-
depth literature on the specifics of Brazil’s transition (e. g. Stepan, 1989; Keck, 
1992; Kingston and Power, 2008; Love and Baer, 2009). PB emerged at a moment 
 Important exceptions include: Baiocchi, 2005; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2012; 2014; Cooke and 2
Kothari, 2001; Cornwall, 2002; Cornwall, Romano and Shankland, 2008; Gaventa, 2006.
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of great change in Brazilian history; Brazil was moving from an authoritarian 
dictatorship to a democracy. This project is specifically concerned with the Social 
Movements (SMs) that were operating within Brazil at this time. 
The importance of context with regard to the import and export of policies and 
practices is well acknowledged. Even when problems are common, solutions are 
often different and context dependent; the problems associated with implementing 
‘one size fits all’ policies have been well documented by the Development Studies 
literature. Generally, this has focused on the export of policies and practices from 
the North to the South. PB saw a reversal in this trend, namely, this time it was the 
North importing a practice which originated in the South. 
The second context investigated in this project is the context into which PB was 
introduced in the UK. PB was first implemented in the UK at the time of the New 
Labour government. Discussion of this context illustrates the ways in which the 
mature, politically neutral, PB fitted well with government ideology and policy at 
the time. In contrast to Brazil, PB in the UK was introduced into a mature 
democracy with a pre-existing culture of civic engagement. The focus here is on 
neoliberal representative democracy and the approach to deepening democracy 
that stemmed from it in the UK. 
As part of the demands of Brazilian Social Movements, PB challenged the 
orthodoxy of the time. Yet in the UK, PB did not present a challenge to mainstream 
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thinking and policy, but rather complemented it.Empirical evidence, predominantly 
in the form of government policy and vignettes (both academic and practitioner 
authored), suggests that PB’s assimilation into mainstream government policy in the 
UK was primarily dependent on two factors: 1) a particular understanding of PB and 
2) changes to political and economic orthodoxy. From this perspective, early 
Brazilian PB practices appear more innovative and display greater democratic 
potential than those in the UK. 
Methodology 
This research was conducted using a particular theoretical lens, namely the 
discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe as articulated in their seminal work 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2001) and its development in subsequent works, 
particularly those of Mouffe. This is not a work of high theory and does not attempt 
to unpick the intricacies of theory; rather it uses this theoretical orientation as a lens 
through which to view and to understand processes at work in the world. This work 
asks, “What can be gained by using this particular lens in terms of our 
understanding of contemporary political processes and practices?”  In addition to 
the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, this research has significant empirical 
elements and makes use of policy analysis and fieldwork. In an attempt to avoid 
unnecessary bias, namely making practice fit theory, this research began with 
empirical investigations and analysis and then reflected back using the lens of 
discourse theory. The use of discourse theory becomes more apparent and explicit 
as this work moves from Chapter One through to Chapter Five and the conclusion. 
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Fieldwork 
The decision to use vignettes for this project was predominantly informed  by 
practical considerations. The lack of data available necessitated fieldwork . The 3
context-sensitive nature of processes and the time and resources available required 
that one or two cases be chosen to study; resources would not allow for more and 
generalisations would be inappropriate. There have now been over two hundred 
and fifty processes in the UK ; at the time this research began it is likely that the 4
figure was closer to one hundred and fifty. The selection of Manton and Tower 
Hamlets as case studies for this project was based on practical considerations, as 
well as “special” and “specific” features these examples displayed. Full details on 
the selection process can be found in Chapter Four. 
Initial discussions were held with members of staff at the PB Unit in the spring of 
2010. Preliminary correspondence and conversations with those working on the 
design and implementation and evaluation of live PB projects in the UK were also 
initiated at this time. These discussions and correspondences raised several areas 
of practical concern including: the demands of fieldwork on the researcher, the 
availability of data, and the availability and amenity of potential interviewees. 
 There are several notable exceptions. Blakey (2007), Blake (2008), and Rocke (2014) have all 3
written academic papers on PB in the UK. SQW Consulting wrote a piece commissioned by the 
government which sought to evaluate PB in the UK. Practitioners developed their own materials for 
the running of individual processes. However with the exception of Tower Hamlets there is no 
substantive evaluative literature by practitioners  on any of the individual processes. The literature on 
Tower Hamlets is extremely limited. 
 The exact figure remains unknown. Two hundred and fifty is a best guess of the UK PB Network 4
and PB Partners. Matters are further complicated by ambiguity of definitions and criteria of and for 
PB. These problems of ambiguity are discussed in Chapters Two and Four.
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Following these discussions and reading of the limited literature available on PB in 
the UK, a shortlist of six processes were drawn up.  From the shortlist, Manton and 
Tower Hamlets were chosen as the vignettes for this project. These cases were 
chosen for a number of reasons, including points of similarity and contrast with 
each other and other UK PB projects (discussed in Chapter Four) There was an 
intensive period of fieldwork between the spring of 2010 and the beginning of 
2011. This involved numerous conversations with those working at the PB Unit, 
formal and informal conversations and interviews , and the attendance of meetings 5
and workshops organised by the PB Unit. Fieldwork, however, continued in a far 
less intensive way throughout the duration of this project; relationships were 
developed with various academics and practitioners; conversations and attendance 
at meetings and workshops continued.  I became a member of both the PB 
Network in the UK and  a member of the steering group for the PB Network. The 
Network has close ties and links to the PB Partners, who are the leading 
practitioners of, and advisors for, PB practices in the UK. 
The vignettes’ ability to speak to several questions was considered in the choosing 
of specific PB processes to research. These included: 
i. What was/is the motivation behind the implementation of PB in the UK? 
ii. What form has PB taken? 
iii. What form of participation is aimed for and what form actually takes place in 
UK PB processes? 
 Full transcripts and/or recordings of formal interviews are available upon request. 5
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iv. Do PBs illustrate a continuation or a break with traditional relations between 
the state and the citizen? 
The vignettes’ ability to address these questions is discussed in Chapter Four; 
Chapter Three deals with question 1; Chapter Four deals with questions 2 and 3; 
Chapter Three begins to explore question 4, which is further explored by way of 
the vignettes themselves in Chapter Four. 
Discourse Theory 
The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (2001) evidences the constitutive nature 
of discourse and the way in which it constructs what are the permitted, viable, 
livable, valid and legitimate identities and subject positions. These positions and 
subjectivities both legitimate and dictate certain behaviours. This project looks to 
reveal the way in which certain forms of citizenship are legitimated. This contingent 
legitimation dictates the permissible purview of the citizen. The post-foundational 
basis of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory views power, not as something that 
can be tamed or brought under control by citizens, but as pervasive of all relations 
whereby every order is necessarily hegemonic. On this account, democracy entails 
not so much the sharing or transferring of power but rather the revealing of the 
mechanisms of power. From a discourse theory perspective, 
[d]emocracy is about much more than institutional design and 
procedure: it is about the processes through which people as political 
agents and as collective actors come to shape the decisions which 
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affect their lives. It is about their exercise of citizenship and political 
agency. (Cornwall, Romano and Shankland 2008, p.41) 
Laclau and Mouffe’s work around the construction of a social reality, which appears 
as the reality (in that it appears as both necessary and the only possible one) but is 
in fact contingent and one of innumerable possible constructions, is crucial to this 
project. The political rhetoric of neoliberalism has come close to proclaiming the 
necessity of particular social realities, which is exactly what is precluded by the 
discourse theory advanced by Laclau and Mouffe. Margaret Thatcher’s ‘There is no 
alternative’ and Tony Blair’s assertion that the Third Way was the ‘only common 
sense way forward’ essentially appealed to an objective universal without 
contingency. From a discourse theory perspective, Third Way social democratic 
forms of neoliberalism have potentially deleterious consequences for democracy. 
Today many politicians and their ideologies have removed the politics 
from 'politics'. There are no longer ‘left’ or ‘right’ policies but only 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ policies implemented by technocratic administrations. 
‘The unchallenged hegemony of neoliberalism represents a threat for 
democratic institutions. (Mouffe 2000, p.6) 
This challenges the assumptions that 1) participation can act as a panacea, and 2) 
participation will always enhance democracy. A discourse theory approach 
highlights the way in which contrasting interpretations of participation, which are 
predicated on specificity of particular discursive environments, may act so as to 
variously strengthen or weaken democracy.   
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Despite a growing interest in and an increased popularity of discourse theory 
generally it remains poorly understood by many. This is understandable given the 
complex, specific and discrete nature of this school of thought. The deep 
philosophical reflections and claims accompanied by highly abstract theory heavily 
influenced by psychoanalysis which characterise discourse theory renders it very 
different to much traditional and contemporary political theory and political 
science. The seminal work for this school, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1989) was a deliberate attempt to make a break with a number of 
traditions which included a break with traditional Marxism and the creation a new 
understanding which incorporated Lacanian analysis. Although many of the terms 
central to discourse theory have been common parlance, for example hegemony 
and discourse, more often than not they are used in a way that divorces them from 
the philosophical and ontological claims. Discourse theory is as much metaphysics 
as it is political theory. However, in addition to being a philosophical work 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy also contains within it a political project - a 
project for radical democracy; the two may be linked but the philosophical claims 
can and do stand independently of the political project. It is the ontological claims 
which form the theoretical framework of this piece not the political project.  
Although there is often some conflation in the literature discourse theory when 
used as a tool is not so much discourse theory as discourse analysis. The distinction 
between discourse theory as a tool i.e. discourse analysis and discourse theory as 
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an approach is an important one. Discourse theory cannot be used as a tool or as 
an instrument. This work makes use of discourse theory as an approach and its 
analysis is in keeping with the ontological commitments of discourse theory. This is 
not to say that there is no analysis of specific discourses. Discourse theory draws 
our attention to specific occurrences like language games and articulations. Various 
discourses are discussed but they are discussed through a discourse theory lens. 
Using this lens enables us to reveal the contingent nature of these discourses 
despite their appearance of necessity and or universality; it also reveals their 
constitutive nature. Discourse theory is concerned with the way in which identities 
are constructed and interpreted, the way in which they are shaped and conditioned 
by discursive contexts through processes or articulation and re-articulation 
(Howarth &) 
There is a common misunderstanding surrounding discourse theory namely that it 
is totalising. In fact discourse theory as initially conceived of by Laclau and Mouffe 
and subsequently developed by them and others, most notably Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough, Glynos, Howarth, Norval, Stavrakakis and Torfing, has always 
emphasised the undecidability of the social and the contingency of any given 
reality. No discourse is capable of completely hegemonising a field of discursivity 
(cf Laclau, Mouffe, Howarth, Norval, Stavrakakis, Torfing and Glynos). Discourse 
theory with ‘the theory of hegemony as the central axis of political analysis’ is 
primarily concerned with the construction of naturalising and universalising myths 
and imaginaries. It is this appearance of universalisation and discourse theories 
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insistence that any universal is a myth which is at its very core; it attempts to unveil 
what appears to be universal but what is in fact contingent. It looks to reveal the 
construction of relationships , systems and structures rather than taking them as 
given. Crucially ‘no discourse then is capable of completely hegemonising a field of 
discursivity’ (Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis, 2000, p.15) 
There are many well rehearsed debates about the value of discourse theory. Any 
ontology is necessarily hypothetical and debates around the merits of all and any 
ontological claims are rich and complex. This work is situated within this tradition 
but it is not a philosophical investigation into the merits of this tradition. This work 
does not engage with these philosophical debates in depth; it is not a 
philosophical work. It is however, worth briefly sketching some of the most often 
cited criticisms. These include it leading to idealism and/or relativist gloom, it 
cannot explain it can only describe and that it falls into the liars paradox i.e. its 
claim to be anti essentialist is in fact itself an essentialist claim (Stavrakakis 2013). 
These criticisms and the rebuttals are well covered in the literature (cf Geras, 
Glynos, Howarth, Laclau, Mouffe, Norval, Stavrakakis and Torfing) and although 
interesting are not of direct relevance to this project. There are, however, features 
of discourse theory which do present real challenges with regard to empirical work.  
  
Early discourse theory tended to be little concerned with the empirical and 
attempts to make use of discourse theory to aid the understanding of empirical 
instances is relatively new. With notable exceptions, most coming from the Essex 
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School (eg. Chouliaraki and Fairclough, Glynos, Howarth, Norval, Stavrakakis and 
Torfing), few attempt to use discourse theory for empirical analysis. Many use terms 
taken from discourse theory but few make use of discourse theory itself. Discourse 
is not, as was previously noted, an instrument or toll and therefore cannot be used 
piecemeal.  
Discourse theory is not prescriptive and therefore cannot provide insights as to 
what should be done. It can highlight problems and puzzles but it offers not 
solutions. Discourse theory does make at least one normative claim though and 
that is that political theory should not make normative claims. The question from a 
discourse theory perspective then is not ‘what is the  proper role of the citizen’ but 
‘what are the myths and imaginaries that a proclaimed proper role for the citizen is 
predicated upon’? 
Discourse theory reveals the historical specificity that takes us to any given present 
conjuncture and views each conjuncture as specific and discrete. This prevents 
empirical analysis grounded in this approach from generating generalisation or 
even general guides and principles. The requirement of historical specificity means 
that empirical cases require long histories and a great deal of contextual 
information; empirical cases cannot be analysed in isolation. Historical specificity 
also dictates that analysis will always be retrospective, reductive and cannot be 
inductive. However, understanding how we arrived at a particular conjuncture can 
facilitate the development of strategies for change. The fact that each strategy will 
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be specific can be viewed as both a strength and a weakness; there can be no 
general guidelines but it also appreciates that each conjecture will require specific 
strategies and the problems associated  with a ‘one size fits all’ solution have been 
well documented.  
Perhaps the biggest challenge for those wishing to undertake empirical work using 
discourse theory is that it has tended to take an anti-epistemological stance 
(Howarth and Torfing 2004). ‘Discourse theory adopts and even radicalises the 
post-positivist critique of epistemology….There are no extra-discursive facts, rules 
of method, or criteria for establishing that can guarantee the production of true 
knowledge.’ (ibid p.27). This is not to say that things do not exist independently of 
discourse, a common misunderstanding of discourse theory, things quite clearly do 
exist independently of discourse but it is only through contingent representation 
that they acquire meaning; our experience of reality is always discursively 
mediated. The anti epistemological stance of discourse theory is a fair criticism and 
does present a conundrum for empirical investigation. However, the fact that our 
experience of reality is always discursively mediated is one of the greatest insights 
of discourse theory. It is an ontological claim which according to discourse theory 
applies to all experience, to all empirical work whether conducted through a 
discourse theory lens or not.  
It is only be taking an anti essentialist stance than we can even begin to imagine 
transformation. Discourse theory does not give insight into transformative potential 
 27
of the individual as it does not operate at that level - the extent to which any 
individual may be empowered by a process is not something discourse theory can 
shed light on. Discourse theory seeks to understand the construction of subject 
positions and identities what they legitimate and what they deny. It does so at the 
societal not the individual level.  
Structure 
Chapter One illustrates the way in which PB originated from the demands and aims 
of a vibrant and diverse set of social movements in 1970s and 1980s Brazil. 
Particular attention is paid to the Workers Party (PT), its relationship with other 
movements, and its transition from a social movement to a political party. This 
chapter explores the role of the PT with regard to the initiation of PB and the 
subsequent development of PB within Brazil. It illustrates the way in which the PT, 
during its social movement phase at least, acted as an umbrella for a variety of 
disparate, and sometimes conflicting, causes and groups. The discussion of the 
Brazilian social movements also highlights the importance of 1) a reconfiguration of 
the political sphere, 2) the construction of a new political subject, and 3) the 
departure from traditional minimalist understandings of the nature of democracy 
itself. This chapter draws our attention to the ways in which these social 
movements were challenging the dominant hegemony; they were demanding an 
expansion of the political sphere and they were demanding a broader and deeper 
form of political subjectivity for citizens. 
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Chapter Two discusses the changes that PB underwent within Brazil before its 
export to other countries. It discusses the changes in PB itself vis-a-vis its diffusion, 
dissemination and translation. It touches upon the adaptability of neoliberal 
hegemony, but that is not the focus of the chapter (this adaptability is explored in 
more detail in Chapter Four). Chapter Two notes that, in addition to the practices 
themselves (their design and implementation), the discursive environment of the 
operation of PB practices is crucial to the ways in which they manifest themselves 
and the potential that they have. It shows that it was a matured and more neutral 
practice of PB, no longer associated with social movements and their political 
demands, that was taken up by other countries. It explores the changes that PB 
underwent in order to explain what made PB so attractive to others, gaining insight 
to the appeal and potential of PB processes. The focus is on general trends and 
changes rather than the specifics of institutional design.  This chapter argues that 
PB underwent significant changes in Brazil itself prior to its export to other 
countries. 
Combined, Chapters One and Two show how PB has been imbued with many false 
hopes which are based on PB as it was in its nascent form, rather than its later 
manifestations, which are generally the ones exported to other countries. It shows 
that PB in 2000 (the model imported to UK) was not the same as it was in the 1980s 
(its nascent form and the basis for many radical claims and hopes made in relation 
to PB). PB is seen as far more radical, innovative and disruptive in its initial 
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presentation. Asking ‘how and why it changed?’ opens the debate as to where its 
radical potential may lie. 
Chapter Three  focuses on neoliberal representative democracy and the approach 6
to deepening democracy that stemmed from it in the UK. This chapter explores the 
new political settlement put forward by the New Labour government. It is 
particularly concerned with the Third Way social democratic form of neoliberalism 
and the associated roles of, responsibilities of, and relationships between, the state 
and the citizen. One of the ways in which the New Labour government was 
conspicuously different from its predecessor was in its emphasis on civic 
engagement. This is explored both in terms of ideology and rhetoric as well as 
concrete policy. Chapter Three looks specifically at the construction of the New 
Labour citizen, and associated constructions of citizenship and civic engagement. 
The policy and rhetoric of New Labour spoke to specific behaviours in terms of 
roles and responsibilities for, and of, the citizenry. These were reinforced by the 
introduction of material practices to enhance civic engagement. The underlying 
identities and subject positions which relate to these behaviours were not generally 
explicitly articulated in any detail and were, as Chapter Four argues, often 
incoherent and contradictory . 7
This chapter contributed a lot to a conference paper I co wrote (Daker and Jamieson, 2012).6
 Large sections of this chapter appear in a book chapter I co wrote, (Jamieson and Fortis 2012).7
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Having explored why the UK would want to import PB processes in Chapter Three, 
Chapter Four looks at the nature of two processes in the UK: ‘Voice Your Choice’ in 
Manton and ‘You Decide!’ in Tower Hamlets. Direct comparison of PB processes in 
different times and locations is not appropriate as the context is radically different. 
As mentioned above, PB processes are contextually sensitive in terms of the form 
the process itself takes, and the institutional design of the process. As PB processes 
are not uniform, it would not be appropriate to make generalisations. The use of 
vignettes aims to answer the following questions: what, how, by whom and why 
have PB processes been implemented in the UK. The conclusions drawn are limited 
by the investigation of two, rather than assessing all, experiences in the UK. There 
has been much research into PB experiences in Brazil, while there has been very 
little on the UK to date. 
The vignettes highlight the importance of both who instigates and implements 
participatory practices and the importance of the context in which it operates. 
They also illustrate some of the many ways in which what is made available to 
participate in may be delimited.  
Chapter Five reflects on the previous chapters and asks what we can learn from 
them. It looks at the implications of the arguments of the preceding chapters  in 
relation to more general questions concerning the following: 
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i. The mechanisms of hegemony and the continued dominance of 
neoliberal hegemony, generally and specifically, in the face of significant 
criticism of and opposition to neoliberalism. 
ii. The nature of participation and the various forms it may take 
iii. The relationship between participation and representative democracy. 
This chapter argues that an increase in participation has the potential to address 
deficits in democracy but it will not necessarily or automatically do so. In fact, it 
may further entrench undemocratic processes and structures. It suggests that we 
need a much better understanding of how participatory processes interact with 
traditional institutions of representative democracy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Origin and Development of Participatory Budgeting in Brazil 
Introduction 
The Workers Party (PT), especially since the election of Lula de Silva as president in 
2002, was associated with a ‘Pink Tide’ washing over Latin America. Participatory 
Budgeting’s (PB) association with the PT and the so called Pink Tide have 
contributed to a perception of PB as radical. Orçamento Participativo (OP)/
Participatory Budget (PB) is a process that emerged out of demands made by 
social movements in Brazil, and was subsequently taken up as official policy by the 
Partido dos Trabalhadores/Workers’ Party (PT), with which it became synonymous. 
PB has been labeled as one of the most radical and empowering participatory 
initiatives (Fung and Wright, 2001). Although some of the demands emanating 
from the SMs of the 1970s and 1980s have been met simply by the transition from 
authoritarian rule to that of democracy which legally enshrined the rights and 
participation of citizens, the more radical hopes of a New Left have not 
materialised. By the time Lula was elected president in 2002, Brazil had settled into 
a Third Way neoliberalism associated with the Blair and Clinton administrations. A 
misattribution of the political features of SMs and the PT to PB itself can lead to a 
romanticisation of PB.  This is not to dismiss the importance of institutional design, 
but it is not the main focus of this chapter. Issues pertaining to institutional design 
are taken up in subsequent chapters. 
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This chapter traces the origin and development of PB in Brazil from the 1980s 
through to the turn of the century. PB has been characterised, by a host of authors, 
practitioners, charities and international organisations, as one of the most radical 
and empowering participatory initiatives currently being deployed. Yet these 
adjectives do not seem to chime with the minimal institutional definitions 
associated with PB today. The literature on both the PT and PB is contradictory. At 
one extreme both are portrayed as radical and political, challenging political and 
economic orthodoxy and providing new hope for the Left in the form of a new 
post-Marxist social democracy. This portrayal is found in earlier writings and 
commentary and, as time went on, both the PT and PB became associated with a 
reinforcing of political and economic orthodoxy succumbing to a Third Way form of 
neoliberalism. This chapter argues calims of PB’s radical and empowering character 
lie in its origins as part of the demands of social movements in the 1970s and 
1980s, and its subsequent championing by the PT; that is to say, in a movement 
and experiment that once was but is no longer. Ultimately, PB should be viewed as 
a tool and the use it is put to is determined by who wields the tool, how they do so 
and why they do so. PB is viewed as inherently political in only a very minimal 
sense i.e. it demands that citizens have some say in public budgets. Stripped of the 
political discourses around the nature of citizen and citizenship, of justice and 
equality, PB is rendered a politically neutral institution with a vague and minimal 
definition that leaves it vulnerable to many interpretations. The depoliticisation and 
reassigning of PB is taken up in later chapters discussing its manifestation in the 
UK, however, as this chapter illustrates this process of depoliticisation began within 
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Brazil itself. The next chapter outlines the nature of the tool/PB in terms of the 
basic institutional features which form the basis of PB as it has been imported by 
other countries. This chapter looks at who wields the tool (PB) and the 
consequences this has. Although highlighting the beginning of the PT's adoption 
of Third Way neoliberal ideology and policy, this chapter stops short of a full 
analysis of this transformation. The PT became a fully fledged advocate of Third 
Way neoliberal ideology and policy after Lula’s win at the 2002 election. This 
chapter looks at PB's history in Brazil up until that point; further developments in 
PB, including the impact of a Third Way government, are explored in the later 
chapter on PB in the UK. 
The discussion starts with a very brief introduction to Brazil highlighting the aspects 
that might make it seem an unlikely paragon of democracy. It then moves to a 
general overview of some significant features of Brazil's new federal pact and new 
constitution. This is followed by a brief overview of the SMs of 1970s and 1980s 
Brazil from which PB emanated, and where some of the more radical claims and 
hopes with regard to the democratic potential of PB may have come from. The 
next section briefly highlights some of the specific features of PB that inspire hope, 
before a more detailed analysis of the relationship between PB and the PT. The PT 
itself started life as a SM and, initially, even after its transition to a political party, it 
maintained close ties with many diverse SMs. The PT was a very early adopter of 
PB and championed its use. This chapter suggests that we can understand many of 
the changes in PB within Brazil over this twenty year-plus period as paralleling 
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those of the PT.  This chapter attempts to explain how political claims made 
regarding PB can be attributed to its handling by and associations with SMs, 
including the PT, rather than the minimal institutional features of PB itself. Early 
conceptions of PB, residing in SMs and the PT, reveal PB as both a formal 
institutional process and the creation of a political forum which expanded the 
political sphere in Brazil. 
1.1 Brazil: an unlikely paragon of democracy 
Brazil would seem to be an unlikely paragon for democracy. However, the reasons 
it would seem unlikely also provide the motivation for many of the social 
movements' demands; the overthrowing of the military regime, social justice, 
equality, new conceptions of the citizen and a battle against the clientelism and 
corruption that had characterised Brazil for so long. The very transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy created a space for debate about the nature of 
democracy, both in terms of normative claims and institutional arrangements. 
Brazil has often been characterised as having the largest income inequality in the 
world (Hunter, 2003, p.158; Schwartzman, 2003, p.1). Despite decreases in income 
inequality since 2003 (Leite and Litchfield, 2007, p.1), where the poorest 20% of the 
population claimed only 2.5% of total income and the richest 20% of the 
population claiming 64% of total income (UNDP, 2002), Brazil continues to rank 
highly on the UN Gini index (World Bank, 2011). Extreme poverty affecting huge 
numbers of people prevents effective participation for many in Brazil. Lack of 
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education and extreme poverty render individuals and groups more susceptible to 
patronage (Hunter, 2003, pp. 157-158). This was a source of contention for many of 
the varied SMs. 
Brazil has never undergone any substantial form of land reform: '48 million families 
have no land and 35 million Brazilians live below the poverty line' (Strong Roots, 
2001, np).  In 1962 one of the most serious attempts at land reform led to a coup in 
1964 and 21 years of military rule (Hammond, 1999; Meszaros, 2000). The land 
issue is inextricably tied to the concentration of ownership, agricultural productivity 
and rural poverty, and unemployment (Hammond, 1999). Old systems and 
inequalities prevent any form of inclusive democracy in Brazil (Hammond, 1999, p.
470). The ability of elites to prevent effective land reform in Brazil dates back to the 
sixteenth century (Meszaros, 2000). More recently, the UDR formed in 1985 in 
response to President Jose Sarney's ambitious agrarian reform bill (Hammond, 
1999, p.471). 60% of Brazil’s farmland lies idle while 25 million peasants struggle to 
survive by working in temporary agricultural jobs (Strong Roots 2001). This too was 
a source of contention for many SMs, most conspicuously the MST, but equality 
and redistribution were also among the main goals articulated by the early PT; PBs 
were seen as tools capable of addressing these explicit aims. 
Traditionally Brazilian society and politics have been clientelistic, hierarchical and 
corrupt. These problems did not disappear with liberation. Sarney’s administration 
(1985 – 1989) was undermined by corruption charges and criticised for 
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strengthening clientelistic politicians (Weyland, 2000, p.54). His successor Collor 
lasted only two years (1990 –1992) before being impeached (ibid, p.47). Franco’s 
one-year presidency (1994-1995) was characterized by turmoil which led to talk of a 
possible coup (Hunter, 2003, p.155). Cardoso’s coalition was plagued by infighting 
and corruption scandals during its second term (1999 – 2001). ‘In September 2000, 
a congressional committee probing organised crime and drug trafficking released 
an explosive report implicating nearly 200 officials in 17 of Brazil’s 27 
states’ (Transparency International n.d.). Again, this was a source of common 
contention among many of the SMs and again PB was seen as a tool capable of 
addressing these issues. 
Following the adoption of the new constitution in 1988, the first direct election 
since the 1960s taking place in 1989, and the resulting inauguration of Collor in 
1990, Brazil could finally be considered a democracy once more (Keck, 1992). 
Brazil, was a democracy which ‘formally recognised social rights and civic 
guarantees and citizens prerogatives [however, these coexisted with]… violence 
and continual human rights violations, in a world that reveals the antithesis of 
citizenship and basic rules of civility’ (Paoli and Telles, 1998, p. 64). 
For all their claims around citizenship and power, the new participatory initiatives, 
including PB, were unable to tackle some of the most fundamental obstacles to the 
realisation of meaningful democratic citizenship on the most basic level. Even 
today the country remains plagued by inequalities, in terms of both money and 
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education, and both the legal and judiciary systems remain inadequate. While SMs 
may have won small battles at the local level, these fundamental obstacles required 
national level action. This is not to dismiss the important advances made in terms 
of civil rights, civic engagement, the extension of service provision to the majority 
of the population, as well as the more limited success in addressing issues of 
corruption. This chapter does not focus on the state of Brazilian democracy, either 
then or now, but rather examines the development and origin of the much hailed 
participatory initiative, PB. 
The next section deals briefly with some of the biggest institutional changes that 
occurred as Brazil transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy. It is these 
changes which formed the political and administrative apparatus that enabled the 
introduction of participatory initiatives, including PB, into Brazil's new democracy. 
The advent of democracy necessitated the creation of a new federal pact and a 
new constitution.   
1.2 A new federal pact 
‘Brazil’s transition to democracy began in 1973 with military President Ernesto 
Gazel’s decision to initiate a gradual liberalisation of the regime and ended in 1989 
with the first direct presidential elections in 3 decades’ (Keck, 1992, p.1). Twenty-
one years of military dictatorship in Brazil ended in 1985 when Jose Sarney took 
the presidential sash (Kingstone and Power 2000, p.3). ‘Brazil's 1988 constitution 
decentralised political authority, thereby granting municipal administrations 
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sufficient resources and political independence to restructure policymaking 
processes’ (Wampler and Avritzer, 2004, p.291). ‘This signalled a broad shift from 
national to local state power, reversing the dictatorship-era pattern of 
centralisation’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p.8). 
Brazil's transition to democracy necessitated a structural transformation of the 
state. Part of this restructuring involved allowing more decisions and policies to be 
made at a local rather than national level. Brazil's federal republic consists of three 
levels of government, federal, state, and municipal, and over the course of the 
1980s more and more responsibilities were transferred from both the federal and 
state levels to the municipal level (Baiocchi, 2005, p.9). Municipalities became ‘the 
de facto source for social spending and public investment’ (ibid., p.9). 
This transfer of power from the national and state levels to the municipal level was 
accompanied by a drive towards greater civic engagement in issues that had 
previously remained the exclusive purview of the state. 
The decentralisation of power in Brazil, as part of the federal pact, 
followed two distinct kinds of rationale. Firstly, decentralisation has 
consisted in handing over functions and activities of centralised public 
authorities to municipal governments... [Secondly], the decentralisation 
of public power has incorporated individual citizens into the process of 
proposing and monitoring public policy, as well as the implementation 
of public acts. (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002,  pp.44-45) 
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The decentralisation of power saw municipalities and their citizens gain at least 
some control over issues pertaining to taxes, land use, housing, education and 
health provision, in terms of planning, policy and provision (Torres Ribeiro and 
Gracia, 2002). Civic engagement and universalist rights were enshrined in law by 
the new constitution. 
Brazil's decentralisation created the institutional openings for actors 
with ties to civil society and social movements to carry out progressive 
experiments. By the late 1980s, many large city governments in Brazil 
began to establish decentralisation programs alongside participatory 
programs. (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002. pp.8-9) 
PB was just one of several experiments in participation, including various 
community councils and neighbourhood associations, that took place after the 
1988 constitution which afforded mechanisms for greater public involvement 
(Souza, 2001, p.160). PB remains the best known and most praised of the various 
participatory initiatives. The reorganisation that granted greater power, autonomy 
and finances to the municipalities between 1988 and 1991 created the legal and 
administrative environment which enabled the implementation of PB. The new 
‘political-administrative system in Brazil is the result of the 'federative pact'…. The 
constitutional contract allows for relative political, financial and administrative 
autonomy for each of the entities (at all the various levels) that are part of the 
federal pact’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.42). A coalition of actors, which 
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included modernizers within government, progressive politicians, and activists, 
formed the coalition behind the change (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002). 
By way of the federative pact [the] responsibility for the provision of public services 
was transferred from the national government to the municipalities (Torres Ribeiro 
and Gracia, 2002, p.44), and municipalities were also granted powers to raise their 
own revenue.Yet the extent to which municipalities were capable of generating 
income depended greatly on whether they were rural or urban.. 
For a large number of these (rural) municipalities the principle source of 
income for the provision of public services, comes from the Federal 
government. In this they differ from the big cities, which have the 
capacity to generate their own income. (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 
2002, p.43) 
This allowed big cities like Porto Alegre, with a relatively large capacity for income 
generation, greater autonomy from national government than other smaller and 
more rural municipalities. Yet the greater autonomy both financially and politically 
accorded to the municipal level as a result of the new constitution was still limited 
and circumscribed by the extent to which both resources and power remained 
centralised. There was a ‘perversity of public policy of the 1990s, when the 
responsibility for economic development, was passed on to the municipalities, 
without in turn providing the necessary power and resources to assume it 
effectively’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p. 27). In addition to this, the 
proportion of budget transferred to municipalities remained relatively low 
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compared to that in developed countries (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia 2002, p.45). In 
effect, municipalities remained technically and financially subordinate to central 
government (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.46). 
The ‘broad and diverse social mobilizations prevalent during the first half of the 
1980s’ (Paoli and Telles, 1998, p.69) had a significant impact on both the nature of 
constitutional changes later that decade and the creation and nature of the PT 
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998). It 
is the nature of these SMs which is the focus of the next section. 
1.3 Brazilian social movements of the 1970s and 1980s 
This section addresses Brazilian social movements (SMs) of the 1970s and 1980s as 
a general phenomenon. Aside from its discussion of the PT, it does not speak to 
the variety or particularities of these movements. Even the most cursory glance at 
the literature reveals these movements to be far from homogenous. This does not 
mean that there was no commonality; the majority of movements spoke in some 
way to rights and social justice, but the specificity of “what rights?”, “for who?”, 
and the interpretation of social justice and how it was to be achieved varied greatly. 
Some general trends can be identified; the PT was indicative of these general 
trends and PB itself emerged as a response to the demands and issues to which 
these general trends spoke. Commonalities included: demands for social justice 
and equality, a new conception of citizenship and the recognition of new political 
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subjects, the necessity of developing a critical consciousness or critical pedagogy  8
amongst the masses, and a fight for accountability and transparency against the 
clientelism, paternalism and corruption that seemed endemic to Brazilian social 
and political life. 
Social movements (SM) experienced a dramatic increase in both their number and 
strength in Brazil during the 1970s and 1980s. By their very existence and visibility, 
as well as by the specifics of their claims and demands, these movements 
questioned the very nature and meaning of citizenship and democracy (Alvarez, 
Dagnino and Escobar, 1998). Rights and who has them are inextricably linked to 
issues of power. However, these movements did not only seek to address the 
balance of power within society but also the way in which power is exercised 
(Baierle, 1998). The PBs came out of demands made by SMs and were an 
expression of both a desire to reduce elite power and claims as to a ‘proper’ mode 
of expression of power (ibid.). 
The 1970s and 1980s were [also] characterized, however, by the 
appearance of new civic associations and new urban social movements 
making claims at the local level, often backed by ideologies of social 
transformation and a break with the past. The ‘new unionism’ around 
Sao Paulo, the grassroots church activism (in the Ecclesiastic Base 
Communities), and the struggles for urban rights were all part of a 
diffuse democratic movement that has been well described in the 
 Although the desirability and necessity of developing critical consciousness/critical pedagogy 8
originated specifically in the Freirean and Liberation Theology movements, it became a general 
theme of many movements.
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literature. These new movements politicized questions of access to 
services, coalescing around nationally organized movements for urban 
rights such as the Cost of Living Movement, the Housing Movement, 
and the Collective Transportation Movement, in the mid-to-late 1970s, 
which emphasized novel practices and values, including autonomy from 
manipulative government agencies and patronage schemes, 
proceduralism and democracy in decision making, and democratic 
access to urban services. (Baiocchi, 2005, p.10) 
Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar(1998) detail the ways in which SMs ‘play a critical 
role in…[determining] the very boundaries of what is to be defined as the political 
arena: its participants, its institutions, its processes, its agenda, and its scope’ (ibid., 
p.1). SMs were able to fulfill this role in Brazil in the 1980s; this was in part due to 
the sheer number of them and the energy they possessed, but also because this 
was a moment of transition in Brazil. The transition from military dictatorship to 
democracy created a space for debate about the nature of democracy, the roles of 
and relationships between state and citizen. A new social and political contract was 
being forged and the form it took was, at least in part, determined by demands 
and claims originating from SMs. In a country where elitism, clientelism and 
paternalism had reigned, new voices were being heard demanding more than the 
minimum of suffrage granted by traditional representative democracy; amongst 
demands for rights pertaining to specific groups within society, there was a general 
call for greater citizen involvement in the new democracy. Given the complete lack 
of citizen participation under military rule, even the most minimal changes would 
have been an improvement. However, the demands of the SMs were actually 
 45
relatively radical, calling for participation in decisions and policies that affected 
them. Greater participation would tackle corruption, clientelism, elitism and 
paternalism but it was not just about remedying ills: the demands, often couched in 
a language of rights, were also crucially about power and specifically transferring 
power from a small elite to the wider population. The SMs were vociferously 
demanding new understandings of the citizen and citizenship and the rights and 
powers they should be accorded (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998). Given the 
glaring inequality across Brazil and its completely inadequate legal and judiciary 
systems, it is hardly surprising that these demands were bound up in debates 
about equality and justice. Many of the movements in Brazil demanded a 
redefinition not only of the political system but also of economic, social 
and cultural practices that might engender a democratic ordering for 
society as a whole….[They] struggled to re-signify the very meanings of 
received notions of citizenship, political representation, and, as a 
consequence democracy itself. (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998, p.
2) 
They sought to redefine what counted as political. Baierle, Daningo and Paoli and 
Telles in separate papers in the same volume (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998) 
all highlight the foundational role played by SMs with regard to the transformation 
of the existing political order; a transformation which focused on the emergence of 
new citizens and the introduction of new participatory initiatives. The movement’s 
new citizens sought ‘[to] radically question the mode in which power is to be 
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exercised rather than merely attempting to 'conquer' it’ (Alvarez, Dagnino and 
Escobar, 1998, p.2). 
Social movements played an important role in bringing about the end of military 
rule, the formation of the new social and political pacts and contracts that emerged 
in Brazil's new democracy, and in the vibrancy of debate around deeply political 
issues pertaining to democracy. Brazil's transition to democracy was about the 
implementation of appropriate administrative, legal and judicial frameworks and 
political institutions. The deeper political function afforded by these movements 
was the development of discourse and debate about the very meaning of 
citizenship, the ‘proper’ role and function of the state, the way in which citizen and 
state relate to one another and concepts of equality and social justice. These 
movements ‘generated (and generate) a sense of enlargement of the political 
sphere via an extended and redefined notion of rights and citizenship’ (Paoli and 
Telles, 1998, p.65). The variety of movements and the extremely diverse origins of 
their claims and demands, for example liberation theology, Catholicism, Trotskyism, 
Leninism and post-Marxism resulted in the development of many different and 
competing conceptions of citizen, state and the interaction between them, as well 
as notions of the importance of equality and justice. 
[I]t is not that social movements are, in themselves, intrinsically 
politically virtuous. Rather, social movements are important because 
they constitute, in the conflictive terrain of social life, public arenas in 
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which conflicts gain visibility and collective actors become valid 
spokespersons. (Paoli and Telles, 1998, p.66)  
A variety of groups, including poor workers, homeless, women, blacks and [many] 
other marginalised people, all demanded to be seen and heard as citizens, as 
political subjects with valid demands around justice which spoke to the very nature 
of social justice and equality (Paoli and Telles1998, p.66). While the particularity of 
the demands of individual groups varied, all demanded a new social and political 
contract. The political ether and normative claims of these various movements 
varied, as did the methods proposed for the accomplishment of their various 
political projects. However, they all shared at least some common struggles and 
adversaries: the old regime, the lack of civil and political rights, the clientelism, 
corruption and paternalism, and the staggering income inequality and severe 
poverty that had pervaded Brazil for so long. These movements, visible and 
audible both within Brazil and internationally, constituted the creation of new 
political subjects demanding a new political settlement. 
The practices of social movements were grounded in the ideologies of 
movements of the 1970s and 1980s, and while demanding dialogue 
with the state, they simultaneously challenged the limits of 
representative democracy by calling for participatory reforms and 
expanding versions of traditional rights. Evelina Dagnino refers to this 
as ‘the new citizenship’ that dominated Brazilian social movements in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Its premise was ‘the right to have rights,’ and it 
lauded the invention of ‘new rights that emerge from specific struggles 
and concrete practices.’ In demanding the recognition of new subjects, 
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it proposed new forms of social relationships mediated by the state, as 
well as new relationships between civil society and the state. (Baiocchi, 
2005, p.11) 
The existence of these social movements and the vibrancy of the very political 
debates they generated can been seen as the source of hope that Brazil once held 
for many on the Left and the reason for viewing Brazil as part of a ‘pink tide’ 
washing over Latin America. Globally, the left could be said to be experiencing a 
crisis at both a theoretical level and in practice, particularly post 1989. In Brazil, the 
end of military rule necessitated a new form of social and political contract, and the 
prominence and vitality with which generally left leaning movements and 
discourses emerged within this space, meant that Brazil seemed pregnant with 
possibility.Although Brazil did become a democracy which introduced new civil and 
political rights, and implemented policies, initiatives and laws to tackle clientelism, 
corruption and paternalism, income inequality and severe poverty, the radical left-
leaning projects ultimately did not materialise. Democracy was new to Brazil but it 
was not a new form of democracy that many had hoped for. Brazil settled into a 
form of democracy very much in keeping with the political and economic 
orthodoxy advocated by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and bore more 
similarities than differences with the UK and the US as they moved towards a more 
social democratic form of neoliberalism associated with the Third Way politics and 
the policies of the Blair and Clinton administrations. 
1.4 PB: the possibility of hope 
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Before exploring the changes in the PT and the associated changes in PB, it is 
worth exploring why PB, at least initially, held so much hope as a new, 
transformative participatory initiative. PB was seen as an arena where the voices of 
new political subjects could be heard, an institution that could address issues of 
social justice, equality and redistribution, and a process that could address issues of 
clientelism, paternalism and corruption by creating mechanisms for accountability 
and transparency. PB was a process and an institution, but it was also seen as the 
creation of a political arena to address the concerns and demands of the SMs from 
which it emerged. 
The Participatory Budget was conceived of in 1989 as an attempt to make the 
municipal councils popular (Nylen, 2000). Although initiated by the PT, they are 
now run across Brazil under various political leaderships. The PBs are processes 
that span a year and annually new ones begin as the old ones end; there is no fixed 
end point where it is believed that consensus will be achieved among all parties. It 
is the earlier Budgeting processes that provide the clearest examples of the 
potential to challenge power structures and processes. 
PBs were designed to hand over policies, decisions and resource allocation to 
those who would be affected by them, initially ‘addressing decisions about 
community level capital expenditures and eventually gaining decision making 
power over major capital investments, service and maintenance programs and 
personnel issues’ (Abers, 1998, p.4). The successes in these areas were significant 
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achievements for a country where elitism, paternalism and clientelistic relations had 
traditionally prevailed. While the actual participation figures (15,000 attending the 
Participatory Budget in Porto Alegre each year by 1995 (Abers 1999) can look 
impressive, when the population of Porto Alegre (1.3 million) is taken into account, 
they seem less impressive (a little over 1% participation). While Brazil boasts that 
PB ‘is today practiced in some 200 cities’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.2), it should be 
understood that Brazil has over 5,560 cities and, in this context, 200 is a relatively 
small number. However, progress has been made and public service provision has 
been extended to the majority of the population in Porto Alegre and the 
surrounding areas (Hatcher, 2002). 
Studies also show that participation is generally from poorer sections of society and 
is generally on the increase (Hatcher, 2002). Against this, ‘critics of direct 
democracy say that it is messy, inefficient, and prone to domination by an articulate 
few’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.2). While there is certainly a danger that the most vocal will 
become over-represented and may dominate the process there is a substantial 
volume of literature which shows that, in Brazil at least, PB enables traditional 
unheard voices and marginalised groups significant space and power. Participatory 
budgeting asserts the value of their voice (Baiocchi, 2006, p.5). 
Here the concern is with the specific nature of PB at the time it originated. 
Participatory budgeting was haltingly introduced in Porto Alegre in 
1990 by an inexperienced and besieged Workers’ Party administration, 
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elected just one year earlier and in search of legitimacy. The idea goes 
back to the 1970s and the social movements that would eventually 
usher in democracy in the mid-1980s. Radical popular educators and 
progressive clergy in these movements emphasized the importance of 
autonomy and participatory democratic procedures; throughout the 
country citizens formed neighborhood associations and social 
movements to demand a voice in such local affairs as transportation, 
health, and housing. (Baiocchi, 2006, p.2) 
PB was about genuine power sharing (Torres Ribeiroand Gracia, 2002, p.23). 
A Participatory Budget in the ultimate analysis amounts to an effort to 
socialise an instrument of power that has in the past been exclusively in 
the hands of elite classes with the outcome that social exclusion from 
the public and political sphere is perpetuated. 
PB, then, can be seen as an instrument for and of the expansion of the political 
sphere when SMs were demanding an expansion and redefinition of the political 
sphere itself. PB was seen as a forum for political (not just administrative) decisions. 
The PT sought to 
share power with the movements from whence we came. … The PT did 
so by opening up the finances of the municipality to a transparent 
process of participatory decision-making through which local people 
had real power. (Wainwright, 2005, no pagination) 
An aspect of citizenship which was associated with PB and originated from the SMs 
was that of ‘critical consciousness’. ‘[T]he assemblies were a forum to discuss news 
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in order to foster the 'critical consciousness' prized by liberation theology 
activists’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p.98), which had a strong influence on many movements. 
PB was seen as a form of ‘citizenship school’ (Torres Ribeiroand Gracia, 2002) where 
the critical consciousness of the citizens could be raised: 
The Participatory Budget Trial, seen by some as a ‘Citizenship School,’ 
was the ultimate action by social movements in the 70s and 80s looking 
forward to achieving social control of the budget and the resulting 
allocation of public funds. (Torres Ribeiroand Gracia, 2002, p.15) 
‘'Citizenship School' is grounded in the idea of, amongst other things, ‘the right to 
own social subjects and their objectives’ (Torres Ribeiroand Gracia, 2002, p.64). It 
was in this context that PB was seen as a forum for discussion of the very meaning 
of citizenship. It was also a place to discuss the “how” and “why” of social 
problems (Baiocchi, 2005, p.102). 
Looking specifically at PB, Baiocchi (2005) argues that 
Community activists in Porto Alegre... are both militants and citizens. 
They consider themselves part of a broad movement for social justice, 
engaged in what they believe is a process of social transformation. 
However, in order to achieve substantive change, they act in civic and 
cooperative ways. They are engaged in their communities and believe 
they must both monitor local government and bring more citizens to 
participate. (ibid. p.4) 
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This focus on social justice and social transformation adds a distinctly political 
dimension to ‘citizen’ and ‘citizenship’; where participation is not simply the 
inclusion of more people within the existing political system and order, but is also 
about contesting and constructing the political system and order itself. This brings 
to the fore the inherently political nature of such participation, where social justice, 
the political system and the political order are not preordained. Baiocchi (2005) 
argues that the notion of citizenship at play here is one which blurs the distinction 
between ‘citizen’ and ‘militant’. The notion of citizenship which emerged from the 
SMs went beyond notions of citizenship, based on rights and duties, found within 
traditional conceptions of representative democracy.   
In this context ‘deep citizenship’ is based on political subjectivity developed out of 
the realisation of, and in the name of social justice, struggles against the prevailing 
social, economic and political environment. 'Thin citizenship’, on the other hand, is 
based on the inclusion of citizens in discussions about service provision priorities 
and implementation. In this ‘thin’ version citizens do not debate the origin or 
validity of the social, economic and political environment but discuss a specific 
project within a preordained and predetermined environment; discussion centres 
around issues of implementation based on preordained notions of social justice, 
social transformation, the political system and citizenship itself. Where ‘deep 
citizenship’ speaks to personal, social, political and economic transformation, ‘thin 
citizenship’ speaks to an inclusion in decisions and policies in a given social, 
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political and economic order and lacks any conception of the critical pedagogy that 
is embedded within ‘deep citizenship’. 
The next section explores the developments in the PT and PB which facilitated its 
non-partisan implementation by parties and groups across the political spectrum; 
this ranged from left-wing parties such as the PDT, through the PSDB of former 
president Fernando-Henrique Cardoso, to conservative parties such as the PFL and 
the PPB (Torres Ribeiroand Gracia, 2002, p.17). 
The section below explores this transition in relation to the changes that occurred 
in the PT, as it moved from a left wing political movement towards a political party 
advocating Third Way neoliberalism. 
1.5 PB and the PT  
The Workers Party (PT) was conceived, developed and grew as Brazil was 
undergoing a transition to democracy; a transition which began in 1973 (Keck, 
1992, p.1). In 2002 the PT won Brazil's second presidential election since the 
beginning of the transition. There were significant changes in the aims and 
structure of the party as well as the political and legal environment and the 
nature of civil society in which it existed during this time. The PT was affected 
by, but also contributed to, many of the environmental changes as well as the 
transition to democracy itself. This section explores how and why a party that 
seemed to offer so much hope to many in Brazil and a wider public, particularly 
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for those ‘on the left’, came to leave many disillusioned and dismayed. The rise 
of the PT attracted attention as it was seen as the start of a new era, the start of 
a new experiment in democracy, ‘presenting an alternative form of democracy, 
and an alternative form of socialism, a new experiment in Radical 
Democracy’ (Branford and Kucinski, 2005, p.23). Lula’s victory was seen as 
paving ‘the way for a new debate on the relationship between socialism and 
democracy, based on a real experiment in a big country’ (ibid. p.23). The PT 
articulated the need for an alternative to the global hegemony of 
neoliberalism. The Lula government broke ‘the bond at the heart of the original 
PT project - that of achieving social justice by building on the power of the 
popular movements to do so - … (as he failed) to turn his electoral mandate 
and huge international support into a democratic counter force to drive a hard 
bargain with the IMF’ (Wainwright, 2005, no pagination). Lula and his 
government were not strong enough to counter the political and economic 
orthodoxy of the IFIs. Over time, the PT settled into the very political and 
economic orthodoxy of neoliberalism which it originally sought to challenge, to 
the extent that decentralisation in all its forms including PB became used as a 
strategy for the deregulation of public services (Torres Ribeiroand Gracia, 2002, 
p.47). Lula himself became an advocate of the Third Way. This shift was in part 
due to the PT's transitions from SM to political party and then from a political 
party to the ruling political party, and to the alliances it had to form in order to 
gain electoral success. The drive to build a PT political party, as opposed to a 
PT SM, and the drive to gain electoral success resulted in the closing down of 
 56
‘the mechanisms linking the party to the social movements and therefore 
act ing as a pol i t ical channel for their expectat ions and their 
pressure’ (Wainwright, 2005, no pagination). 
The Workers Party was formed in 1980 and in 2002 its candidate, Lula de Silva, was 
elected to presidential office. 'With Lula’s victory the PT completed the cycle: all 
leading Brazilian parties have now been in both the opposition and the 
government in the period since the country returned to democracy in 
1985' (Hunter, 2008, p.16). The Party had been a beacon of hope for many on the 
Left, both domestically and internationally, and for a varied and larger audience in 
Brazil (Wainwright, 2005). It had also been perceived as a dangerous threat, 
internationally and domestically. Fear spread across the international financial 
markets in 2002 over the possible election of Lula, causing the currency to drop 
almost 50% in just a few months (Schwartzman,2003, p.3); foreign investment fled, 
interest rates climbed, the Real dropped and long-term debt papers became short-
term debt papers as the possibility of default grew (Schwartzman, 2003, p.3). 
'Investment banks including Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and Merrill Lynch began 
downgrading their ratings of Brazil early in May' (Burbach, 2002). Whether this is 
seen as a good or bad thing, a success or failure, depends largely on who is 
speaking and their particular areas of concern and interest. 
The PT has received worldwide attention both from the academic community and 
the wider public and has been cast as an anomaly. As the Left was experiencing a 
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crisis theoretically and in practice, particularly post-1989, the PT continued, with 
occasional and sometimes significant hiccoughs, to grow both in numbers and in 
strength. It was not alone though: ‘While Socialism declined in the West during the 
final decades of the twentieth century, the Brazilian left created three new forms of 
popular organization that took the left by surprise in other countries........ the 
Workers Party - Partido Trabalhadores (PT)........Central Unica dos Trabalhadores 
(CUT) and.....Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST)’ (Branford and 
Kucinski, 2005, p.21). The rise in unemployment in the late 1990s led to loss of 
influence of CUT and loss of ideological ground to Marxist parties like the PCdoB 
and the PSTU, the latter later joining the PT and the former remaining ‘the 
dominant force among left-wing students’ (ibid., 2005, p.26). 
The PT stood out in a context where many on the Left displayed an inability to 
move beyond traditional economic reductionism. A failure to appreciate the 
antagonism ever present in social relations and the interplay between power, 
conflict and democracy stymied the overall project of many on the Left. In contrast 
to this, the early PT can be seen as a form of post-Marxist movement which moved 
beyond traditional economic reductionism and fully appreciated the multiplicity of 
struggles, the inherently conflictual nature of social and political relations and the 
centrality of power. In this vein the PT advocated a form of socialism radically 
different to traditional conceptions; under this conception, socialism and 
democracy were not just compatible but necessitated each other. For the PT there 
was no democracy without socialism and no socialism without democracy. The PT 
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understood democracy as a process without an end rather than as the end of a 
process itself. 
In contrast with many traditional conceptions of socialism the PT recognised the 
inability of a movement or party to ‘'organically' reflect the wishes of social 
movements’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.47). The PT sought to be a party 
which did not dictate to its members but rather one where the workers had voices 
that were heard. PB served as an interface for the mediation of demands made by 
administrators both PT and non PT (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.47). The 
pioneering trail of PB in Porto Alegre was adopted as official party policy by the 
Workers’ Party’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002) 
  
[T]he Participatory Budget, with its potential for bringing together 
long-standing popular demands for change, constitutes a project for 
transforming relations between government and society, whose 
strongest political party advocate is the PT…. 
The Participatory Budget reflects the popular movements’ need for a 
political platform, especially within the Workers’ Party (PT)…. [T]he 
Participatory Budget stands for the tangible expression, in quite a 
visible form, of the commitments made by this party to democratic and 
popular management. It should also be remembered that there have 
been links between the political culture of this party and the demands 
of social movements ever since the 1970s and 1980s. (Torres Ribeiro 
and Gracia, 2002, p.61) 
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The PT was one of the most prominent SMs that became a political party with the 
ability to bring together many diverse sections of society variously associated with 
different SMs. It also championed PB. Initially the PT was aligned with the demands 
of the social movements out of which the PB grew, but over time the aims and 
ideology of the PT moved further and further away from the demands of the 1970s 
and 1980s SMs. The PT continued to champion PB after its alignment with the 
demands of the social movements ceased. As the nature of the PT changed so too 
did the nature and use of the tool PB. 
In its early day the PT took the form of a social movement rather than a political 
party. It was not alone in its calls for participation and other SMs were also 
influential in the rise of PB. Although it would become more of a top-down process, 
initially calls for PB came from outside the mainstream political arena and 
represented a bottom-up form of participation. 
‘In Porto Alegre, activists from neighborhood associations started demanding 
direct input into the city budget in 1985. Through a process of trial and error, 
participatory budgeting evolved into a year-long cycle of meetings that allow 
participants to decide on projects in their own neighborhoods as well as for the city 
as a whole’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.3). 
The SMs of Brazil were plural and diverse in nature. They did not hold the same, or 
necessarily compatible, demands; nevertheless they shared some common 
contentions, and most significantly a common adversary, and this served to form a 
bond between the groups. The military regime was seen as the embodiment of 
many of the struggles these SMs faced. With the fall of the military regime, this 
shared adversary disappeared; as a result the bond between the groups and the 
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focus of their individual struggles weakened. The PT brought together many 
movements but crucially they all maintained their autonomy. The PT, at least 
initially, was able to act as an umbrella organisation for the many struggles 
represented in the SMs. One illustration of the PT's innovative politics was its 
relationship, historically, with the MST landless movement - a movement that 
occupies the large estate lands of the rich and then tries to use it for co-operative 
agriculture. The PT both critically supported this movement and was supported by 
it, while at the same time respecting its autonomy. 
In addition to the fall of the military regime the PT faced another challenge in terms 
of its ability to represent either the demands of individual SMs or the collective 
demands of the SMs. The PT initially acquired power at the mayoral level, it then 
moved up the various levels of government before becoming the ruling party in 
2002. The bond created by common opposition to a powerful regime, linking the 
PT to other SMs, was fundamentally challenged as the PT acquired more powers 
and became the regime. The specifics of this and other changes to the position of 
the PT is explored in more detail below. 
Prior to election in 2002, Lula was promising an alternative to neoliberalism and his 
party had a tradition of close ties to social movements who also positioned 
themselves against neoliberalism, such as the MST (Petras, 1997; Martins, 2000). 
The PT was committed to challenging the corrupt, clientelistic and hierarchical 
culture in Brazil and tackling inequality. PBs were one of the main instruments used 
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to address these issues.  ‘[F]or the PT, participation means empowering the poor to 
become aware of inequalities and injustices (political consciousness raising), and to 
reform the political and social systems through collective action’ (Souza, 2001, p.
174). This can be contrasted with ‘the multilateral community (where for many), 
participation is a way of transforming unorganized people into members of a civil 
society that can help provision of public services. This latter view also stresses 
short-term 'results', both in scope and time, rather than long-term changes’ (ibid., 
p.174) associated with the developing of critical consciousness, claiming political 
subjectivity and the fostering of a participatory culture. The PT held a vision of 
participation as a process of transformation as opposed to the inclusion of a 
greater number of people. 
The PT emerged in the wake of a series of major strikes in the late 1970s which 
mortally wounded the military dictatorship. In 1977 Lula led the ABC metalworkers' 
campaign for increased wages and other benefits. Continued discontent led to 
strikes the following May, Lula’s participation in which led to his brief imprisonment. 
It was in December 1978 that the first serious discussions about the formation of a 
workers' political party were held at a meeting convened by Lula. On January 9th 
1979, the Metal Workers' Congress approved a proposal ‘calling on all Brazilian 
workers to unite to build a party, the Workers Party’. The proposal for the PT was 
officially launched at a congress of the Sao Paulo metalworkers in Linz in January 
1979. On May Day of the same year, the PT circulated the Workers Party Charter: 
PTs Charter of Principles 1979 'Democracy means organized and conscious 
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participation by workers' (Agência PT de Notícias n.d.). On February 10th 1980 
1200 people met at Sion College in Sao Paulo and took the first steps towards 
formally creating the PT. 'The formal foundation of the PT took place in Sao Paulo 
in February 1980 at a meeting of 300 people in an auditorium of the journalists 
union named after the murdered Vladimir Herzog' (Manifesto, Approved by Motion 
Pro-PT, on February 10, 1980, in Zion School (SP), and published in the Official 
Gazette of 21 October 1980). 
The PT was somewhat of an anomaly both in terms of its structure, ideology and 
the international and domestic environment in which it came into being and 
developed. The PT understood democracy and politics as processes rather than 
defined trajectories with a specific end point.  The context in which the PT was 
formed, grew and developed make it stand out and are also crucial to gaining a 
better understanding of the Party as it was then, the changes it underwent and the 
party it became. Its internal structure, ideology and ability to represent disparate 
groups without them losing their particularity also contributed to its anomalous 
status. 
It is supported by many Catholic activists, but defends equal rights for 
homosexuals and is willing to consider the legalisation of abortion. It is 
a mass party, operating openly, yet it is structured like a Leninist party, 
with a central committee and strict rules about adherence to party 
decisions (although in practice these rules are often broken). At the 
same time, and even more paradoxically, it allowed the existence of 
organised tendencies within the party. Its supporters were active 
 63
members, and often leaders, of the many social movements in Brazil. 
However, the movements are not affiliated with the party and often 
clash with elected PT local authorities. (Branford and Kucinski, 2005, 
p29)  
The PT is an example of a particular party with this ideology and the PBs are an 
example of their way of governing at a practical level; allowing these disparate 
groups to be brought together in a forum, and allowing the differing demands and 
claims of the groups to be heard. 
Differing, often competing claims, were to be recognised and discussed in the 
forum created by PB. The forum held ‘the good of the city’ as its overall objective 
(Baiocchi, 2005) but the nature of ‘the good’ was not preordained by the PT or any 
other group. This aspect of PB reflects the PT's understanding of the multiplicity of 
struggles and the inability of any one group to represent them all. The lack of one 
concrete view as to what constituted ‘the good’ is what enabled the articulation of 
differing and competing claims. The PB was, however, also an intensely practical 
forum where decisions had to be, and indeed were, made with regard to budget 
allocation for projects seen to be good for the city. Given the diversity of groups 
and claims within the PB forum, competing claims were not always reconcilable (Y. 
Cabannes, 2013, pers. comm., May 9th). In order for a decision to be made by so 
many competing groups some form of consensus had to be reached. However, the 
nature of the consensus developed in the PB forum was ‘temporary, fragile and 
pragmatic’(Y. Cabannes, 2013, pers. comm., May 9th). The nature of PB as a 
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process where at the end of each cycle decisions and priorities can be revisited 
meant that no consensus on them was final. Groups and individuals whose claims 
and demands had not been met within one round of PB could re-articulate them in 
another. As a place for activists and movements to meet and articulate their claims, 
the PBs were also a place where new relationships and alliances could be forged; 
marginalised groups could find common ground with one another and thereby 
strengthen their claims (Baiocchi, 2005). 
The PT not only proposed a different structure and ideology from dominant parties 
in Brazil but was itself organised and committed to this different structure. This was 
an anomaly in Brazil where parties and politics had been characterised by 
corruption, clientelism, hierarchy, and exclusion. The PT was unique in Brazil not 
only in terms of ideology but also in terms of structure. 
Democratic vocation of the PT, however, goes beyond political 
affiliations who defended and advocates. Also the internal organization 
expresses our commitment to libertarian. She reflects the commitment, 
always renewed, the directions of military bases to make itself PT a free 
society and participatory premise that other, bigger, we want institute in 
the country. Refractory monolithic and verticalism of traditional parties - 
including many associations of the left - the PT strives to practice 
democracy at home and precondition for democratic behaviour in 
society and in the exercise of political power. The same goes for the 
relationship between the party and its social bases and the society as a 
whole. Although he was born by the force of movement union and 
popular and they hold a powerful bond of inspiration, and reference 
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dialogue, seeking to offer them a political direction, the PT refuses, on 
principle, the stifle their autonomy and, moreover, to treat them as 
customers or belt drive.  
(Socialism Petista is part of the resolution adopted at the 7th National 
Meeting, held between May 31 and June 3, 1990 at the Palace of 
Convention Hall, in Sao Paulo, and reaffirmed the 2nd Congress, held 
in Belo Horizonte, between 24 and 28 November 1999.) 
Some of the support that the PT gained can be attributed as much to the way in 
which they organised their own party as to their higher ideological aspirations. 
They promoted and demonstrated honesty, commitment (with parliamentarians 
contributing up to one-third of their salaries to the party coffers), transparency, and 
anti clientelistic politics. These characteristics made the PT an anomaly in Brazilian 
politics at the time. ‘Scholars of the country’s notoriously weak party system 
regularly noted the PT’s outlier status as virtually the only ideologically driven, 
internally democratic, and disciplined party’ (Goldfrank and Wampler, 2008, p.246). 
This section will focus on the relationship between the PT and the budgets,  it also 
looks at some of the changes that took place as a result of the PTs success. ‘The PT 
was reelected in 1992, with OP as its 'central axis' of government’ (Baiocchi, 2005, 
p. 40). Once the PT started winning struggles and assuming greater power it 
became harder for it to fulfill the uniting role that so often took a negative form i.e. 
anti-neoliberalism or anti-the-past and current regimes. It became the regime and 
as it did so it also seemed to become less opposed to neoliberalism in its policies if 
not in its rhetoric. 
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Lula and the PT faced pressure both internationally and domestically from both the 
left and the right. Although coming into power has undoubtedly increased these 
pressures and created new ones, taking office is not the only reason or explanation 
for changes within the PT and its relationship with others. There is a much longer 
history which must be taken into account. Only by looking at this history can we 
begin to understand changes to the PT and avoid the trap of analysing, and 
putting hope in, a party that no longer exists as it did at its formation. To assume 
nothing has changed is to misunderstand the party. The PT’s relationship with 
'social movements and their struggle; the internal structure of the party and the 
compositions of delegates to its Party Congress; and both its programme and its 
political alliances' have all undergone significant changes in the last twenty years 
(Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003, p.8). The PT began to display signs of neoliberal 
orthodoxy in its economic policy since winning the presidency. It is possible, 
however, to trace the roots of this to the history of the PT; in particular in its policy 
on alliance formation, its swing from ideological purism to a more tactical and 
pragmatic line and its move to a more “middle ground”. ‘The PT’s fall from grace is 
best explained by the political institutional pressures that induced party leaders to 
change their strategies, by national and international markets that provided a 
limited range of options, and by intra-party conflicts regarding the strategies that 
should be utilized to govern effectively’ (Goldfrank and Wampler, 2008, p.246). 
Acknowledging all of these, the focus here is on the changes in the nature of the 
party as a result of changes in strategy aimed at party building and electoral 
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success rather than ideology. This includes reflecting on the associated move 
towards a middle ground as the PT became increasingly unable to umbrella intra 
and extra party conflicts, and the fiscal restraints of economic orthodoxy to which 
the PT ultimately adhered. 
The early PT could be labeled a socialist project, however it was also a democratic 
project and did not follow the traditional authoritarian socialist model.. Their 
manifesto and other early documents talk of socialisation of democracy rather than 
socialism per se. Their own documents reveal a view of democracy as a process 
rather than an endpoint where there is no space for ‘the good’ or a model society. 
An aim of the PT was, and still is, to ‘radicalize democracy’ versus the dominant 
world hegemonic project to ‘deepen democracy’ (i.e. a transformation of the 
political order versus a deepening of existing channels, systems and procedures), 
their aim being an inclusion of the marginalised in an active way, politicising them. 
This was deemed possible only through a restructuring of power relations. The PBs 
and their focus on the ownership of resources were part of the PT’s project to 
radicalize democracy. As a party the early PT had two explicit goals; 1) an inversion 
of priorities and 2) popular participation. PB was one of the main ways in which 
these goals were to be achieved. 
When the PT first formed over twenty years ago, it did so against a backdrop of 
military rule, strikes and oil shocks. During this time the PT had close ties with social 
movements and a deep involvement in social and class struggles (Petras and 
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Veltmeyer 2004, p.8); this included links with trade unions, Catholic organisations 
'and many other parts of the vibrant Brazilian civil society' (Teivainen, 2002, p.624), 
such as Trotskyists, Leninists and Marxists. It aimed to design and implement a 
democratic socialist alternative (Nylen, 2000, p.126). It sought a new form of 
socialism, radically different from the Soviet model, which 'would preserve diversity, 
civil liberties and tolerance' (Abers, 1999, p.68). 'The PT strategy is to mobilise the 
population through the participatory democracy process, not simply to create a 
more active citizenship or to achieve a fairer distribution of social goods, but to 
create a counter-hegemonic force capable of confronting the federal government 
and the capitalist state' (Hatcher, 2002, no pagination). The PT provided a home for 
many activists and intellectuals including 'Mario Pedrosa 'Brazil’s best known art 
critic and the leading Trotskyist theoretician. Antonio Candido a famous literary 
critic; and Paulo Freire who developed pedagogy of liberation' (Branford and 
Kucinski ,2005, p.35). As a ‘new left’ party they faced challenges from the 
traditional Left in Brazil, e.g. PCB and PCdoB who challenged their claim to speak 
for the Workers.  
In the context of ‘‘Partido Trabalhadores’ / ‘Workers Party’ - what does ‘worker’ 
mean? It is not just Marxist reductionism, limiting it to an economic class, but rather 
post-Marxist as it incorporates a wide variety of social struggles, and the various 
struggles do not lose their particularity but rather form a common bond as anti- the 
current regime. This can be seen at the level of official PT doctrine (which remained 
loose enough for associated groups to maintain their particular demands and 
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identities) and in their active attempts to form alliances with student bodies and 
Amnesty groups, for example. The PT and various other actors, including various 
leftist activists and social movements, deny economic determinism and class 
reductionism, recognising the multitude of non economic struggles. ‘So came the 
proposal of the Workers Party. The PT is born of the decision of the exploited to 
combat an economic and political system that cannot resolve their problems 
because it exists only to benefit a privileged few. For a mass party’ (PT Manifesto 
1980.) Initially, the PT was certainly looking for an alternative to the existing 
political and economic regime in Brazil at the time. The successful attempts at 
getting the disparate groups, their members and followers, to recognise the city as 
a whole rather than being limited to their particular demands was crucial to the 
success of the PBs (Baiocchi, 2006). Once in power, though, it could no longer 
create a support base around being against the regime as it became the regime. 
When the PT was founded it was deeply involved with a variety of social 
movements and their struggles, however as time went on, and it became an 
electoral party, both its interest and support for these causes decreased. The PT, as 
the party in power, merely pay lip service to these issues and struggles while they 
focus on working through institutional channels and forging alliances with the 
bourgeoisie and elite sections of society, in order to consolidate their position as an 
electoral party (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003, p.9). The composition of the PT has 
also changed; by the 1990s the majority of the party was made up of professionals 
and middle and lower class employees (Petras and Veltmeyer,2003, p.9). 'The right 
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turn of the PT at the national level was preceded by a similar pattern at the state 
and municipal level during the decade of the 1990s' (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003, 
p.9). There is a history of discussion within the PT about its relationship with social 
movements. Although it does not endorse its political agenda, it shares similar 
roots and some ideology with the largest movement in Brazil, the MST. The PT did 
consider forming stronger links with social movements in order to gain more 
support and form a bloc capable of challenging neoliberal political hegemony after 
Lula’s defeat in 1998 but ultimately decided against this and actually distanced 
itself from social movements (Branford and Kucinski, 2005, pp.53-54), seeking ‘to 
win over the centre of the political spectrum and to avoid alienating conservatives’ 
and controversially formed an alliance with the Liberal Party (ibid.). It was not 
possible for the PT to become more strategic without impacting on its ideology. 
‘Recognizing the party’s extreme disadvantage in campaign finance, and thus in 
elections generally, the dominant faction’s leaders began moderating the PT’s 
rhetoric and policies in order to attract campaign contributions both on and off the 
books, first at the local level in select cities, and later at the national 
level’ (Goldfrank and Wampler, 2008, p.263). This not only diluted the ideological 
imperatives of the early PT but also by seeking ‘off the books’ finance it betrayed 
the party’s commitment to address the corrupt nature of Brazilian politics. The 
party, heralded as both exhibiting and promoting honest, open, transparent 
politics, devoid of clientelism and corruption, was already falling prey to the 
traditional modes of Brazilian politics it had once so vociferously denounced. These 
issues continued and, particularly during the second term, saw the PT besmirched 
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by scandals of corruption and bribery (Goldfrank and Wampler, 2008). ‘The PT had 
established Brazil's first mass political party according to its own ethics of popular 
democracy, but after the disappointment of 1994 - and even more so of 1998 - it 
accepted the rules of Brazil's corrupt political system’ (Wainwright 2005 np). In 
order to build a broad base of support the Party had to dilute its rhetoric, and in 
order to run successful election campaigns it required greater financial support. In 
response to these demands the Party’s ideological purity gave way to pragmatism, 
and the PT began to operate within the corrupt systems it had previously so 
vehemently decried. 
The PT had to change, develop and adopt a more practical approach, as the failure 
of the PT orthodoxy in Fortaleza and elsewhere demonstrates  (Nylen, 1997, p.9
425). Radical Leninist sloganeering alone could not be the basis for a political party 
or for effective reform. The PT can be seen to have two distinctive phases prior to 
gaining office; the movement-building phase from their conception to 1985 and 
the party building phase post-1985 (Nylen, 2000). During the party building phase 
differences in ideology became more prominent (Nylen, 1997, p.436). By the time 
of the formation of a heterodox PT in 1992/1993 there were already concerns that 
the party would fall prey to 'electoralism and bourgeois reformism' (Nylen, 1997). 
The PT’s original model of governance was different from both left-wing Leninist 
styles of governance and right-wing neoliberal styles of governance and ideology. 
The PT not only aimed for democratic elections but also sought a democratisation 
 Early in 1988 the party in Fortaleza expelled its more orthodox members but still lost the election 9
later that year (Nylen, 2000)
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of the economy and for participation and citizenship to extend beyond decisions to 
the deliberation process (Nylen, 2000; Abers, 1998). Making the state both 
participatory and redistributive requires the mobilisation of the poor and 
unorganised, bureaucracy must become more flexible and responsive and 
widespread political support must be gained (Abers, 1998). In addition to increased 
participation, core policy included targeting public policy to favour the poor, taxing 
higher income groups (Abers, 1998) and opposing neoliberal privatisation policies. 
'Non-Marxist socialism was the essence of PT heterodoxy' (Nylen, 2000, p.426). 
However, Lula’s privatisation, decentralisation, and prevention of subsidies and 
protection, along with free trade policies and commitments to debt repayment 
(leaving little budget left for either agrarian or social reform), suggest the PT is 
moving closer and closer to neoliberal ideals. 
Lula's government pushed through neoliberal reforms of which Tony 
Blair would be proud. These included the reform - effectively partial 
privatisation - of an extremely unequal public pensions system, which 
nevertheless left the inequalities almost untouched; and amending 
Brazil's relatively radical, albeit contradictory, 1988 constitution to 
facilitate the creation of an independent bank with the freedom to raise 
interest rates as high as it wants. (Wainwright, 2005, no pagination) 
Even the social policies and projects for poverty alleviation that Lula did introduce, 
for example Fome Zero and Bolsa Família, struggled with issues of poor 
implementation, ‘inadequate monitoring, clientelism, weak accountability and 
alleged political bias’ (Hall, 2006, p.689). 
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In order to acquire and retain power it seems that a party must appease and 
appeal to the powerful and elite, nationally and internationally. 'There have been 
sharp centrist or rightward turns by the PSDB and PT precisely at the moments at 
which they took the reins of Government' (Power, 2008, p.101) 'Alliance politics is 
both the cause and the consequence of ideological convergence' (ibid p.102). 
Initially, the PT was very reluctant to form alliances, but its attitude to forming 
alliances changed as the party evolved. Crucially, there was a major shift in the type 
of organisations and people the PT formed alliances with, and the ideologies that 
these groups represented. 'The most that can be said is that Political activists 
increasingly believe that they must ally with former enemies in order to achieve 
governability in the Brazilian journalistic sense, that is in order to pass legislation of 
interest to the executive' (Power, 2008, p.102). Once in power, unless they initiate 
an authoritarian style dictatorship, the policies they are able to implement will 
again be limited to those which appeal to the elite and powerful. In 2002, Lula did 
not have enough support in either the Chamber or the Senate to pass legislation 
without acquiring ideological support from sympathetic members of the PSDB and 
the PMDB (Hunter, 2003, p.153). In order to get into office, the party had to 
compromise  their left wing ideology, once in office they had to continue to do this 
or be left stranded and unable to pass any legislation or reform due to lack of 
support. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that in 2002, of the 27 states in 
Brazil, only 3 of them had PT governors while 12 of them were either PSDB or 
PMDB (Hunter, 2003, p.154). Without the support of these other two parties, Lula 
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would find it extremely difficult to implement any reforms. Reforms which alter the 
structure of power within a society, enabling further social reform, would be almost 
impossible to implement without force. Many policies are created with a rhetoric 
that appeals to the masses but which in actuality only furthers the interests of the 
few. 
The PBs had to appeal to the interests of more than ‘just’ the poor in order to gain 
support and success for their policies, in much the same way as the PT have had to 
do at both a national and, subsequent to Lula taking office, international level. A 
combination of forming alliances with other groups possessing differing ideologies 
and agendas, and a diluting of policy objectives so as to make them more 
appealing to a broader base, accounts for the increased support shown for both 
the PT and the PBs. Over time, both the PT and the PB became less associated 
with socialism and radicalising democracy. Today many see Lula as one of the 
leading proponents of the Third Way and the PBs as a way to achieve good 
governance. The good governance agenda  can be seen as having eight 10
fundamental characteristics: it ‘is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, 
transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows 
the rule of law’ (ESCAP, 2009, no pagination). Good governance is a system or 
technique for decision making and policy implementation and focuses primarily on 
institutions. It displays a strong concern for the efficient running of a political 
system and efficiency in general. There is a conspicuous absence of analysis or 
 The term ‘good governance’ has been used by many in various ways but this serves as a basic 10
guide to the concept. ‘Good governance’ is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
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consideration of power, and great concern for stability and management 
techniques. Participation, seen through the lens of good governance, is devoid of 
early PT conceptions of participation which entailed the politicising of citizens and 
the development of a critical consciousness. The good governance agenda speaks 
to criteria for the development of formal institutions rather than the development 
of a forum or space for political debate. 
After winning the presidential elections, Lula attended conferences in London 
celebrating the ‘The Third Way’ and gave speeches about taking the middle road. 
Conspicuously absent from the PT’s 2002 official platform were the words socialism 
or socialist (Hunter, 2003, p.153). International and domestic pressures had forced 
the PT to move to the middle if they were to ensure electoral victory. Lula sent 
messages to the international community signifying fiscal responsibility by 
promising to reduce inflation and to maintain debt repayments and also made links 
with Brazil’s right wing Liberal party (PL). Below is an extract from a speech Lula 
gave that was reported in Reuters December 11th 2006 showing just how much he 
had moved towards the middle ground and the Third Way. 
Today I’m a friend of Delfim Netto (finance minister of the 1964-1985 
military regime) I spent 20 odd years criticising Delfim Netto and now 
he is my friend and I am his friend. Why am I saying this? Because I 
think this is the evolution of the human species. Those on the right are 
moving towards the centre. Those on the left are becoming more social 
democratic leftist. These things blend together according to the 
amount of grey hair on your head, according to the responsibility that 
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you have. There is no other way. If you meet an elderly person who is 
leftist, it’s because he’s got problems. If you happen to meet a very 
young person who is right wing, he’s got problems too. When we hit 60 
years of age, that’s the point of equilibrium because we are neither one 
nor the other, we transform ourselves by taking the middle road, that’s 
the road that must be followed by society. (Lula, 2006, cited in, 
Kingstone and Power, 2009, p.82) 
This is a long way from the Leninist sloganeering and post-Marxist and Gramsci-
informed ideology associated with the early PT. Ultimately ‘Brazil has transformed 
the PT more than the PT has transformed Brazil’ (Goldfrank and Wampler, 2008, p.
266). 
The Party of 1980 was certainly not the one elected to power in 2002. 'Like 
Cardoso before him, Lula chose to ally with conservative parties in congress and 
went on to implement an economic agenda so orthodox that his presidency was 
dubbed Cardoso’s third term' (Power, 2008, p.82). Although there has been some 
significant continuity there has also been much change. ‘In its early years, the PT’s 
political action resembled that of a radical social movement demanding the end of 
capitalism and the establishment of socialism. Its slogan in 1980 was 'The party 
without bosses.' But in 2002 the PT chose one of Brazil’s biggest capitalists, textile 
magnet José Alencar, as Lula’s vice-presidential running mate.......’ (Flynn, 2002, no 
pagination). Representing a wide variety of groups is not the same as forming 
alliances. The PT became much more strategic in its aims. ‘[C]oncepts such as 
‘social pact’ were an anathema at the birth of the Workers Party in 1980, Lula 
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explicitly asked for the support of the ruling elites during his campaign.......and he 
proposed the formation of .....a pact between workers and employers, so that the 
country’s problems could be solved consensually’ (Branford and Kucinski, 2005, p.
22). During the 1980s the PT was more radical, but during the 1990s it became 
more social democratic in character. The party began a process of normalisation in 
the second half of the 1990s and Lula’s race for the Presidency in 2002 accelerated 
this trend (Hunter, 2008, p.17). 'The Party broke with the past and publicly 
acknowledged the benefits of adapting to international market trends. This first 
occurred with Lula’s third run of the Presidency in 1998, and became even clearer in 
the 2002 campaign.’’ (Keck, 1992, p.24). This is in stark contrast to the early anti-
capitalist statements of the early PT. 
This commitment to root democracy in capitalist also made - so as the 
option described capitalist unequivocally our democratic struggle. One 
most powerful stimulus to our organization as a political party having an 
alternative project of government and power, was the discovery (for 
most of the PT, before empirical than theoretical) of structural perversity 
of capitalism. We were, and we being, angry response to the 
unnecessary suffering of millions, a logical consequence of capitalist 
barbarity. The concrete historical experience - in other words, the 
pedagogy negative Brazilian miracle and so many other tragic 
examples of situations life national and international - has taught us 
that capitalism whatever its material power, vocationally is inequitable 
and unjust, by nature averse to that fraternal sharing of social wealth, 
which is a prerequisite of any genuine democracy. It is the capitalist 
oppression that results in absolute poverty by more than one-third of 
humanity. Is that it imposes on the American new forms of enslavement, 
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which reduced the income per capita at 6.5% in recent years, making 
many countries regress to levels of twenty years ago. It is the capitalist 
system is based, ultimately, the exploitation of man and the brutal 
commodification of human life, responsible for heinous crimes against 
democracy and human rights, the crematoria of Hitler to the recent 
genocide in South Africa, through our notorious torture chambers. Is 
Brazilian capitalism, with its predatory dynamics, responsible for the 
starvation of millions, by illiteracy, marginalization, violence that spreads 
by all plans of national life. It is capitalism that maintains and deepens 
the real basis of inequality office in Brazil. Therefore, the incorporation 
of PT - Manifesto and Program of the Foundation -- have advocated the 
overcoming of capitalism as essential to the full democratization of 
Brazilian life. Even though larger ones do not deepen the internal 
design of clearly socialist. And the ten years that followed, the painful, 
but passionate fight democratic, just made our choice to confirm and 
enlarge the capitalist commitments transformers PT. 
(Socialism Petista is part of the resolution adopted at the 7th National 
Meeting, held between May 31 and June 3, 1990 at the Palace of 
Convention Hall, in Sao Paulo, and reaffirmed the 2nd Congress, held 
in Belo Horizonte, between 24 and 28 November 1999.) 
As the PT developed so did the purpose to which PB was put. Originally, PB was 
both an institutional process and a deeply political forum. Over time, the 
institutional process remained but the associated expansion of the political sphere 
that the forum of PB engendered became less prominent. The forum of PB was tied 
to explicitly political claims; the creation of new political subjects, the development 
and ownership of political subjectivity acquired through the development of critical 
consciousness, the multiplicity of struggles and the necessity that they be heard. As 
the PT relinquished these claims, PB as a forum ceased to exist. The institution 
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remained and with it some of the original goals, namely to tackle corruption and 
clientelism and to enhance transparency and accountability. These goals were in 
keeping with the overall projects of the IFIs and Third Way governments like those 
of Blair and Clinton. The Lula ‘government had moved from a supposedly tactical 
acceptance of the IMF terms to a wholehearted acceptance of neoliberal 
orthodoxy’ (Wainwright, 2005, no pagination). The radical democratic, socialist and 
Freirean-type ‘school of citizenship’ aspirations that would have challenged many 
of the assumptions of IFIs and Third Way forms of government disappeared from 
PT rhetoric and policy. PB was one of the PTs most prominent policy initiatives and 
it too became a less political and more pragmatic tool. 
There are a variety of claims and projects which aim to be counter hegemonic. The 
grander projects and claims tend to be somewhat utopian and include projects to 
overthrow the neoliberal capitalist order and realise a different form of democracy, 
more often than not this is some form of  socialist democracy. These projects tend 
to assume a universal project, an anti capitalist project, and false homogeneity of 
struggles; they fail to acknowledge the multiplicity of struggles highlighted by post 
Marxist approaches. The lesser projects and claims are not only more practical but 
are also theoretically more coherent. They display a more nuanced understanding 
of the nature of the hegemonic struggle. Attempting to endow initiatives like PB 
with the potential to overthrow neoliberal capitalism is to set them up as straw 
men. To demand that PB (or any form of formal civic engagement) be capable of 
directly challenging the dominant hegemony misunderstands the dynamic nature 
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of the hegemonic struggle. Placing unrealistic expectations on formal civic 
engagement suggests a utopian formulation which fails to acknowledge that 
counter hegemonic projects are necessarily multi headed. Misunderstandings 
pertaining to hegemonic nature arise from the failure to acknowledge its dynamic 
relation, one of co constitution, that exists between hegemony and counter 
hegemony; this and an assumed false homogeneity with regard to counter 
hegemonic claims/projects. Once this dynamic, heterogenous nature is revealed 
and made explicit then PB can be variously transformative (counter hegemonic) 
and reinforcing of the status quo (dominant hegemony). Tarso Genro (a political 
theorist, leading member of the PT and a past mayor of Porto Alegre), an advocate 
of initiatives like PB, recognises their potential but also appreciates the limitations 
of initiatives like PB. His work focuses on the realisation of a socialist democracy. He 
is quite clear that the task of realising a socialist democracy is gargantuan and on a 
very different level to the operation of initiatives like PB. It would need to be a 
national if not international multi-faceted counter hegemonic struggle and 
necessitate an anti-capitalist strategy. 
There are lesser counter hegemonic projects and claims and it is here that 
initiatives like PB may have some transformative potential. This is not to suggest 
that PB alone could accomplish any of them simply that PB and initiatives like it 
may contribute towards them. These projects include attempts to: penetrate the 
State, democratise the State, create a non state public sphere and thereby move 
some power from the State to the citizenry. In these approaches PB would be one 
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of many non homogeneous molecular struggles. The question then is not whether 
PB itself reinforces the dominant hegemony or whether it is counter hegemonic but 
how, when and in which ways can it contribute to counter hegemonic struggles. 
This approach acknowledges the fluid, mutating, co-contaminating and co-
constitutive nature of hegemony and the hegemonic struggle. A PB process could 
be predominantly counter hegemonic in character and yet still exhibit aspects of 
hegemonic reinforcement. The co-constitutive nature of PB would hold that equally 
the reverse is also true, that is a PB process could be predominantly hegemonic in 
character and yet still exhibit transformative (counter hegemonic) aspects. 
   
During the late 1970s/early 1980s there was a development of a ‘new’ Left across 
Latin American; this was particularly strong and vibrant in Brazil (Couto, 2013). It 
rejected traditional Marxism and looked to marry socialism and democracy. It saw 
democratic reformism as a way of realising ‘real’ i.e. social and economic 
democracy rather than merely ‘formal’ i.e. political democracy. There were  many 
rich and vigorous debates about types of democracy and the types of institutions 
and social relations necessary to realise ‘real’ democracy (Couto, 2013). For some 
(Genro, Baierle, Santos) PB was viewed as an institution aimed at achieving a 
reconfiguration of state society power relations which could further the project for a 
real democracy; not that PB alone could achieve this but that it could contribute to 
a much larger multi faceted project. 
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The implementation of small local initiatives, like PB, became possible although 
further extensions were hindered by a lack of national initiatives and a lack of 
ambition for ‘real’ democracy at the national level (Baierle 2003). This happened for 
a variety of reasons including pragmatism, ideology and international environment; 
this limited the transformative potential of these initiatives shifting such potential 
away from any conflict that may arise between local and national initiatives and the 
ideologies that drove them (ibid). As such the extent to which PB was able to act so 
to further a project for ‘real’ democracy restricted to the local level.  
PB, and similar initiatives, viewed as an attempt to penetrate state power and thus 
democratise the state may be seen as partially successful. One strategy that sought 
to achieve this was the formation of a public policy which occurred in dialogue with 
the State. PB was viewed as an avenue for this dialogue between state and citizen 
because of its capacity to render local government budgetary decisions 
participatory. PB did form new relationships between the state and the citizenry 
and did foster new forms of civic engagement. Both PB and PT looked to transform 
these relationships by moving their relative sites of power, forming a new 
innovatory relationship between citizen and state, thus allowing citizens to act 
collectively as part of a non state public sphere. This transformation reduced the 
State from potential enemy to political object, one which could now be realistically 
democratised. The forming of new relationships between citizen and state required 
new institutions, both formal and informal. PB, as a formal institution, spoke to 
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disparate demands from a newly formed non state public sphere and, as a process, 
it brought them together. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced some of the factors that contributed to changes that PB 
underwent from its conception in the SMs of the 1970s and 1980s to its role as the 
PT’s ‘main axis of government’ (Baiocchi, 2006) as the political party in power. 
Acknowledging the importance of the new federal pact and the space created by 
the end of the authoritarian regime, this chapter’s main argument has been for an 
understanding of PB as a tool which in and of itself is relatively politically neutral; it 
makes a minimal political claim, namely that citizens be given some say in public 
budgets. The handling of PB by various groups reveals that other more potentially 
political claims associated with PB reside, not in the process itself, but rather in the 
hands of the implementers. In its more political manifestations, PB was not just an 
institutional process but was also an explicitly political forum. This political space is 
not intrinsic to the process of PB, but rather it develops out of specific 
understandings of citizenship and democracy which prize the development and 
ownership of political consciousness and the necessity of a forum which allows for 
the articulation of competing demands. This chapter has argued that both the 
changes in the PT and the transfer of PB into the hands of others are germane to 
the manifestation of PB and consequently what can, and cannot, be achieved by 
the process. PB’s association with SMs and the early manifestation of the PT can 
lead to a romanticised idea of both PB and its potential. The PT championed PB 
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and initially the PT was aligned with the demands from the SMs out of which the PB 
grew. These claims and demands spoke to a new political settlement and the 
creation of new political subjects which went beyond the minimal conditions 
necessary for traditional models of representative democracy; they related to forms 
of citizenship and civic engagement that went far beyond universal suffrage and 
regular free and fair elections. Over time, the aims and ideology of the PT moved 
further and further away from the demands of the SMs of the 1970s and 1980s. The 
PT continued to champion PB after its alignments with the demands of the SMs 
ceased. The hand of the PT changed and as a consequence so did the use and 
nature of its tool - PB. 
The extent to which any specific PB process was affected by these or other case-
specific factors cannot be assessed without an investigation of individual instances. 
This is due in part to the very context-sensitive nature of PB but also due to 
peculiarities of the socio-economic landscape of Brazil in general and the many 
varied areas it is composed of. Where this chapter has charted general 
developments in the advocacy of PB and the consequent impact this had on PB 
itself, the chapter on PB in the UK will focus on two specific cases and thereby 
afford a more specific and detailed analysis of the form of PB undertaken. The next 
chapter explores some of the changes that the PB process underwent in Brazil prior 
to its translation to other countries. It is particularly concerned with changes that 
rendered PB so attractive to a diverse set of actors. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Development of PB: Progress or Ossification? 
Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the environment in which PB emerged. This 
chapter focuses specifically on the PB process and its development. The problems 
associated with implementing policy and processes in different contexts have been 
well documented both generally and specifically with regard to PB. Here the focus 
is not so much on these factors but rather what made PB so attractive and also 
what constitutes success with regard to its implementation. Of late it has become 
more common to speak of policy and practice translation rather than diffusion or 
transfer or in terms of export and import. Newman and Tonkens (2011) illustrate the 
usefulness of thinking in terms of translation:  
[T]ranslation is emerging as a theoretical approach to understanding 
the flow of policy ideas across borders. The more usual concepts of 
policy transfer or diffusion tend to conceptualise policies as rather static 
objects that can move across boundaries without losing their 
coherence. The idea of translation, in contrast, focuses on the flows, 
processes and movements at stake in the process of policy 
development and learning. Attention shifts to the local settings in 
which ideas are translated, mediated and adapted (e.g. Czarniawska, 
and Sevon 2005; Lendvai and Stubbs 2007; Sahlin-Andersson and 
Engwall 2002). (ibid. pp.19-20)  
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Given one of the claims of this project is ‘context matters’ translation would seem a 
more useful concept than transfer or diffusion. This becomes even more apparent 
in subsequent chapters exploring PB in the UK and the specificity of the UK 
context. 
The translation of PB to different countries with radically different political, social 
and economic contexts will clearly impact upon the nature and consequences of 
the process. However, this chapter argues that the most fundamental changes to 
PB took place within Brazil, and that these changes facilitated its translation into 
other contexts. The factors affecting the success of PB have been widely 
researched and analysed and there remains much disagreement around this. 
However, the focus of this chapter is on the nature of success. What would 
constitute success for PB? PB grew out of demands for an alternative both to the 
traditional politics of Brazil and that of the prevailing political and economic 
orthodoxy of neoliberalism. This chapter asks what happened to PB that rendered 
it an attractive process for proponents of neoliberalism including the World Bank. 
By 2012 the biggest champion of PB was not the PT, but was instead the World 
Bank (Goldfrank, 2012). Unsurprisingly, this was due to a confluence of changes in 
neoliberalism as well as changes in PB. Neoliberalism took a participatory turn and 
PB went from a space or forum to a formal institution - a process. Many have 
addressed the consequences of translation. Here the attention is on what made PB 
ripe for such widespread translation. PB emanated from overtly political 
movements and demands which were radical and distinctly different from the 
 87
prevailing orthodoxy, and over time it became a politically neutral and politically 
malleable process. Tracing PB back to its origins in the SMs and contrasting this 
with later institutionalised and even constitutionalised models reveals that the 
development of PB maintained only some of the original aims and hopes of the 
SMs. 
This chapter starts by looking at how PB is generally understood today. It then 
briefly outlines the PB process in Porto Alegre, which came to serve as the 
exemplar of the process, before contrasting this with the demands, hopes and aims 
of the SMs detailed in the previous chapter. While the development of PB did 
realise some of the demands and aims of the SMs, ultimately these were only those 
in keeping with dominant models of representative democracy and neoliberalism 
as they shifted towards more participatory and social democratic forms, 
respectively. The more radical and alternative demands and aims remain unmet, 
and are generally no longer part of PB processes even in Brazil. 
This chapter concludes that the formalisation and translation of PB does represent 
some achievements in terms of the demands of the SMs. However, these 
achievements are eclipsed as formalisation and institutionalisation themselves, 
regardless of what form they take, preclude the realisation of core aspects of the 
more radical demands of the SMs. Ultimately, the more radical demands around 
the creation of new political subjects and a new political sphere are revealed to 
operate on a different logic from that on which formalised PB processes operate. 
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Formalised PB processes do offer new channels for civic engagement understood 
as including more people within an already existing sphere which at best broadens 
the sphere. Moreover, the more radical demands of the SMs were not about 
inclusion, but transformation; they spoke to a new or at least deeper sphere 
populated by new political subjects, and called for a new political space/forum/
arena populated by new political subjects. This is contrasted with PB as a process. 
2.1 PB Today 
PB has been widely praised, and is indeed today widely practiced, as one of the 
most empowering participatory innovations, no longer the preserve of left wing 
movements, parties and organisations. ‘To speak of Participatory Budgeting today 
is to speak of a seemingly infinitely malleable set of institutions that... continues to 
attract attention from actors on all ends of the political spectrum. It is to speak 
about an institution present in more than 1500 cities spread over five 
continents’ (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, p.1). It also bears another less noted but 
no less remarkable feature. PB, birthed by the SMs of the 1970s and 1980s in 
Brazil, arose from a space of contestation, but went on to become institutionalised 
and even constitutionalised in Brazil. Few formal institutions develop directly out of 
protest movements. 
Today PB is generally understood as a process, a policy instrument and a 
mechanism that affords citizen involvement in the allocation of public budgets. It 
has become a policy instrument able to meet a variety of political aims. As a policy 
instrument it has become the tool of local and national governments and global 
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institutions including the World Bank and UN Habitat. This indicates a significant 
shift from bottom up demands to top down policy implementation. There is no 
single definition of PB but a brief look at some of the definitions used by these 
adopters of PB reveals the extent to which PB has become a politically neutral and 
malleable process. 
World Bank, UN Habitat: the biggest advocate of PB today (Goldfrank, 2012) 
There is no single definition, because Participatory Budgeting differs 
greatly from one place to the next. [...] Nevertheless, in general terms, 
a Participatory Budget is 'a mechanism (or process) through which the 
population decides on, or contributes to decisions made on, the 
destination of all or part of the available public resources. 
(UN-Habitat, 2004, no pagination) 
PB Unit: the body responsible for importing PB to the UK, and who supported the 
public sector and community groups in developing participatory budgeting 
processes in the UK. 
Our agreed definition with the Department for Communities and Local 
Government is: 
Participatory budgeting directly involves local people in making 
decisions on the spending and priorities for a defined public budget. 
PB processes can be defined by geographical area (whether that’s 
neighbourhood or larger) or by theme. This means engaging residents 
and community groups representative of all parts of the community to 
discuss and vote on spending priorities, make spending proposals, and 
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vote on them, as well giving local people a role in the scrutiny and 
monitoring of the process and results to inform subsequent PB 
decisions on an annual or repeatable basis. 
(PB Unit, 2008, p.11) 
Participatory Budgeting Project: the main advocate of PB in the US 
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a different way to manage public money, 
and to engage people in government. It is a democratic process in 
which community members directly decide how to spend part of a 
public budget. It enables taxpayers to work with government to make 
the budget decisions that affect their lives. 
(Participatory Budgeting Project, n.d., no pagination) 
Participation Compass: an example of the plethora of tools, developed to provide 
practical information for those working to involve people, which appeared 
alongside the growing emphasis on participation. 
Participatory budgeting is an umbrella term which covers a variety of 
mechanisms that delegate power or influence over local budgets, 
investment priorities and economic spending to citizens. 
(Participation Compass n.d., no pagination) 
As previously noted, PB has been characterised as one of the most radical and 
empowering participatory initiatives currently being deployed (Fung and Wright, 
2001). Yet the definitions of PB today do not accord with the idea of PB explored in 
Chapter One. Chapter One explored the way in which PB became relatively 
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politically neutral which allowed, as the origins of the definitions above suggest, PB 
to be used as a policy instrument by a variety of actors. 
2.2 Porto Alegre - the Exemplar 
While there is no commonly agreed upon definition of PB independent of the 
various institutions that use it, there is a great deal of literature describing the 
various processes of PBs (Santos, 1993; Navarro, 1996; Fedozzi, 1997; Baierle, 
1998; Abers, 2000; Fischer and Moll, 2000; Souza, 2001; Wampler and Avritzer, 
2004, among others). The following discussion will outline the basic ideal features 
and processes of a PB cycle. This outline is based on literature which typically 
focuses on Porto Alegre PBs as the exemplar and uses Belo Horixonte and 
Fortalexa for comparisons.The illustration (Illustration 1) below demonstrates the 
various stages in the annual cycle of an ideal Brazilian PB process. 
Porto Alegre was both the birthplace of PB and also the city whose process, in its 
later, mature, more developed form, was generally accepted as being the 
exemplar, both within Brazil and with others from across the globe.  The Porto 
Alegre model’s ‘importance and influence on the global travel of PB is well 
accepted’ (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, p.2). While enjoying exemplar status, given 
the minimal and neutral definitions above, and the scope for variation they afford, 
the Porto Alegre model was often adopted piecemeal and transformed 
dramatically as it travelled across the globe. The wide variations in PB models 
within Brazil has also been widely documented (for example, Santos, 1993, Souza, 
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2001; Wampler, 2002; Wampler and Avritzer, 2004; Baiocchi, 2006, among others). 
However, looking at the mature Porto Alegre model reveals the development of PB 
into a formal process within Brazil and begins to show how it became a tool that 
was attractive to individuals and organisations across the political spectrum. 
Originally championed by the PT, PB became the tool of choice for a variety of 
political parties in Brazil. Looking at the process itself reveals that, although not 
devoid of political content, the decoupling of PB and the demands of SMs, 
particularly the more radical and alternative political claims, occurred within Brazil. 
This was not simply a consequence of its adoption by politically and economically 
orthodox organisations. Rather, the minimal political content of PB as a process and 
formal institution was both compatible and in sympathy with the prevailing 
economic and political orthodoxy, and this made it ripe for such widespread 
translation. The development of PB coincided with the growing emphasis placed 
on participation within neoliberalism; this confluence rendered the two congruent. 
Brazil has been running PBs for close to three decades now and the processes of 
PB have evolved and developed over this period and ‘[b]y 2001, an intricate system 
had been consolidated’ (Koonings, 2001, p.85). The processes involved in PB are 
continually assessed and developed. ‘Near the year’s end, participants redraw the 
rules of the process for the following year based on their experience’ (Baiocchi, 
2006, p.3). The finance available for PB comes from a discretionary spend but a 
‘significant portion of [this part of] the annual municipal budget (between 9 and 21 
percent of the total)’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.3) is open for PB:   
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In Porto Alegre, activists from neighborhood associations started 
demanding direct input into the city budget in 1985. Through a process 
of trial and error, participatory budgeting evolved into a yearlong cycle 
of meetings that allow participants to decide on projects in their own 
neighborhoods as well as for the city as a whole. (Baiocchi, 2006, p.3)  
The illustration below details the form that this matured version of PB took and 
shows the extent to which it had become a formalised institutionalised process. 
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The PB Cycle - Illustration 1 
!  
This illustration above (illustration 1) and the table below (table 1) are both drawn 
from an interactive versions found at: http://www.ongcidade.org/site/htm/comum/
cicloEN.html [Accessed 01.02.12] 
Part of Cycle Activities





at the regional and 
micro-regional, 
thematic and other 
levels. Meetings to 
integrate the Delegates 
Forum and the 
Planning Forums.
Agenda
- Accounts Rendered; Presentation of Investment Plans 
- Presentation of PB regulations 
- General and Technical Criteria 
- Discussion of the List of Councillors to be sent to the 
PB Council 
- Suggestions of priorities and requests submitted 
through the Internet
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2. April / May - 
Regional Thematic 
Assemblies 




-Selection of Thematic Priorities 
-Election of Councillors 
-Establishing of the number of delegates based on level  
participation in regional 
-Accounts rendered
3. May / June / July - 
Regional Thematic 
Meetings 
Holding of Regional 
Thematic Meetings
Agenda
-Election of Delegates 
-Prioritisation of Works and Services 
-Deliberation on request made over the internet (in the 
Forum of Delegates) 
-Before Prioritisation: delegate visits the sites targeted by the 
requests in order to understand the request being made




-Swearing in of new Councillors 
-Submission of the prioritisation of Works and Services 
-Selection of a general theme for the current PB cycle
5. July - September 
Analysis of Demands 
and Budget Structure 
(resources to be 
allocated to each 
Department)
Government
- Analysis of technical feasibility of requests made 
- View of proposed general budget structure
6. August / Sept. 
Vote on the Budget 
Structure
Agenda
- Discussion and voting on the general budget structure 
- Beginning of resource distribution for the regions and 
thematic committees of the PB Council
7. October / Dec 




- Finalisation of the distribution of resources for the regions 
and thematic committees  
- Presentation and voting on the Investment Plan Proposals 
(technical and financial analysis of service and 
construction requests) in the regional and thematic 
delegate forums, with the Cabinet of Budget Programming, 
Municipal Secretary of Political Coordination and Local 
Government and similar organisations 
- Reception of Investment Plans beginning before the 
proposals are returned to their corresponding forums
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Details of each part of the cycle - Table 1 
After the PT introduced and established PB in Porto Alegre, the process was 
exported to dozens of other municipalities throughout the country. In 1992, a 
dozen PT municipalities had participatory budgeting; by 1996 the number had 
increased to thirty-six. PB grew and became common practice in municipalities run 
by parties other than the PT. ‘Over 100 municipalities experimented with it 
between 1997 and 2000, and at least 200 did so between 2001 and 2004, at least 
half of which were run by other political parties’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.5). It took about 
ten years before the PB cycle developed into this form. It is worth noting that it 
also took time for significant numbers of people to become involved. 
The table below (Table 2) shows the number of people taking part in the Porto 
Alegre PBs each year from 1990 to 2000. 
Participants in Porto Alegre PBs 1990-2000 - Table 2 
8. November / Dec. 
Discussions
Agenda
- Discussion of alterations to the PB Internal Regulations 
- Discussions of general, technical and regional criteria in 
the regional and thematic forums
9. December / Jan 
Debate and Voting
Agenda
- Debate and voting on PB internal regulations and general, 
technical and regional criteria
10. February Recess




The data from this table is taken from the Administration of Porto Alegre cited in 
Wampler and Avritzer( 2004, p.302).  
One of the possible explanations for why participation increased so dramatically 
after the first few years is previous participants praise for the process; PB was based 
on a principle of attraction rather than promotion.  ‘Once the process started to 
show results—three or four years after its introduction—the number of participants 
grew dramatically. By 2004, some 20,000 were attending the first round of 
meetings, many of them for the first time. A conservative estimate is that ten 
percent of adults in the city have at one point participated’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p3).  










Year No. of Participants
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The maturation of PB ran concurrently with a global trend championing the benefits 
of increased public participation. By the dawn of the twenty-first century, a double 
movement appeared to characterise debate and thought on democracy at the 
international level. Firstly, the conviction that liberal democracies should be 
exported worldwide, and secondly a desire to deepen democracy where it was 
already entrenched. Two common and interrelated motivations for the latter can be 
identified: 1) to make governments and institutions more responsive to the needs 
and concerns of their citizens and 2) to address what had come to be seen as the 
deficits of modern democracy. Two of the most prominent perceived deficits are 1) 
a crisis of legitimacy of governments and 2) a general apathy among citizens. The 
proposed solution was a 'political project of developing and sustaining more 
substantive and empowered citizen participation in the political process than what 
is normally found in liberal representative democracy alone' (Gaventa, 2005, p.2). 
This was accompanied, at the theoretical level, by an increase in attention given to 
deliberative models of democracy by many prominent theorists including Cohen 
(1989; 1997), Dryzek (2000; 2010), Fishkin (1993; 2003)  and Habermas (1991; 
1992). These models and theories are associated with an emphasis on the 
importance of combining traditional representative mechanisms with the 
construction of public spaces where citizens are entitled to voice their opinions, 
desires, and preferences. This so called deliberative turn of the 1990s was 
characterised by claims that authentic deliberation and collective decision making 
comprise the nexus of democratic legitimacy (Dryzek, 2002). Participation came to 
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be seen as a panacea for the perceived deficits of contemporary democracy. The 
question of the desirability of participation was off the agenda, and attention was 
focused on how its increase could be realised within contemporary democracies. 
By the 1990s there had been a noticeable shift in mainstream thinking from 
minimalist elitist conceptions of representative democracy - where the masses are 
deemed incapable of acting in accordance with democratic principles for the 
greater good of society and where mass mobilisations are seen as a threat to 
democracy - towards a view where the inclusion of the masses and the 
democratisation of all aspects of life is not just seen as desirable but necessary in 
order to address the crisis of representation and legitimacy faced by contemporary 
existing democracies. Calls for greater participation were now part of the 
mainstream agenda and no longer the preserve of social movements and left-wing 
thinkers and activists. Towards the end of the twentieth century there was a general 
acknowledgment that 
[t]he traditional institutions of representative democracy, while the 
ultimate guarantor of accountability, are also viewed as insufficient in 
complex and differentiated societies. More sophisticated methods are 
called for to enable decision-making bodies to respond to the 
multiplicity of views and interests which no longer - if they ever did - 
follow simple lines of class or party loyalty. (Newman, 2001, pp 130 
-131) 
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By the turn of the century, the limits of consultation as a way of engaging local 
communities and making good use of their potential to contribute both to the 
efficient provision of services and to a more vibrant democratic polity had become 
apparent. It was not producing the desired results and citizens were not interested 
in being consulted. Traditional partnership models for local government were 
being replaced by more collaborative models where collaboration is defined by 
active contribution of resources. Collaborative models view citizens as both being 
and possessing valuable resources. The development of a host of democratic 
innovations based on some notion of collaboration signified a change in 
relationship from government (local and national) working for the people to one of 
the government working with the people. This move was politically motivated, in 
terms of civic engagement, and economically motivated, in terms of resource and 
efficiency maximisation. PB was one such innovation. PB may not have been an 
easy fit with the traditional neoliberalism associated with Thatcher and Reagan, but 
it did fit naturally alongside the social democratic forms of neoliberalism associated 
with the Third Way policies of Clinton and Blair, which grew in prominence around 
the turn of the century. The previous chapter charted the PT’s move away from its 
radical and socialist origins and towards the prevailing orthodoxy of neoliberalism. 
The PT did drop much of its radical rhetoric, ideology and policy but, even as Lula 
himself became an explicit advocate of Third Way thinking and policy , he and his 11
party retained PB as official policy (Martell, 2010). 
 In July 2003 Lula attended a conference on 'Progressive Governance' essentially Third Way 11
thinking and policy, in London. (Kingstone and Power, 2009)
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The Participatory Budgeting that has traveled promises to solve one 
of the problems of democracy, namely its unruliness and 
unpredictability, substituting this with rational, more inclusive, and 
more transparent demand-making. This makes it compatible with 
both 'good governance' and New Public Management discourses as 
well as with some social justice projects. (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, 
p.1) 
PB may have developed out of radical and alternative demands but it proved itself 
capable of also being an instrument for far more orthodox political and economic 
ends. 
PB attracted international attention, becoming a best practice that was 
taken up by a number of international networks. Now, it traveled as a 
politically neutral device, one that could improve governance and 
generate trust in government. (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, p.2) 
PB became an attractive tool for anyone seeking 
to increase the transparency of public management in order to enhance 
democratic legitimacy, by: 1) improving accountability, which seeks to 
make executive responsibility more transparent: and 2) increasing the 
amount and volume of participation in government. (Ganuza and 
Baiocchi, 2012 p.8) 
There are a variety of explanations for the growing attention paid to participation 
by institutions like the World Bank ranging from the relatively benign to the 
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suspicious and outright deprecating. On the one hand, there appear to be what 
Goldfrank (2012) calls the ‘true believers’, namely those who advocate the use of 
PB for its ‘transformative, democratizing, poverty-reducing potential’ (ibid p.14), 
and on the other, those who advocate PB as a way to maintain and promote a 
neoliberal agenda (Goldfrank, 2012, p.14) . In its more generous interpretation, 12
the emphasis on participation and interest in innovations like PB are viewed as 
‘programs seeking to reform how the state functions by increasing citizen 
oversight’(Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, p.7). There are a variety of strategies 
associated with the latter which again range from the relatively beneficent to the 
more skeptical and cynical. Neoliberalism's new emphasis on participation, 
including its adoption of innovations like PB, can be seen as a reaction to criticisms 
of the Washington Consensus (WC) but one which still maintains its core principles 
of ‘privatization, liberalization, deregulation, and generally reducing the role of the 
central state’ (Goldfrank, 2012, p.1). PB affords a role for the citizen in this strategy 
to accompany that of the private sector in more traditional neoliberalism. PB is 
particularly suited to this as ‘the rules associated with PB can be used to maintain 
the status quo, because they provide government officials with a better 
understanding of citizens’ demands’ (Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012, p.7). Rather than a 
response to criticism, the growing emphasis on participation can also be viewed as 
simply an acknowledgement that civic participation can serve to enhance efficiency 
as well as legitimacy and thereby both aid the maintenance of the status quo and 
facilitate a fuller realisation of its explicitly economic ends. This appreciation is 
 Goldfrank (2012) also identifies other factors affecting PB. He also ultimately rejects the 12
more orthodox Marxist interpretations of World Bank motivations.
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exhibited by the addition of the good governance agenda to the traditional WC. 
According to this view participation, and specifically PB, can facilitate ‘good 
governance and avoid cost overruns and corruption in its projects’ (Goldfrank, 
2012, p.6). More sceptical interpretations of the growing popularity of, and 
emphasis on, participation view ‘the adoption of participatory approaches in 
general as an attempt to co-opt the ideas and the activists of its civil society 
opponents in order to neutralize them or to use them to help advance a neoliberal 
agenda’ (Goldfrank, 2012, p.4). The merit of these interpretations can only really be 
determined on a case by case, or policy by policy, basis. Here, the issue is that PB 
had become a process capable of acting as an instrument for any of these 
agendas. A return to the demands of the SMs reveals that the even more generous 
and benign interpretations are devoid of the more radical and alternative elements 
of the SM demands. 
2.4 Social Movements Revisited 
The previous chapter discussed the general nature of the SMs and their demands. 
This section discusses the relationship between these demands and various 
manifestations of PB. To varying extents, PB did continue to be an instrument 
capable of tackling the corruption and clientelism of Brazilian political life, it did 
allow greater civic involvement in decisions about public budgets, it did give voice 
to previously excluded groups, and it did redirect resources. In this way it did 
contribute to a new political settlement with new roles and responsibilities for the 
state and citizen within Brazil. However, it did not become part of, nor contribute 
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to, the realisation of a new political settlement, or a new form of democracy in the 
sense demanded by the SMs. PB’s relationship to the demands of the SMs from 
which it was birthed had inspired hope for a new form of democracy. As PBs 
relationship with more radical and alternative demands diminished so too did its 
ability to contribute to a new form of democracy. PB became an instrument of 
Brazil’s new democracy but this was only new to Brazil; it was and remains very 
much in keeping with the orthodoxy of an adapted form of neoliberalism and 
associated Third Way policies. 
It is worth revisiting why the PB, at least initially, held so much hope in terms of a 
new transformative participatory initiative. As noted in Chapter One PB was a 
process and an institution but it was also seen as the creation of a political arena 
capable of addressing the concerns and demands of the SMs from which it 
emerged. PB was seen as a part of the fabric of a growing culture of participation in 
Brazil which began in the development of social movements in the 1970s and 
which, by the 1980s, included formal organisations and a variety of actors 
developing concrete participatory innovations in their struggles for democracy and 
against military rule (Mainwaring, 1989; Baiocchi, 2006). Movements concerned 
with demanding a greater voice for the population and demands for increased 
participation pre-dated the introduction of PB. 
Given the authoritarian and military rule in Brazil a call for more democracy is easy 
to understand; Brazil has a history of a glaring lack of democracy:  ‘The way that 
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decisions are made in participatory budget meetings marks a real break from past 
models of civic engagement. Participants spend a fair amount of time in 
deliberative discussions…… Beyond providing a forum to choose projects and 
priorities, participatory budget meetings enable other forms of collective action 
and discussion.…..participants regularly carve out these spaces for open-ended 
discussion’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.4). These spaces and the nature of discussions that 
took place within them were not so much formal institutional components of PB 
itself but rather the informal institutions of the SMs from which PB originated. 
PB ‘emerged as an attempt to transform relations between government and society 
and set up institutions that promote joint management of public resources’ (Torres 
Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.59). In this way it was a new system and a new 
institution. The district level meetings gave citizens direct access to government 
and an opportunity to demand justifications from government; this ability to 
demand justification is credited with generating a sense of empowerment amongst 
citizens (Baiocchi, 2005, p.104). For example, ‘In Porto Alegre, a prefigurative social 
movement innovation - norms of claim making and collective access to the public 
good - became institutionalised and extended to a whole city’ (ibid., 2005, p.5). 
While there were a number of participatory initiatives, it was PB that served as by 
far the most popular, in terms of both its reputation and the extent to which it was 
used as a form of institutionalisation: ‘[T]he OP stands out as a system that has not 
only provided services and improvements for the urban poor but involved large 
numbers of them in active civic life’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p.2). 
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The PB process, aside from the much talked of benefits with regard to local 
governance issues ‘has become a sort of school of democracy’ (Baiocchi, 2006 p.2) 
and has helped aid a general culture of participation (Baierle, 1998) in Brazil. This 
pedagogical aspect ‘built into participatory budgeting’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.5) was 
about much more than learning about budgets or how decisions are made. It was 
informed by Freirean critical pedagogy and liberation theology; as such it 
emphasised the necessity of becoming aware of and understanding the prevailing 
social, economic and political world, so that one could both see but also 
appreciate the origin of social, political and economic injustice and thereby be in a 
position to challenge such injustice (Y. Cabannes, 2013, perf. comm., May 9th). 
‘[T]he regime of state-civil society relations under OP was different from anything 
that had been seen before in Porto Alegre’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p. 47), which alone 
constitutes the ‘novelty’ of PB as a form of participation. However, perhaps the 
most interesting and novel aspects of PB are not its institutional form, but rather its 
association with the claims of SMs and activists with regard to notions of 
participation and citizenship, and the associated understandings of political 
subjects and the political sphere. 
The Participatory Budget trials carried out in various municipalities 
between 1997 and 2000 lie at the heart of complex changes that are 
taking place in the relationship between state and society in Brazil. 
Such trials bring the hope of genuine democracy and active citizenship 
and reveal ways of reducing social inequality. The trials also point, 
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broadly speaking, towards new ways of understanding the state, in 
which forms of self-management involving full social participation 
prevail when issues of public interest are at stake. (Torres Ribeiro and 
Gracia, 2002, p.21)  
PB became a site of not just administrative debate but one of political 
debate; ‘meetings becoming sites for open-ended discussion of 
community problems over and above the stated agenda and allocation 
of budgeting priorities. (Baiocchi, 2005, p.95) 
As noted in the section above the ‘reinventing and reclaiming 'citizenship' was a 
dominant theme in social movements in the 1980s and 1990s. PB was influenced 
by and associated with various notions of participation and citizenship originating 
in the SMs. The heavy involvement of activists in the early development of PB 
(Baiocchi 2005) saw the continuation of these ideas. PB was, at least initially, 
associated with new conceptions of citizenship, participation, social justice, social 
equality and redistribution as well as the more practical issues of dealing with 
clientelism, paternalism and corruption. 
Looking back over the 1990s, a longtime PT activist recalled, '[T]hat old 
militancy of going door to door to confront the government is gone. 
Now OP is everything,' while another said that 'the era of the mass 
protest [has] ended in Porto Alegre. (Baiocchi, 2005, p.45) 
Protest did not entirely disappear but the PB had become a vehicle for the 
demands of SMs whose traditional method had been protest: ‘Even a cursory 
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reading of association newsletters reveals an evolution throughout the 1990s 
toward a language where the meaning of popular struggles is equated with 
participating in the OP,’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p.46). 
Conversations about deeply political issues, including migration, unemployment, 
the environment, planning and land tenure were what facilitated the development 
of ‘political consciousness’ amongst PB participants (Baiocchi, 2005, p.102). This 
pedagogical aspect was not formally institutionalised within PB but rather it was a 
way of being derived from the critical pedagogy and liberation theology that had 
influenced so many of the activists and SMs who took part in PB. 
The community activists originating in the SMs of the 1970s and 1980s ‘use the 
language of citizenship to describe rights and responsibilities, and they describe 
themselves as citizens’, (Baiocchi, 2005, p.4) but crucially by including debates 
about social justice, social transformation and the political system they spoke to a 
‘deep’ notion of citizenship. As PB was initially heavily influenced by this style of 
community activism and its conceptions of citizenship it seemed to have the 
potential to usher in new ‘deeper’ forms of participation and citizenship. 
At a time when scholars are pointing to a crisis of the welfare state as a 
threat to industrial democracies, here we see an instance of an 
innovation by municipal government that has empowered local 
citizenry, fostered new activism in civil society, and created a novel form 
of coordination across the state-civil society divide. (Baiocchi, 2005, p.3) 
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As Baiocchi (2005) emphasises, community organisers and activists played 
important roles with regard to the organising, running and popularity of PB. There 
was a noticeable difference between the community leaders and activists of 1970s 
and 1980s Brazil and those that began to emerge in the 1990s (ibid., p.127). This 
change of focus from the traditional conflictual modes of operation of SMs to one 
of participatory governance by individuals and groups who played a significant role 
in the running of PB was undoubtedly one of the factors which effected a change in 
the nature of debate and discussion in these public arenas. While SMs are credited 
with creating the space for deeply political debates where different visions and 
projects could be promoted and challenged, the new-style organisers and activists 
were generally more project orientated. Over time, overtly political discussions 
were considered to be inappropriate within PB arenas (Baiocchi, 2005, p.166). The 
PB citizen shifted from one based on a conception of deep citizenship to one 
based on thin citizenship. The process and the individuals who took part became 
less political and more pragmatic in orientation. 
The discussion of neoliberalism and the increasing importance placed on 
participation earlier in this chapter suggests an understanding of the citizen in 
which the conception of citizen originates from a given political and economic 
project. That is rather than asking ‘what is the role and status of the citizen?’ it 
starts by asking ‘how can the citizen further the project?’. The role and status of the 
citizen is developed out of the answers to the latter. The more radical aspects of 
the SMs demanded a new conception of the citizen which, unlike neoliberal 
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understanding and constructions, took the citizen and the role of the citizen as 
prior to economic ends. Given the socialist leanings of the SMs it is possible to 
identify an economic project in their conception of the citizen, but the conception 
they developed was not dependent on this. The SMs’ construction of the citizen 
was first and foremost political. The SMs’ political citizen was one that was capable 
of recognising and challenging economic orthodoxy, however it was not predicated 
upon economic project. 
There is a burgeoning literature on democratic innovations. Warren (1996) and 
others rightly identify this literature as focusing on democratic, rather than 
economic, ends and an associated broadening of the political sphere. Both stand in 
stark contrast to the conceptions and logic of the SMs. Assessing what travels 
under the name of PB, Ganuza and Baiocchi (2012) suggest a ‘decoupling of 
Participatory Budgeting from a broader set of institutional reforms of which it had 
been part in the 1990s’ (ibid., p.2). This is certainly an insightful and important 
article which, amongst other things, speaks to the elasticity of PB, and ultimately 
the form PB takes is revealed as overdetermined. Here I wish to suggest a different 
decoupling, that of PB from the radical demands from which it originated. There 
are many aspects of the demands which are absent from alternative manifestations 
of PB, but here I focus on a few that were prominent in the SMs and conspicuously 
absent from later PB processes: critical consciousness as a founding principle of 
citizenship and a logic of contestation and transformation. This logic includes what 
might be considered a deepening, as opposed to the broadening mentioned 
 111
above, of the political sphere. This difference ultimately hinges on a logic of 
transformation of the existing sphere exhibited by the SMs versus a logic of 
inclusion into an already existing political sphere. The latter operates on a defined, 
or at least definable, common good, whereas the former operates on an essentially 
contested notion of the common good where any consensus reached is merely 
pragmatic, temporary, fragile and open to disruption at any moment. The latter 
contains a notion of citizen identity and political subjectivity as claimed whereas the 
former prescribes identity and subjectivity. To borrow from Gaventa (2006), this is 
the difference between ‘democracy-building’[as]’ an ongoing process of struggle 
and contestation rather than the adoption of a standard institutional design’ (ibid., 
p.3). The radical demands were rooted in a logic of contestation (Dagnino, 1998) 
and a lack of closure where PB cannot be formalised as it is itself a process in 
process. ‘Democracy is at once the language of military power, neoliberal market 
forces, political parties, social movements, and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs)’ (Gaventa, 2006, p.5). Democracy and accompanying notions of 
participation and citizen empowerment are the currency of a diverse set of actors. 
The tightly structured nature of the matured process tends to circumscribe broader 
discussions. As Baiocchi (2006) himself notes later in his book, as time went on PBs 
were characterised by discussion about the adoption and implementation of 
specific projects rather than the more open ended discussions which characterised 
earlier PBs. 
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The PB process, aside from the much talked of benefits with regard to local 
governance issues ‘has become a sort of school of democracy’ (Baiocchi, 2006 p.2) 
and has helped aid a general culture of participation’ (Bairele, 1998). ‘There is a 
pedagogical component built into participatory budgeting’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.5 ). 
Unlike the delegated decision-making of representative democracy, 
direct participation requires active intervention that in effect trains 
people for citizenship through problem-solving, communication, and 
strategizing. But the achievement with the greatest lessons for 
progressives elsewhere is the transformation of the relationship 
between the government and the governed. (Baiocchi, 2006, p.2) 
The idea of 'citizenship school' is grounded in the idea of, amongst other things, 
‘the right to own social subjects and their objectives’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 
2002, p.64). This pedagogical aspect was not formally institutionalised within PB 
but was rather derived from the critical pedagogy and liberation theology that had 
influenced so many of the activists and SMs who took part in PB. 
The understanding of citizenship found within the SMs bears a striking resemblance 
to that found in the works of authors like Levinson (2011) and Fraser (1992). Both 
accord pivotal roles to education, identity formation, counter-discourses, counter-
publics and alternative political spaces. This is a radically different conception of 
citizenship from that of ‘citizenship as constraining or 'disciplining' the 
subject,’ (Levinson, 2011, p.285) which occurs when citizenship is prescribed and 
defined rather than claimed and disputed. For Levinson (2011) and the SMs, ‘In a 
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democratic society, what constitutes legitimate expressions of citizenship itself 
becomes a matter of debate and disputation’ (Levinson, 2011, p.281). The 
‘claiming of identity and subjectivity by citizens as opposed to state-prescribed 
counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, 
interests, and needs’ (Fraser, 1992, no pagination, cited in, Levinson, 2011, p.281). 
Neoliberal discourses predicate the role and function of the citizen on specific 
understandings of democracy, whereas, for the SMs and the authors above, the 
ability to debate and to contest the nature of democracy, the role of the citizen, 
and the prevailing social, political and economic settlement is at the core of what 
citizenship and democracy are. 
If in Latin America the modernizing, developmentalist state of the 
1940s to the 1970s wanted ‘productive’ citizens who worked for the 
good of the country, the neoliberal state wants ‘participatory’ citizens 
who can learn to solve their own problems and provide for their own 
needs privately, or at best through civil society. (Levinson, 2011, p. 292) 
The SMs called for 'critically conscious' citizens capable of demanding alternative 
social, political and economic settlements. Many have noted the ability of PB to act 
as a ‘school of citizenship’ including Levinson (2011), Cabannes (2015) the World 
Bank (n.d.) and the UK PB Unit (2008) to name just a few. The political neutrality 
and malleability of PB suggests that it is capable of schooling many different forms 
of citizenship. The SMs sought PB not as a process which contained preordained 
notions of citizenship but as a space where their vision of citizenship could be 
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performed and new political subjectivities thereby constituted. There are cases, 
generally very early manifestations, where this seems to have occurred: 
As Silva and Teixeira’s case study of OP in Recife shows, it has given rise 
to new opportunities for people to constitute themselves as political 
subjects. In doing so, it has enlarged their sense of their own spheres of 
agency, bringing them not only into contact with other citizens in the 
pursuit of rights, but also into the interface with government. (Cornwall, 
Romano and Shankland, 2008, p.37) 
However, this was due to the heavy involvement of SMs rather than a necessary 
feature of PB as it matured into a formal process. The good governance agenda 
and neoliberalism’s participatory turn emphasise governing with the state. This 
contrasts with the contestatory logic of the SMs. The critical consciousness which 
they advocated was for them necessary so that citizens could recognise the nature 
and mechanisms of their oppression and thereby be in a position to challenge 
them. 
Details of the changes that the PT underwent as it transitioned from a SM to a 
political party are explored in detail below. It is, however, worth noting that the PT 
was not the only SM to undergo significant changes. With the transition to 
democracy came a noticeable shift in the articulations of many SMs, ‘social 
movements shifted practices and discourses toward demanding a voice and 
participation in local governments and toward proposing specif ic 
policies’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p.10). Demands generally focused not on overthrowing 
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the regime or claims about the form a new regime should take (as had been the 
case while the country remained under military rule), but rather on the roles and 
functions of citizen and state in Brazil's new democracy. If not the cause of this shift 
then at least concomitant with it was an identifiable difference between the 
community leaders and activists of the 1970s and 1980s and those that began to 
emerge in the 1990s (Baiocchi 2005). The new style leaders were ‘schooled in 
participatory governance rather than the conflictual tactics of social movements or 
the deal making of neighbourhood politics’ (ibid., p.127). Many of the leaders of 
the SMs became less radical and more pragmatic in their orientation during the 
1990s. 
D'Oliveira stresses the emergence of a group of trade union leaders, 
including Lula, whose approach was essentially one of pragmatic 
negotiations. He argues that in the 1980s, when the independent trade 
union movement was highly political as its every action, however 
economic or sectional in intent, came up against the dictatorship, they 
appeared as radical political leaders. But as the militant trade unions, in 
the car industry especially, faced rising unemployment and declining 
influence, the influence of leaders was one of caution and pragmatism. 
Another group in the post 1994 leadership - for example, ex-guerrilla 
José Genuino - had reacted to the fall of the Berlin Wall by dropping 
any belief in radical change and adopting a variant of Tony Blair's 'third 
way', weak social democracy. (Wainwright, 2005, no pagination) 
Old school activists bemoaned the decline of political discussion and the growing 
preoccupation with issues of politics and policy. Baiocchi (2005) quotes a comment 
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made by an older community activist which typifies this change in discourse, 
‘people 'these days only talk about projects and not enough about the big 
questions'’ (ibid., p.103). PBs, far from the deeply political arenas of early SMs, 
came to be seen as a place where it was not appropriate to discuss politics 
(Baiocchi, 2005, p.116). Once forums for lively political debate, they had become a 
process for making practical decisions about budget allocation and overtly political 
debate was seen as an obstacle to the efficiency of the process. PB became a place 
where competing groups left ideological commitments at the door and entered 
into practical relationships with one another (Baiocchi, 2005, p.116). PB was a 
forum for groups who identified with a variety of parties and movements to come 
together to discuss issues pertaining to the community as whole, i.e. a broader 
community of which all the groups were part. In this context community activists 
came to understand ‘there to be 'three' worlds: those of 'the government', 'the 
community', and 'political parties' (ibid., p.113). While these boundaries did to 
some extent remain blurred this division significantly impacted PB. PB had initially 
been a result of deeply political demands, championed as a way to begin the 
implementation of PT ideology, a space to form bonds and challenge the 
government and a community of new political citizens. It was becoming a politically 
neutral place for the community to make practical decisions and an institutional 
process to discuss the administration of projects rather than an arena for political 
debate. 
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For all the novelty, radicality and hope associated with PB outlined above much of 
it was short lived and/or remained a relation of association. While PB was, at least 
initially, associated with claims of SMs and activists with regard to notions of 
participation and citizenship and the associated understandings of political subject 
and the political sphere, the extent to which it actually embodied these is 
questionable. Certainly, if it embodied them at all it was only during early 
manifestations of PB when it was closer to SMs and populated and propagated by 
old-style activists. ‘[O]ver time broader conversations diminished and discussion 
focused on individual projects (Baiocchi, 2005, p.102). The PT was originally a SM 
which displayed many of the general trends of the SMs of the 1970s and 1980s and 
was also PB's biggest champion. Over time PB became less and less associated 
with the normative political claims of the SMs and the early PT; it became a more or 
less neutral political instrument rather than a tool of a political project. PB became 
part of the mainstream and the norm across Brazilian cities regardless of the party 
in power in the district. 
PB was only possible due to the ‘decentralisation of power and political 
administrative autonomy brought about by the constitutional federal pact in the 
1980s (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.44) and ‘the participation of citizens in 
drawing up the municipal public budget is today guaranteed by Federal law’ (ibid., 
p.56). However, the form that decentralisation took and the triumph of prevailing 
political and economic orthodoxy meant that the amount of power and resources 
available for decision making at the local level remained circumscribed. The end of 
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authoritarian rule did entail the restructuring of the relations between state and 
society in Brazil. However, the much hoped for emergence of complex social 
subjects, corresponding to new political roles (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.
27) did not materialise. They were hampered by the dominance of economic 
efficacy and technical rationality (Paoli and Telles, 1998) at the expense of the 
normative political demands of the 1970s and 1980s SMs. This trend away from 
policies of redistribution and away from an ethic of responsibility towards an ethic 
of efficiency identified by Paoli  and Telles (1998) and Freitas (1995) continued into 
the 1990s and the start of the twenty-first century. 
2.5 PB: A variety of analytical frameworks 
The ‘lack of a coherent analytical framework able to guide evaluations of politico-
administrative practices leads to extremely divergent evaluative criteria and 
conclusions on the results and prospects of participatory programs’ (Souza 2001, p.
179). Matters are further complicated by a lack of agreement on the nature and/or 
aim of participation. 
A variety of authors have suggested various criteria for analysing and assessing 
PBs. Wampler and Avritzer (2006) suggest participatory publics as an analytical 
framework ‘to explain the changing form of political participation after Brazil's 
democratization….. (Linking) the strategies of political renewal and contestation to 
the new institutions that are now spreading across Brazil’ (ibid., p.309). Posner 
(2003) ‘argues that popular participation will be strong and effective where 
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structural reforms expand the resource base and policy-making authority of local 
leaders, local institutions strengthen accountability and facilitate citizen input in 
decision-making, and political parties attempt to organize and mobilize groups and 
constituents at the grass-roots’ (ibid., p.39). For Posner (2003) the accountability of 
public officials and institutional arrangements to facilitate political participation are 
the crucial factors (ibid p.42). Kooning (2004) makes use of Diamonds (1999) ‘key 
parameters for democratic consolidation: performance, institutionalization and 
deepening’ (Kooning, 2004, p.88) to assess ‘whether the participatory budgeting 
process contributes to strengthening (or consolidating) democratic governance 
through the promotion of political and social citizenship rights’ (ibid., p.88). 
Kooning (2004) also makes the case for the consideration of ‘the resources made 
subject to participatory decision making, the seriousness of its implementation, and 
the overall preparedness of both administrators and grass roots and civil society 
actors. In addition, the prevailing configuration of forces within political society may 
work in favour of participatory governance (as was the case in Porto Alegre) or 
against it (as was the case in Fortaleza in the 1980s and SaÄ o Paulo between 1989 
and 1994). (2004, p.96). Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1998) analyses PB ‘along the 
following vectors: redistributive efficiency, accountability and quality of 
representation in participatory democracy, autonomy of the participatory 
budgeting vis-a-vis the executive government on the city, from technobureaucracy 
to technodemocracy, dual power and competing legitimacies and the relations 
between the participatory budget and the legislative body vested with the formal 
legal prerogative of budget approval’ (1998, p.462). Souza (2001, p.179) even 
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draws up a table (copied below) summarising the main strengths and weaknesses 
of PB. 
Summary of PBs main strengths and weakness according to selected literature 
Souza (2001) - Table 3
!  
Despite the many and varied criteria and frameworks almost all would agree on 
certain components, for example citizen involvement in financial decisions. More 
precisely, ‘a broad definition: PB allows the participation of non-elected citizens in 
the conception and/or allocation of public finances’ (Sintomer et al. 2008, p.168). 
However, other criteria are more disputed, for example the thought that PB should 
be an ongoing cycle and not a one off event. Although much of the academic 
literature would suggest this latter element is a crucial part of PB, many one off 
processes have been labeled PB; this is certainly the case in the UK as is explored 
in Chapter Four. 
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Sintomer et al (2008) use a hexagon to explore and explain the many different 
manifestations of PB across Europe. They identify six kinds of processes: private/
public negotiation table, consultation on public finances, 'proximity' participation, 
Porto Alegre in Europe, participation of organised interests and community funds 
on local and city level (ibid). Sintomer et al (2008) also set out some simple basic 
requirements for PB: 
In Europe, in order to sever it from other participatory instruments, five 
criteria need to be added: 
1. The financial and/or budgetary dimension must be discussed; PB is 
dealing with the problem of limited resources 
2. The city/region level has to be involved, or a (decentralised) district 
with an elected body and some power over administration (the 
neighbourhood level is not enough) 
3. It has to be a repeated process (one meeting or one referendum on 
financial issues are not examples of participatory budgeting) 
4. The process must include some form of public deliberation within the 
framework of specific meetings/forums (the opening of administrative 
meetings or classical representative instances to 'normal' citizens is not 
PB) 
5. Some accountability on the output is required 
     (Sintomer et al 2008, no pagination) 
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Although these are simple and basic criteria many processes in the UK which claim 
to be PB would not meet them . I would like to suggest that a triangle may be 13
used to understand variations in PB processes. The purpose of the triangle is not to 
outline detailed criteria or give a definition of what may constitute PB but rather 
show the different directions it may take and how the Porto Alegre exemplar 
became so ripe for translation. Cabannes and Lipietz (2015) have also developed a 
triangle as a way of understanding different PB processes . The one presented 14
here is neither a development of, nor a criticism of, their work. 
A PB Triangle 1.0 - Illustration 2 
!  
The three corners of the triangle are labeled: Radical Politics, Resource Distribution 
and Neoliberal Governance. The terms ‘radical politics’ and ‘resource distribution’ 
 This is discussed in detail in chapter four. 13
 Indeed I am grateful to Yves Cabannes for suggesting the triangle shape to me several years 14
ago as we discussed my interpretations of PB. I am also indebted to Graham Smith for 
discussing this triangle with me and helping me develop my ideas.
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more or less speak for themselves . ‘Radical Politics’ represents the beliefs and 15
demands associated with the SMs and the early PT in Brazil, including a 
reconfiguring of the political sphere and a redefining of the proper roles and 
responsibilities of the citizen and the State. ‘Resource Distribution’ represents 
discussions and decisions about the way in which resources are distributed and 
here specifically refers to resource distribution in terms of social justice which 
tends, although not necessarily, towards a redirection of resources to marginalised 
groups and issues; the very early PBs certainly did focus on a redistribution of funds 
away from the rich elite and towards the poor and services which would be of 
benefit to them. ‘Neoliberal Governance’ is a more ambiguous term which is much 
harder to define, not least because there are many varied understandings and 
interpretations of both ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘governance’. This project is concerned 
with the more participatory social democratic form of neoliberalism advocated by 
the New Labour government in the UK ; the details of this are explored in detail in 16
the next chapter. Although not the place to fully explore and analyse the notion of 
‘governance’ due to the ambiguity of the term, it is worth briefly outlining the 
general way in which it is used here. 
For the purposes of this work the main concern is the particular way in which the 
shift from government to governance reconfigures the role, function and 
 Arguably this triangle could be adapted and used in a more general way i.e. ‘Radical 15
Politics’ could mean social movements and/or challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy and 
‘Resource Distribution’ need not necessarily be tied to social justice.
Again arguably the triangle could be used with a more general interpretation or other 16
particular understandings of ‘neoliberalism’
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relationships of both the State and citizen and the host of participatory initiatives 
which accompanied. While acknowledging possible benefits this project takes a 
somewhat skeptical view of the shift from government to governance. It also finds 
affinity finds with Stoker’s (1998) exploration of governance. ‘The academic 
literature on governance is eclectic and disjointed (Jessop, 1995, cited in Stoker ,
1998, p.18). Stoker (1998) speaks of governance as having many different 
meanings but generally signifies a shift in thinking and working and one that blurs 
the line between private and public. Stoker (1998) also lists the variety of 
understandings of governance, it being associated with: New Public Management, 
the efficiency of public service provision, better management, an organising 
framework to understand/investigate public administration, greater civic 
involvement and a government that steers and enables rather than commands and 
controls. All of these are in keeping with the way in which ‘governance’ is being 
used here. 
Previously the state “governed”, now with the shift towards governance the state 
plus the citizenry plus private economic agents and organisations (some of which 
operate above the level of the nation state) “co govern”. 
Governance is about the interaction between various actors (Stoker, 1998, p.17) 
which not only blurs the lines between public and private but also blurs the lines 
around accountability and responsibility. Governance signifies a shift from solely 
State involvement and responsibility, with regard to service provision, towards 
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shared responsibility and involvement. This generally means some combination of 
State, citizen and private entities. The State remains involved and is partnered by 
private entities (e.g. public private partnerships) and/or citizens via some form of 
participation. These partnerships were seen as a way to enhance efficiency of 
service provision and empower citizens. However, several authors including Stoker 
(1998), Newman (2001) and Swyngedouw (2003) have noted the ambivalence of 
such arrangements. 
The socially innovative figures of horizontally organised stakeholder 
arrangements of governance that appear to empower civil society in 
the face of an apparently overcrowded and ‘excessive’ state, may, in the 
end, prove to be the Trojan Horse that diffuses and consolidates the 
‘market’ as the principal institutional form. (Swyngedouw, 2005, p.2003) 
Marketisation is not the only concern with regard to the shift to governance 
though. There are concerns that the joining up of the state, the citizenry and 
private entities creates confusion and complication around accountability and 
transparency; how can we hold the state accountable for policy it is no longer the 
sole author and implementer of (Stoker 1998)? Another concern is that the shift 
towards governance  recasts the electorate so they are no longer citizens or 
political subjects but rather stakeholders (Mouffe, 2005; Stoker, 1998; 
Swyngedouw, 2003). For Mouffe (2005) the shift towards governance contributes to 
a post political (and therefore post democratic) landscape which ‘implies a 
conception of politics as the resolution of technical problems, not active 
engagement of citizens exercising their democratic rights….' Unlike government, 
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governance refers to ‘policies' rather than ‘politics’ (Mouffe 2005, pp.103-104 in 
Urbainati 2003). 
Despite supposedly diminishing the role and responsibilities of the State, 
governance arrangements always involve the State. This challenges the idea that 
governance involves less State, instead it may be more helpful to think of 
governance involving the State in different ways. 
In fact, many of these networked organisations are both set up by, and 
directly or indirectly controlled by, the state and, regardless of their 
origins, necessarily articulate with the state… In fact, the state takes 
centre stage in the formation of the new institutional and regulatory 
configurations associated with governance (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). 
This configuration is directly related to the conditions and requirements 
of neo-liberal governmentality in the context of a greater role of both 
private economic agents as well as more vocal civil-society-based 
groups. The result is a complex hybrid form of government/
governance. (Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001, no pagination, cited in, 
Swyngedouw, 2005, p.2002)  
Governance is then here understood as a new way of governing which affords the 
potential for the introduction of a host of participatory initiatives including PB. It is, 
however, a complex notion and practice which does not necessarily have a positive 
democratic impact. 
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2.6 A PB Triangle 
In addition to suggesting different types of processes the triangle below attempts 
to explain the attractiveness, in terms of its fluidity and adaptability, of PB to 
different actors in different contexts. It looks at different kinds of process in relation 
to the Porto Alegre exemplar process. The exemplar process being the later more 
mature processes rather than the earlier processes associated with social 
movements and their demands. 
A PB Triangle 1.1 - Illustration 3 
!  
In the triangle above the Porto Alegre exemplar process sits squarely in the middle. 
The star on the left hand side represents the earlier PB processes that were closely 
connected to the SMs and their demands focusing on both radical politics and 
resource distribution. Chapter One illustrated the changes that PB underwent as 
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time progressed; it became predominantly associated with the PT rather than the 
disparate social movements, and as the PT itself transitioned from a social 
movement to a political party with a closer resemblance to the prevailing neoliberal 
and Third Way orthodoxy. So too did PB become adapted to this political 
context.The triangle above suggests that the later processes sit not along the right 
hand side but towards, if not squarely in, the middle of the triangle. Sitting in the 
middle the exemplar process can move in any direction. No longer anchored in 
radical politics, as earlier manifestations were, enables translations of PB to move 
around the triangle and still bear some resemblance to the Porto Alegre exemplar 
PB. If PB as advocated by organsiations like the world bank, and practiced in 
American and European examples of the process, were to be compared to those 
positioned on the right hand side of the triangle the resemblance would be much 
less; this would call into question the validity of calling these processes PB. As PB 
moves and is translated in different contexts it can move anywhere within the 
triangle. The vignettes of Chapter Four illustrate the ways in which UK processes 
seem to be situated on the right hand side. Stars (both representing early PBs in 
this chapter and one in Chapter Four representing UK PBs) are placed right on the 
line rather than within the triangle. This represents the most extreme cases. As PB 
processes are so flexible and context sensitive each process differs. Individual early 
Brazilian processes may move along the lines or indeed into the triangle itself as 
the emphasis and goals change with each process. The way in which PB is 
translated will depend in great part upon the context in which its translation occurs. 
Chapter Four will illustrate that the neoliberal context of the UK had a great impact 
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on the way in which PB was translated in the UK and suggest that UK processes 
tend to sit along the right hand line. Using the triangle analysis, what constitutes a 
success for any particular PB process will depend upon its place within the triangle, 
the definitions of and the relative importance attached to each of the corners (i.e. 
radical politics, resource distribution and neoliberal governance). 
Conclusion 
PB is notoriously context sensitive and many have assessed and analysed individual 
cases in order to identify the factors which contribute to a successful process. Many 
factors have been identified. Here, the focus has been on the way in which PB 
transformed into a neutral process, an instrument capable of being used for diverse 
political ends. The focus then is not on what affects success but rather what 
constitutes asuccess. Undoubtedly, given the neutral and malleable state of PB its 
translation and adoption beyond Brazil will have an impact on the nature and 
consequence of the process and its implementation. This chapter has argued that it 
was the shifts that PB underwent in Brazil itself that rendered it malleable and 
neutral and in doing so ripe for such widespread translation. Demands for a 
political space, a forum populated by new political subjects based on alternative 
ideas of citizenship, were replaced by the formulation of a process populated by 
neoliberal citizens. The discussion has also presented a triangle visualisation as a 
way of understanding these processes. The triangle visualisation helps to illustrate 
how a multitude of different process can be identified under the name of PB, it also 
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helps to clarify the way in which the success of any particular process may be 
assessed using flexible criteria. 
Albeit with somewhat mixed results, PB has proved itself as a formal process 
capable of enhancing transparency and legitimacy, and that has been able to tackle 
some of the negative informal institutions of corruption, clientelism, elitism and 
paternalism that pervaded Brazilian political life. However, the more radical positive 
informal institutions regarding contestation over meanings, new political spaces 
and new political subjectivities, are all far less in keeping with economic and 
political orthodoxy than transparency and accountability, are no longer a necessary 
corollary of PB as it has developed into a formal process. 
Key aspects of the SMs which continued to influence very early PBs disappeared 
from PB as it matured into a formal process. While PB as a formal process tended 
towards concrete demands with regard to specific projects and budget allocations 
earlier manifestations recognised that ‘negotiation cannot be reduced to the 
materiality of what is demanded’… As PB developed debate was restricted to the 
material level and the symbolic debates disappeared. There ceased to be debates 
about the construction of a decentred and plural conception of the public interest 
which characterized the SMs’ (Paoli and Telles 1998, pp. 74-75). The anti neoliberal 
character of the SMs was also lost. Embryonic manifestations of PB pointed to ‘the 
emergence of a new type of citizen, a new relationship between the public and the 
private, constructed as a countercurrent to the capitalist modernisation of 
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Brazil’ (Baierle, 1998, p.135). PB as a politically neutral process was devoid of any 
such ethical-political principles. PB exhibited ‘a dual significance of citizenship 
[which] includes both the exercise of rights from the state and the self -governance 
and autonomy of society’ (Baierle, 1998, p.136). While the former remains 
uncontroversial and a more or less standard feature of contemporary formulations 
of democracy the latter is open to subversion. For the SMs this ‘self -governance 
and autonomy of society’ referred to the development of a critical consciousness 
and a challenging of dominant social, economic and political settlements. However, 
the ‘self-governance and autonomy of society’ could also be understood in a more 
orthodox neoliberal way as a replacing of the state by civil society; that is, 
extending the project of shrinking the state to include not just the private sector 
but also civil society. Relatedly the competencies that citizens achieve via PB may 
be diverse and range from a political awareness and agency to deliberation and 
budget literacy.  
This chapter has introduced several themes that will be explored further in 
subsequent chapters. Despite participation having acquired the status of an 
unquestionable good, important questions remain regarding the nature and form 
participation takes. A number of factors affect this: who, in this chapter what kind of 
citizen takes part in what, in this chapter a process or a political forum, how, in this 
chapter by contesting orthodoxy and associated meanings of citizenship and 
democracy versus the implementation of projects and why, in this chapter to 
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include greater numbers in existing structures against the possibility of 
transforming those structures. 
Just because the desirability question was off the agenda it is not clear that an 
underlying desire for stability had disappeared and many tensions and conflicts 
seem to pass unacknowledged and or unresolved. Underlying tensions include: 
whether the primary incentive for an increase in participation is the maintenance of 
stability of the political system or whether there is an explicit political goal where 
participation makes a contribution to democracy rather than just stabilising. The 
nature of incentives and motivations for an increase in participation will obviously 
have an impact on the form participation takes. This chapter has also begun to 
touch upon the various ways in which the prevailing orthodoxy, in this chapter 
neoliberalism, may respond to critique. Forms and types of participation and the 
relationship between neoliberalism and critique are explored in subsequent 
chapters culminating in an explicit discussion of both in Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
New Labour and Civic Engagement 
Introduction 
Having previously argued that participatory practices are predicated on the 
ideological and discursive environment of their operation, this chapter explores the 
nature of this environment, which, for the purposes of this project, is that of the 
New Labour government in the UK (1997–2010). In the UK, PB was first 
implemented during the New Labour government. The focus of this chapter is the 
policy and discourse of New Labour, specifically with regard to civic engagement 
and the participatory possibilities it afforded. This situates the two vignettes within 
the discursive and ideological environment of their operation and compliments the 
previous chapters’ discussion of the Brazilian context from which PB emerged. This 
chapter explores the nature and place of civic engagement within New Labour 
ideology and policy; it does so via an exploration of “the who”, in terms of 
constructs of the citizen, including the citizen as a member of a community; and 
“the how”, in terms of decentralisation, of civic engagement within New Labour 
policy and discourse. Ultimately, New Labour is understood as an adaptation and 
mutation of neoliberal hegemony. While the main focus of this chapter is on the 
policy and ideology of New Labour, consideration is also given to the mechanisms 
and processes that resulted in the manifestation of New Labour’s variant of 
neoliberalism, in terms of its relation to the previous incarnation of neoliberalism in 
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the UK and the immediate history of decentralisation in the UK. As Lister (2001) 
notes, there was a ‘deep ambivalence’ (ibid., p.426) within New Labour policy and 
rhetoric, and the proper role of social policy is to explore ‘the contradictions and 
tensions and the uneven and unfinished character of social-political projects’ (Lister 
2001, p.426). In keeping with this and the work of others, most notably Driver and 
Martell, New Labour is understood to have been both shaped by Thatcherism and 
also a reaction to it. The project espoused by New Labour is revealed to be one 
that combined various, and at times contradictory, discourses (Newman, 2001) 
which fundamentally restrained ‘the transformation that, according to Tony Blair 
(2000), is the raison d’être of a Labour Government’ (Lister 2001, p.442). 
Clearly, the below is not a wholesale analysis of New Labour ideology and policy. 
There is a wealth of literature exploring New Labour ideology and policy, and the 
analysis here draws heavily on the work of Driver and Martell, Hall, Mouffe and 
Newman all of whom, in one way or another, give an account of the depoliticising 
effect of the various economic and or moral discourses at play in New Labour and 
its Third Way. 
The change in government after the 1997 General Election has been viewed by 
many on the British Left as a moment of immense political potential which 
remained unfulfilled. For Stuart Hall (2003), the move from Thatcherite 
Conservatism to Blair's Labour government was a missed opportunity to offer 
radical alternatives to Thatcherism, rather than adapting to the prevailing neoliberal 
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conditions. In his famous article 'New Labour's Double Shuffle' (2003), he goes on 
to address various areas - health, public sector reform, economic policy - in which 
the post-political conceit of 'New Managerialism' enabled Blair's government to 
embrace neoliberal values while maintaining a rhetoric of reinvention. The 
disquisition of diversity remained at the heart of this rhetoric throughout the New 
Labour years. Drawing on Chantal Mouffe's assertion that the denial of antagonism 
in favour of consensus and collective identity is what prevents much of liberal 
thought from comprehending democratic practice, this chapter seeks to 
understand the way in which aspects of this manifested under New Labour in the 
UK. The apparent contradictions in New Labour oratory and policy have been well 
documented (for example, Lister, 2001; Driver and Martell, 2002; Hall, 2003; 
Newman, 2001). Of particular interest here are: the notions of citizens; the roles 
and relationships ascribed to the State and the citizen; a preoccupation with the 
notion of community, the accompanying emphasis on 'community building' while 
concomitantly promoting a form of heightened individualism; and the specifics of 
New Labour decentralisation as exhibited by New Labour rhetoric and policy and 
the consequence and implications this has for civic engagement. 
In keeping with the overarching theoretical orientation of this project, identities and 
meaning - specifically those of the State and citizen - are viewed as socially 
constructed. This chapter attempts to excavate some of the  constructions of New 
Labour. The who and the how are revealed as a set  of dynamic relations of co-
constitution, where each is constitutive of and constituted by the other. 
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Furthermore, they stand (both jointly and severally) in a dynamic relation of co-
constitution with the political settlement propounded by New Labour; this in turn is 
dynamically co-constituted by New Labour ideology, which is dynamically co-
constituted by the hegemonic environment of its operation. These relations are 
dynamic in that the continual flow between constitutive elements creates a never-
ending feedback loop, where the extent to which the one impacts on the other, 
and vice versa, varies. In other words, they are all mutually dependent and 
contingent upon one another and can only be understood within the context of 
their operation, where this context itself is situated in a wider context and so on ad 
infinitum. 
3.1 New Labour in Context 
3.12 New Labour and Public Participation 
Along with the already noted shift away from traditional minimalist and elitist 
democracy, there was also a move away from consultation. As was noted in 
Chapter Two the limits of consultation had become apparent and it was being 
replaced with more collaborative models; collaborative models view citizens as 
both being and possessing valuable resources. Resources includes financial 
resources, especially when collaboration was between the public and private 
sector. Resources were not, however, exclusively financial and, when collaboration 
was with the citizenry, most often the resources were those of knowledge and a 
capacity to monitor and to evaluate. This was part of the shift from government 
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(local and national) working for the people to one of the government working with 
people. 
Along with these general global motivations for an increase in public participation, 
New Labour articulated its own specific motivations for it. For New Labour, an 
increase in public participation was the medicine for many existing ills and one 
which would also afford many additional betterments. It could lend greater 
legitimacy to existing forms of representative government, it could render 
governments more accountable to, and more responsive to, the needs and desires 
of citizens, it could elicit valuable information from citizens making for more 
efficient, effective and responsive service provision. New Labour branded itself as 
an enabling State on a course of democratic renewal and invigoration. Civic 
engagement was both constitutive of, and constituted by, the new political 
settlement advocated by New Labour. It afforded greater roles for both citizens and 
local government than either the previous government or traditional manifestations 
of representative democracy in the UK, and was at the core of New Labour’s 
strategy for democratic renewal. As the roles of local government and the citizen 
changed so did the role of central government. The proper role for the State was 
deemed to be one of enabling rather than providing. The State should enable local 
government and citizens to provide for themselves and their communities. For 
citizens this meant taking opportunities for work, education and training created by 
the State, principally via the Welfare to Work (1997 onwards) initiative and the 
various New Deal (1998 onwards) initiatives. In addition to this, citizens were to 
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take a greater role in decision making and service provision within their 
geographical communities, principally via decentralisation and the accompanying 
participatory initiatives. For local government, this meant a transfer of 
accountability and decision making capacity from central to local government. 
Under New Labour, participation was conceived as part of a ‘joined-up’ 
government in which the responsibility for choosing policies was not a sole 
prerogative of political leaders, but rather a partnership between central 
government, local government and the citizen. The dissemination of consultative 
fora and participatory initiatives (including PB ) promoted the construction of 17
institutional spaces for collaborative partnerships facilitating a form of co-
government. These fora were also sites for greater accountability and enhanced 
service provision; providing accountability from local government to the citizen and 
this then feeding back to greater accountability from local government to central 
government A focus on performance and results identified the citizen as a 
privileged site of accountability for service delivery. New Labour promised to 
modernise government, to promote modernisation of bureaucratic agencies by 
replacing anachronistic institutions, and to ensure that efficiency-driven, customer-
oriented apparatus would be responsive to the needs and demands of their clients/
citizens (Cabinet Office, 1999). ‘In consultation and partnership with the people, we 
will design a modern welfare state based on rights and duties going together, fit 
for the modern world’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997). 
 Other examples include citizens’ juries and locally elected mayors.17
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This form of co-government resonates with another more general trend - that of a 
shift from government to governance and a move towards governance beyond the 
State. Greater inclusion of the citizenry in decisions and democracy, beyond mere 
suffrage, has been associated with a move from traditional vertical forms of power, 
from government to the people, to more horizontal and networked forms of power. 
Third Way discourse shifted the sphere of politics away from the State and towards 
the social. Transformation traditionally achieved through the transformation of the 
State and the claiming of State power by political subjects was now to be achieved 
by the empowering of citizens . 18
New Labour did show a renewed interest in civic engagement but was not singular 
in the renewed emphasis it gave to public participation; as detailed in Chapter Two 
there was a global trend championing the benefits of increased public 
participation. Third Way is here understood as variously both author and product 
(generative and derivative) of discursive and normative shifts pertaining to the 
relationship between the State and the citizen; it did not appear deus ex machina 
and, despite explicit claims, it is revealed to be far from politically neutral. 
3.13New(?) Labour 
As well as these general trends New Labour was also shaped by policy and 
discourse of the outgoing government. The political settlement propounded by 
New Labour was different from any other existing in the UK prior to 1997. It was 
  PB is here seen as an example of governance beyond the state.18
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borne out of an acknowledgement of contemporary global systems and a response 
to previous policy and ideology. ‘The reason for having created new Labour is to 
meet the challenges of a different world’ (Labour Party Manifesto 1997, no 
pagination) and ‘Some things the Conservatives got right. We will not change 
them. It is where they got things wrong that we will make change’ (ibid., no 
pagination). It was driven both politically, most explicitly with regard to equality and 
the role of the citizen, and economically, most explicitly in terms of efficiency and 
competition. In addition, the political and the economic motivations and discourses 
were overlaid with a moral discourse around duties and responsibilities, and a 
further more pragmatic type of discourse, that of a Third Way. Claiming to 
supersede the traditional left/right binary of politics, the Third Way was couched in 
a language of pragmatism which held it as the only common sense way forward. 
‘[T]he broad notion of a unified society with a strong sense of purpose 
and direction, can be achieved in different ways for different cultures 
and nations. And it is really a matter of common sense. Working as a 
team is an effective way of working; or playing a sport or running an 
organisation. My point is that a successful country must be run the 
same way. 
That cannot work unless everyone feels part of the team, trusts it and 
has a stake in its success and future 
This is where a new economics of the centre and left of centre must go, 
an open economy working with the grain of global change; disciplined 
in macroeconomic and fiscal policy yet distinguished from the laissez 
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faire passive approach of the right by a willingness to act to prepare the 
country for this change, and a commitment to ensure that its benefits 
are fairly distributed and all our citizens are part of one nation and get 
the chance to succeed. That this is the real way to combine efficiency 
and equity in a modern age.’ (Blair, 1996, pp.4-5) 
'Third Way' is a term loosely used to describe 'the emergence of new social 
democractic governments throughout the world’ (Arestis and Sawyer, 2001, p.1) 
and here refers specifically to the New Labour government in the UK and the 
policies and practices they advocated. The Third Way places an emphasis on 
decentralisation, the importance of "the local"  and greater citizen involvement. 
What emerges from this thinking is a technical managerial interpretation of 
participatory practices aimed at increasing efficiency.  
The shift from the neoliberal hegemony of the 1980s to the more social democratic 
form of neoliberalism displayed by the Blair government is understood, here by 
Stuart Hall in his famous article 'New Labour's Double Shuffle', (2003), not as a 
fundamental ideological shift away from neoliberalism or any fundamental changes 
in principles (particularly the supremacy of the market) but rather as neoliberalism 
adapting to oppositional demands to ensure its continued dominance. The 
adaptive nature of neoliberalism enabled it to maintain its dominance in the face of 
significant challenges and criticisms. The way in which it adapted was determined 
by the challenges and criticisms it faced in such a way as to defuse them. Ultimately 
this was neither a significant shift away from neoliberalism nor a simple 
continuation of neoliberalism rather what developed was a hybrid form of 
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neoliberalism riddled with contradictions. These contradictions were due in great 
part to the overlaying of various discourses. 
As Leitner et al (2007) and Barfuss (2008) have illustrated in their discussions of the 
birth of British neoliberalism following the crises of the 1970s, it did not appear 
deus ex machina but was itself formed out of contestation. Following a boom 
period after the post war settlement, the UK suffered an economic crisis with 
extremely high inflation and unemployment which saw economic growth decline 
considerably. These economic conditions created a political crisis where strikes 
become more and more common and disruptive, class conflict continued 
unresolved and the idea of a United Kingdom (i.e. England, Ireland and Scotland) 
was increasingly under threat (Devine, 2007). The country came to be seen as 
ungovernable (ibid.) and by the early 1980s local government in the UK was 
considered to be in crisis (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). The 1970s saw 
both Labour and Conservative governments elected on manifestos they were 
unable to meet once in power. The country seemed increasingly deeply divided by 
the Left/Right binary, with both sides promoting very different solutions. Finally with 
the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and her continued occupancy of office 
with her becoming the longest serving prime minister of the twentieth century the 
ideological battle between left and right seemed to be over. While discontent 
remained, the Conservative party, with economic policies characterized by 
deregulation and privatisation and their brand of neoliberalism, brought significant 
growth to the UK, particularly during the 1980s, and remained in power until 1997. 
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With the election of John Major in 1991 there was some minor revision to the 
previous Thatcher dominated government, most significantly for this discussion 
with regard to local government. However, these changes are generally seen as 
relatively minor and, despite Thatcher no longer being prime minister, the 
Conservatives continued to be heavily influenced by the rhetoric and policy of her 
previous governments. 
Drawing on this, the loss of the 1997 UK election by the Conservatives is seen as 
having created the potential for a change in direction which was not realised.The 
Thaterite form of noeliberalism which existed prior to New Labour taking office 
could be characterised as being ‘dedicated to the extension of the market (and 
market-life) forms of governance, rule, and control - tendentially at least - all 
spheres of social life.’ (Leitner et al, 2007, p.28). Rather than entirely abandoning 
this general trajectory, the incoming Blair Government chose to follow a path of 
continuation, albeit adapted in order to address the dissatisfaction that had arisen 
as a consequence of decades of neoliberalism in the UK. 
Blair's government implemented a more social democratic form of neoliberalism 
which allowed a role for the state, albeit a limited one, in mitigating the harshest 
consequences of neoliberalism which had heaped the burden on the poorest 
sections of society. In its adapted social democratic form, the informing ideals and 
principles of neoclassical theories of economics - efficiency maximisation and the 
superiority of the market with regard to both economic and social policy – 
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remained: ‘The aim is no longer to restrict capital but to seek it as a friend’ (Martell, 
1999, p.2). This and the related accompanied focus on competition, citizens as 
consumers, a fetish for targets and the promotion of entrepreneurs and a general 
entrepreneurial spirit helped foster a form of individualism. ‘Individuals compete. 
There are winners and losers. Having won in fair competition, the winners are 
entitled to their gains; indeed, they occupy the most honoured places in the social 
pantheon. As for the losers, their duty is to lick their wounds and return as soon as 
possible to the fray …’ (Marquand, 1998, p.69). 
The adaptations and changes in British neoliberalism during the Blair government 
are here understood to have been pursued not because of significant shifts in 
ideological considerations but rather to minimise and or neutralise threats to its 
dominance. The specific area of concern here is with the creation and extension of 
consensus-based democracy, facilitated by a hijacking of terminology associated 
with the left, which contributed to the creation of a post-political landscape 
precluding alternative ideas, policies and, most vitally  identities. To quote Martell 
(1999), ‘'The 'Third Way' is, in part, about the reunification, in the centre ground, of 
old false divisions. It is very much aimed at overcoming conflict and building 
consensus’ (ibid., p.3). The dominance of Third Way ideology was further 
concretised by this consensus-driven view of democracy which eroded choice. 
Change was presented as logical and even moral. If choice is limited then so are 
the decisions which can be made, and so, given that meaningful political 
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participation is about exercising decision-making powers, is the potential for 
participation 
New Labour's neoliberalism combined market-friendly policies with those of social 
inclusion and as such was able to appeal to a variety of disparate groups, thus 
enabling the neutralisation  of potential threats to its dominance. Despite the 
proliferation of rhetoric on participation, diversity and inclusivity, the vignettes of 
the next chapter suggest there was limited increase of political control or 
engagement among British citizens. This is discussed later with reference to the 
different forms participation may take. 
The policy and practice of New Labour was informed by both its underlying 
principles and by oppositional claims which, while remaining subordinate to those 
underlying principles, were embraced and became part of New Labour rhetoric. 
Much of the way in which New Labour behaved was reactionary (in the literal sense 
of reacting after-the-fact to contestations from outside), and in this way their 
behaviour can be seen more as revisionism than co-optation. 
As Leitner (2005) puts it: 
Much contestation has emerged as a direct response to neoliberalism, 
objecting to its imaginaries and practices and its deleterious impacts, 
particularly on disadvantaged groups and locations … First, 
contestations might be directed to specific negative outcomes of 
neoliberal policies, seen as barriers to realising a particular imaginary, 
rather than the working of neoliberalism in toto. (ibid., p.5). 
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This is where New Labour placed itself: in opposition to specific negative outcomes 
of neoliberal policies rather than to neoliberalism in toto. In addition, groups and 
individuals who engage in vocal contestation of neoliberalism in toto appear to 
remain in the minority, and have become associated in both the discourses of the 
government and the mainstream media with anarchism and violent direct action; 
contestation within the mainstream centred around specific issues and concerns 
rather than overarching ideologies. The Third Way displayed a commitment to 
maintaining the position of the market, and concessions were made in the form of 
state intervention. These concessions, ones which importantly did not significantly 
disrupt the overall ideology or goals of neoliberalism, included: 
A minimum wage, tax and benefits changes to make work more 
worthwhile for the unemployed, and training and work programmes to 
encourage individuals out of welfare dependency and social exclusion 
and into the labour market. (Martell, 1999, p.1) 
Rather than addressing inequalities created by the existing economic and social 
systems and relations, the Blair government looked to create easier access to those 
structures. Exclusion, poverty and inequality were not seen as a result of the 
economic or societal hierarchies inherent in neoliberalism but as due to the inability 
of marginalised individuals to take part in these hierarchies. ‘Social democratic 
communitarianism has become more moral and oriented to obligations required of 
the individual and less socio-economic and geared to corporate obligations to the 
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community’ (Martell, 1999, p.6). Welfare dependency, for example, was to be 
eradicated without any consideration given to how it was being produced by 
systems and relations, placing the responsibility on the individual’s lack of social 
capital - skills, education and opportunity. People were to be helped and 
encouraged to take part in systems that had been, at least in part, responsible for 
that very lack of social capital, and not to participate in their own governance but 
to be complicit in their own exclusion. 
The shift from the British neoliberalism which characterised the 1970s and 80s to 
the more social democratic form was achieved through both state intervention and 
the inclusion of new social groups. Several tactics can be identified, including 
concession and co-optation, via a hijacking of any potentially contentious 
language, demands and ideals, in such a way that they came to bolster and 
support the dominant ideology rather than threaten it. While seemingly moving 
away from it, the Blair government in fact fostered support for the wider neoliberal 
project by implementing a form of neoliberalism that cushioned the majority from 
its harshest excesses. 
This was accompanied by the use of a universalising rhetoric which placed New 
Labour ‘in the middle’ of the political spectrum. This enabled it to absorb and 
assimilate disparate groups and their competing demands more easily than it could 
by claiming allegiance to the Left or Right, as it was able to justify concessions to 
contestations on both sides. New Labour maintained the primacy of the market 
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while allowing a role for the state to address some of the most glaring inequalities 
created by market mechanisms: ‘[W]hile free-market intellectuals criticize the Blair 
government on many grounds, they appear to acknowledge that the underlying 
commitment to a broadly liberalized economic management is a genuine 
one’ (Leitner et al., 2007, p.45). Policies and practices designed to appease more 
traditionally left-wing concerns were also put into place. While policies bore the 
language of these concerns, their focus was on using them to effect efficiency and 
quiet contestations, rather than to address the concerns themselves. In this way 
ideals and contestations traditionally associated with the Left, which were 
ostensibly about political demands regarding equality and justice, came to be used 
as tools to meet economic goals. The whole of society was reorganised and 
reshaped by the Third Way in order to further market efficiency. Inequality was 
addressed by tackling pre-, rather than post-, market inequalities. Policy making 
tended towards the creation of equality of opportunity to compete in a market-
driven society and to this end created initiatives to develop social capital, to 
enhance skills and to increase training opportunities, rather than embracing the 
ideology traditionally associated with the welfare state (Driver and Martell, 1999). 
New Labour ‘was not just about creating an alternative to the state and the market, 
but addressed issues of civil society and cultural values’ (Newman, 2001, p.2). The 
Third Way presented a new ideology and by implication new subjectivities and 
identities; it presented a new moral psychology and a new reality and by 
implication a new conception of our place and role within society. 
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The third way is positioned as the route out of a proclaimed failure of 
traditionally antagonistic ideological programmes to offer up genuine 
answers to social problems. …. Given the presence of crisis, third ways 
have projected themselves as more than merely a technical fix; their 
task is a wholesale cultural and moral renewal. (Barstow and Martin, 
2002, no pagination) 
New Labour’s Third Way perspective and accompanying political settlement was no 
exception. As governments change, citizens are presented with new 
representations of the world, their position in it, and what constitutes a viable or 
liveable identity. The next section explores “the who?” of civic engagement by 
exploring New Labour’s construction of the citizen. 
The enabling state of New Labour ascribed specific roles for the state, the citizen 
and the community. In stark contrast to Thatcher’s famous dictum ‘there is no such 
thing as society’, New Labour ascribed significant roles and responsibilities to 
society by way of the communities of which it is composed. However, looking at 
the context in which Thatcher made this remark, in an interview for Women's Own 
magazine on October 31 1987, there appear to be some similarities between her 
perspective and that of the later Blair government. Thatcher said: 
I think we've been through a period where too many people have been 
given to understand that if they have a problem, it's the government's 
job to cope with it. 'I have a problem, I'll get a grant.' 'I'm homeless, 
the government must house me.' They're casting their problem on 
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society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are 
individual men and women, and there are families. And no government 
can do anything except through people, and people must look to 
themselves first. It's our duty to look after ourselves and then, also to 
look after our neighbour. People have got the entitlements too much in 
mind, without the obligations. There's no such thing as entitlement, 
unless someone has first met an obligation. (Thatcher 1987, cited in, 
Briandeer, n.d., no pagination) 
There were significant differences between the approaches of the Thatcher and 
Blair governments but as the discussion below highlights they both shared an 
emphasis on individual responsibility. For Blair this was articulated in a language of 
duty and responsibility, where for Thatcher it was articulated in a language of 
obligation. Both emphasised the need to reduce dependency on the State and a 
need for individuals to take greater responsibility for their circumstances. Both 
argued for greater emphasis on the individual rather than economic and social 
structures and systems as the primary cause of any individual’s circumstances. This, 
as well as other aspects of New Labour thinking and policy, goes some way to 
explaining the claim, made in various blogs and press articles (some attributing the 
statement to Thatcher herself), that New Labour was Thatcher’s greatest success. 
The belief was that the Thatcher government made history by removing the 
possibility of a return to more traditionally socialist ideas centred on the welfare 
state and the primacy of structural causes for individual circumstances. 
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Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) argue that local government is about much 
more than just service delivery - it is also about community. For New Labour it was 
very much about both, although it was based on a particular understanding of 
community. Community enjoyed pride of place within New Labour rhetoric and it 
played a lead role in its proposed new political settlement. It was both a reaction to 
Thatcherism’s dictum that ‘there is no society’, and also independently important to 
New Labour as the site and the means of achieving their new political settlement. 
The local as opposed to the national was better placed to deal with local issues. 
The development of strong local communities was integral to New Labour’s 
decentralisation initiatives and the thinking that motivated them. As well as much 
rhetoric and policy around the role of the citizen, New Labour also spoke to the 
citizenry collectively as members of communities. The notion and construction of 
communities, generally although not exclusively constructed around locality in 
terms of geography, was pivotal to both the economic and the political projects of 
New Labour. 
New Labour’s appeal to a politics beyond left and right did not go beyond this 
traditional antagonist binary to a politics where there is an appreciation of multiple 
sites of conflict; for New Labour there was no place for conflict within politics. They 
constructed a social world without conflict or antagonism, where community was 
harmonious rather than riven with tension and conflict as it is understood by 
Mouffe (2001; 2013), for example. The rational and moral impetus of the Third Way 
towards the goals of consensus, cohesion and stability precludes dissent and 
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discord either within communities or between a minority community and the 
mainstream; such antagonism would be cast as immoral or irrational, rather than 
progressive or radical.This drives to the heart of the form of participation realised 
under New Labour as it precludes the possibility of participating in anything 
outside the realms of the prevailing common-sense pragmatism espoused by New 
Labour. As the subsequent vignettes illustrate, this tends to restrict participation to 
the inclusion of citizens in issues of implementation rather than policy, as 
overarching policy ideas were constructed as indisputable common sense. 
Although there may be space to influence policy and practice at the very micro 
level, this operates within a larger ideological apparatus which, according to New 
Labour’s construction of the Third Way, is the only sensible way forward and, 
therefore, not up for debate of any kind . An attempt to force discursive closure 19
may have been a specific manoeuvre of New Labour, but it is not necessarily 
exclusive to New Labour. Despite explicit claims from New Labour concerning the 
renewing of democracy, the sharing of power, joint responsibility and joint decision 
making, decentralisation and the importance of the local, and greater citizen 
involvement, the political was more often than not eclipsed by the economic and 
the moral. Mouffe (2005) argues that this shift from the political to the economic 
and the moral, combined with the pragmatism of the Third Way, effected a form of 
depoliticisation.  
 Ultimately this renders participation superficial. In effect it manifests as little more than 19
inclusion as is borne out by the vignettes in the chapter following this. 
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3.14 New Labour Community and Communitarianism  20
New Labour advocated a form of communitarianism which amongst other things 
emphasised the importance of community and the relationship between the 
individual citizen and the community with regard to political life. The word 
'community', one with an interesting history in British politics, has been said to 
have held a unique and important position in Blairite rhetoric. In a speech to the 
Womens' Institute in 2000, Blair used the word no fewer than eighteen times, 
emphasising that his use of the term went beyond the purely geographical and had 
wider ideological implications: 
At the heart of my beliefs is the idea of community. I don’t just mean 
the local villages, towns and cities in which we live. I mean that our 
fulfilment as individuals lies in a decent society of others. My 
argument ... is that the renewal of community is the answer to the 
challenges of a changing world. (Blair, 2000, no pagination,  cited in, 
Milligan and Conradson, 2006, p.16) 
The speech went on to stress the importance of 'community' in what in Mouffe and 
Laclau’s thought would be seen as depoliticised terms, surrounding it with the 
language of morality. A subsequent section of this speech refers to 'the helping 
hand of an active community, not the cold shoulder, the cruelty, of those who say 
'you’re on your own'’. New Labour's use of 'community' went beyond 'the 
common-sense of the day' arguments, it posits a universalist doxa that dismisses 
 I am indebted to Rebecca Daker for many hours of conversation about Blair's 20
communitarianism. 
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ideological opposition as irrational  and pushes it into the territory of moralising. 21
‘Community' crosses over from the rational to the ethical, from 'common sense' to 
an equally unassailable moral necessity. 
Various authors have already rehearsed the argument that New Labour's particular 
brand of communitarianism worked both as an antidote to the individualism and 
self-interest of Thatcherism and as a rebuff to 'Old Labour' and the heavy-handed, 
interventionist state. Both Levitas (2000) and Driver and Martell (2006) have 
identified points of specificity in New Labour's communitarianism which distance it 
from previous incarnations. Levitas (2000) contrasts it with the communitarian 
thought of utopian socialists such as Fourier and Owen by highlighting the links of 
opportunity and responsibility that New Labour 'community' forges between 
individual and state, quoting Blair's election campaign sound bite 'opportunity plus 
responsibility equals community'. Driver and Martell (2006) explore the sociological 
and ethical underpinnings of New Labour communitarianism, and demonstrate its 
usefulness in shoring up neoliberalism by binding social cohesion to economic 
efficiency. Levitas calls it 'the central collective abstraction for New Labour' (2000, 
p.191), a way of expressing geographical, vocational, ethnic or any other kind of 
commonality without resorting to terms redolent of Old Labour and the strong 
state, and while maintaining links with the lexis of civic responsibility. 
 Congruent with Mouffe's universal consensus based on reason that lies at the heart of 21
liberalism.
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Labour appealed to ‘community’ to address the heightened individualism of 
Conservative-led economic growth of the 1980s and to combat the danger of a Big 
State creating an irresponsible citizenry, dependent on the care of the state and 
unable to take on social responsibility (Driver and Martell, 2006). ‘Community will 
restore the moral balance to society by setting out duties and obligations as well as 
rights. And where Old Labour looked to the state for action, New Labour talks of 
reinventing government through collective action in the community’ (ibid, p.28). 
As set out in the preceding pages, the social inequalities created by the 
unrestrained individualism and unfettered free market policies of the Thatcher era 
had to be moderated. Communitarianism was a useful tool in this process, as it 
could be used across any number of policy areas: housing, welfare, education, 
justice, the arts. Levitas (2000) shares Driver and Martell's (2006) view that Blair's 
repeated references to 'community' are a deliberate strike against Thatcher's 
‘There is no such thing as society’. 
Driver and Martell (2006) highlight the way in which New Labour's 
communitarianism uses moral rather than political arguments to maintain distance 
from the Left. On the ethical and the 'meta-ethical' level, Driver and Martell 
observe, New Labour communitarianism pulls away from both the New Right of 
neoliberalism and neoconservatism (signalled in Blair's rhetoric by terms like 
'selfishness' and 'cruelty') and from the ‘Old Left’ and 'a rights-based culture which 
has ignored duties and responsibilities and led to dependency on the welfare state' 
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(ibid., p.33). The imagined 'community' invoked by New Labour provides support 
and social cohesion while also requiring that the individuals within it shoulder their 
civic responsibilities and contribute to the social and economic well-being of the 
group. In this way, economic efficiency enters moral territory, as a virtue upheld by 
the responsible, communitarian citizens of Blair's 'decent society'.   
Driver and Martell's (2006) observations may be taken a step further, as contended 
above, by a move towards Mouffe's formulations on the displacement of the 
political by the moral in models of deliberative democracy: 
Morality has been promoted to the position of a master narrative; as 
such, it replaces discredited political and social discourses as a 
framework for collective action. Morality is rapidly becoming the only 
legitimate vocabulary: we are now urged to think not in terms of right 
and left, but of right and wrong. (Mouffe, 2002, p.1) 
New Labour communitarianism, then, steers a moral as well as a pragmatic course 
between Left and Right, which, following Mouffe's line of argument, weakens the 
political dimension of public life. If the 'communities' of New Labour policy are to 
be constructed in response to moral necessity, then the political becomes 
increasingly irrelevant to the formation of collective identities. As well as being a 
response to economic demands and civic responsibility, as demonstrated by Driver 
and Martell (2006), the creation of any New Labour 'community' comes about 
through moral rationalism, a consensus as to what constitutes Blair's 'decent 
society'. This community cannot, then, be a political one, in Mouffe's sense of the 
 157
word, as its very existence is predicated on the elimination of antagonism and 
dissent. Blair's communitarianism failed to fulfil the radical potential of the post-
Thatcher moment (Hall, 2003). 
The normative dimension of communitarianism, posited as inevitable by Driver and 
Martell (2006), is unavoidably problematised by New Labour's alleged commitment 
to a diverse and pluralistic Britain. On the one hand, the 'strong community' of One 
Nation discourse requires common norms and values which foster cohesion and 
national identity, while on the other, the demand that difference and diversity be 
recognised necessitates a decentralised, less homogenous approach. The latter, 
Driver and Martell (2006) argue, is not motivated solely by a left-wing agenda of 
multiculturalism but also by the magnetic pull of neoliberal hegemony towards the 
free market: 
New Labour's interest in a pluralist civil society is part of its attempt to 
break with postwar forms of socialism and social democracy - in 
particular with state intervention in the economy... Labour's interest in 
'reinventing government' along more communitarian lines marks a shift 
in politics which, in ambition at least, would leave more to voluntary 
endeavour, whether by individuals, families or other non-state 
institutions. This means, of course, a positive commitment to private 
enterprise and the market economy. (ibid., p.118) 
The marketisation of more and more aspects of life privileges choice and the 
individual (Driver and Martell 1999). Individuals, as consumers, make choices about 
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their consumption of private and public goods and individuals, as private people, 
make choices about lifestyle, culture and beliefs (ibid). Greater individual choice 
appears to be favoured in New Labour communitarianism with regard to health, 
education and welfare, in line with the development of entrepreneurial 
governance, although the collective rather than the individual is ‘favoured for 
treatment of neighbours, responsibilities of parents for children and expected 
preferred family form’ (Driver and Martell 1996, p.6).  
As the above and many others (notably Newman, 2001) have demonstrated, New 
Labour's social policy is riddled with inconsistencies, although Driver and Martell 
(2006) make some attempt to lend it coherence by casting it as a move towards a 
form of 'liberal conservatism' that draws together communitarian and liberal 
thinking, and ‘which celebrates the dynamic market economy and is socially 
conservative’ (ibid., p.27). Even without unpicking the many threads of what 
constitutes the communitarian and the liberal, it has already proved instructive to 
note that the different strains of communitarianism identified by Driver and Martell 
within New Labour lead inexorably to the depoliticisation of the community; and, 
inevitably, this problematises the construction of both individual and group 
identities. 
New Labour defined itself as 'other' in being opposed to Thatcherism and Old 
Labour, but more important in this discussion is New Labour's appropriation of 
names and terms associated with that which they claimed to oppose. As language 
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responds to the dominant ideology, so terms such as 'community' and 
'participation' became more fluid as they were used to represent and tie together 
(rather than genuinely unite) disparate groups – for example, Black British people 
claiming ancestry from places as different as Nigeria, Somalia and Jamaica being 
referred to as 'the black community'. While some individuals within these groups 
have resisted, on the whole it enabled New Labour to quieten a number of 
oppositional claims and groups, offering them the rhetoric of diversity while 
simultaneously engaging in naming that promoted homogeneity.    
The rereading of Marx on which the radical democratic project of Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001) depends, one that no longer prioritises a relatively simplistic class 
struggle but which recognises a growing multiplicity of social actors working in 
common as political subjects. The formation of any collective political identity that 
would be able to resist both New Labour’s and social democratic neoliberalism's 
ability simultaneously to assimilate and to fragment resistance would require the 
creation of precisely the kind of chain of equivalence (as defined by Mouffe and 
Laclau, 2001) that is impeded by the moralising rhetoric and contradictions 
discussed above. Mouffe (1992), writing on political identity five years before the 
advent of the New Labour government, defines it thus: 
The creation of political identities as radical democratic citizens, for 
instance, depends on a collective form of identification among the 
democratic demands found in a variety of movements: those of 
women, workers, blacks, gays, the ecological, as well as against other 
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forms of subordination. This is a conception of citizenship that, through 
a common identification with a radical democratic interpretation of the 
principles of liberty and equality, aims at constructing a 'we', a chain of 
equivalence among their demands so as to articulate them through the 
principle of democratic equivalence. (Mouffe, 1992, cited in, Martin, 
2013, p.112) 
In this kind of commonality, plurality is not crushed or erased because difference 
remains constitutive of the 'we', something that New Labour communitarianism is 
unable to comprehend. 
Still, though, we are confronted by the question of who has, or should have, the 
power to name and  thereby be able to contribute to definitions of citizen and 
citizenship. This implies that the only way to achieve radical political subjectivity is 
for oppressed citizens to reject the rhetoric and critique that comes from a position 
of transcendence and to take control of language. New Labour not only hijacked 
terminology but also renamed groups, for example, refugees and asylum seekers 
became 'migrants'. While renaming may not be as powerful as the hijacking of 
names accompanied by a subversion of meaning, it still threatens the ability of 
individuals to group and to form bonds capable of challenging government 
rhetoric. The extent of this challenge is well documented by a variety of authors 
from different perspectives from Bourdieu to Foucault. 
In addition to the imposition of a false homogeneity, in terms of a harmonious 
community working for the ‘common good’ (see for example New Labour’s 
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frequent use of ‘One Nation’), New Labour also ascribed several roles to the citizen 
as an individual. These often contradictory articulations attempted to define the 
proper role of the citizen as a political subject. 
As governments change, citizens are presented with new representations of the 
world, of their position in it, and of what constitutes a viable or liveable identity. As 
New Labour constructed its citizens simultaneously as free market consumers and 
competitors, as members of a communitarian society who were told should be 
both morally united and culturally pluralistic, as potential beneficiaries of the 
welfare state but also as the economic and social actors responsible for the health 
of that state, they were, overburdened by contradictions, precluded from claiming 
political identities and only able to partake of political narrative through the 
heightened individualism of a Giddens-style 'life politics'. Once Left and Right had 
been proclaimed dead, politics had given way to morality in government. 
3.2 Who - The New Labour Citizen 
Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) argue that the notion and construction of 
citizenship is of fundamental importance with regard to the democratic potential of 
decentralisation. They draw a number of stark contrasts in order to highlight this, 
for example Gyford (1991) states: 
the citizen debating public issues in the agora of ancient Greece could 
be seen as the historical symbol of political democracy. The consumer 
making judgements on price and quality in the shopping centre would 
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be the contemporary symbol of economic democracy. (Gyford, 1991, p.
18). 
The discussion below looks at the particularities of citizenship promoted by New 
Labour and ultimately reaches a similar conclusions to that of Burns, Hambleton 
and Hoggett (1994) with regard to the centrality of the notions and constructions of 
citizen and community at play, and democratic potential. 
Janet Newman (2001) addresses many of the ideological inconsistencies in New 
Labour policy; she stresses the way in which the government shaped discourse to 
remake the identities of its citizens through welfare reform and policies claiming to 
combat social exclusion. In a move away from Old Labour, the citizen of New 
Labour rhetoric is constructed in terms of duty and responsibility rather than 
dependency; the relationship between citizen and state is, as Newman (2001) puts 
it, 'quasi- contractual' (ibid., p.150), with the opportunities and rights offered by the 
state being matched by the responsibilities of the citizen. 
The 'modernisation' of welfare was structured around a norm of the 
active, working citizen, availing him or herself of the opportunities to 
become part of the new information-based  economy and equipped 
with the skills and capacities to do so […] The norm of active, working 
citizen differed from previous Labourist conceptions of work in the 
women as well as men, and those previously marginalised through 
disability, single parenthood or long-term unemployment, were 
expected to become fully integrated members of the working 
population. (Newman, 2001, p.150) 
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Newman (2001) argues that not only was the New Labour vision of welfare and 
social inclusion normative it was also moral. The rhetoric of rights and 
responsibilities, in demanding that everyone be a breadwinner and contribute to 
the economy, enabled what she calls a 'disciplinary' approach to social welfare; 
anyone resisting (for whatever reason) the training or 'welfare to work' schemes 
intended to reduce their reliance on benefits and back into work would be guilty of 
a moral failing, that of refusing to recognise their civic responsibilities, which in turn 
justifies punitive measures such as the withdrawal of benefits. The duties of 
citizenship are defined here in terms of active economic responsibility, rather than 
simply (and more traditionally) obeying laws and paying taxes. 
As noted above, New Labour did promote an agenda of greater civic engagement. 
The nature of civic engagement under New Labour was in part determined by a 
specific conception of the citizen. At the same time, the New Labour citizen was in 
part determined by a particular conception of civic engagement. Correspondingly 
the proper place and function of civic engagement was derived from specific goals 
and aims to be achieved by it. These goals included developing greater 
accountability, legitimacy, efficiency and responsivity. 
The next section explores some of the conflicting political, economic and moral 
subject positions ascribed to the New Labour citizen. ‘These discourses provided 
new, legitimate subject positions and identities for social actors’ (Newman, 2001, p.
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167). The overlaying of, often incongruous, moral, political and economic discourse 
by New Labour created complex, contradictory notions of the citizen. The citizen 
became overburdened and according to the various discourses at play was 
expected to fulfil a variety of conflicting subject positions simultaneously. The 
interplay of these discourses resulted in various incongruous subject positions 
becoming fused together under the position of citizen. Citizens were cast as 
rational, responsible politically and morally bound efficiency maximisers. As 
Newman (2001) points out in her examination of New Labour, the issues and 
problems that Labour sought to address, such as inequality and social exclusion, 
were not new; rather, it was the discourses created around these issues that were 
novel. New Labour explicitly called for responsible active citizens. The below 
examines this responsible and active citizen first with a focus on ‘responsible’ and 
then with more focus on the ‘active’ aspect. The two are viewed as related and so 
no hard and fast distinction actually holds. 
3.21 The Responsible Citizen 
In a speech to the Singapore business community in 1996 Tony Blair spoke of the 
development of a ’new’ stakeholder society for the UK. The stakeholder concept 
was reframed in terms of, state rather than firm, and citizen (variously understood in 
connection with society, community and the individual) rather than employee. Blair 
articulated a series of characteristics, derived from but also deviating from US 
stakeholder relations between firms and employees, that he envisioned as the way 
forward for the UK. The term ‘stakeholder society’ quickly disappeared from New 
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Labour rhetoric and policy. However, many of the issues and relationships Blair 
spoke about with reference to it in the 1996 Singapore speech, albeit rebranded in 
various ways, did remain a prominent part of New Labour policy and ideology. This 
very early speech illustrates some of the thinking which continued to influence New 
Labour’s idea of society and the state/citizen relations implicated with it. 
Given the intended audience for this speech, a business community, a certain 
emphasis on commerce and the economic is to be expected and indeed the 
speech centres around Blair’s desire and strategy for ‘Britain to be one of the really 
dynamic economies of the 21st century’ (Blair 1996, p.2). However, in this speech, 
Blair explicitly connects economic success with new state/citizen relations, viewing 
them as intertwined where each is both dependent on and determined by the 
other. In this speech, Blair states that the development of a stakeholder society is 
‘the real way to combine efficiency and equity in a modern age’ (ibid., p.6). The 
notion of a stakeholder community articulated is explicitly pragmatic, with its 
emphasis on practicalities, political, in terms of steering a course between Left and 
Right, moral, in that we all have duties and responsibilities, and economic, as the 
whole thrust of the speech is around the UK again becoming one the top global 
economies. The intertwining and conjoining of the economic, the moral and the 
political is indicative of the way in which New Labour superimposed various, and 
often apparently contradictory, discourses on one another (Newman 2001). Of 
particular interest here are Blair’s articulations around trust, in terms of addressing 
the lack of legitimacy and accountability of British government: private and public 
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sector partnerships, in terms of the continued role of the private sector; the 
economic justification for social cohesion, in terms of the interplay of economic, 
moral and pragmatic discourses; One Nation, in terms of a homogenous and 
harmonious community and responsible citizens and active citizens, in terms of the 
contradictions explored in below.  All of these terms and phrases speak to the role 
and place of the citizen and community within the New Labour project, all feature 
in the 1997 Labour Manifesto, and all continued to play significant roles in New 
Labour rhetoric and policy in all its three terms in government. ‘Our mission in 
politics is to rebuild this bond of trust between government and the people. That is 
the only way democracy can flourish’ (Labour Party Manifesto 1997). For Blair, trust 
means ‘the recognition of a mutual purpose for which we work together and in 
which we all benefit’ (ibid p. 2) and the idea of One Nation centres around ‘a 
country in which we acknowledge an obligation collectively to ensure each citizen 
gets a stake in it….an active politics, the bringing of a country together, a sharing 
of the possibility of power, wealth and opportunity’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997, 
p.2). These were the foundations upon which the New Labour project was built. 
A stakeholder citizen is an active and responsible citizen: ‘If people feel they have 
no stake in a society, they feel little responsibility towards it and little inclination to 
work for its success’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997, p.3). While New Labour often 
did, and Blair here specifically does refer to responsible citizens, the discourse was 
one which effectively both endowed citizens with certain responsibilities and also 
served to create responsible citizens. While their explicit call for ‘responsible 
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citizens’ is a normative stance appealing to a certain morality, the 
‘responsibilisation’ of the citizen attests to a particular causal understanding, and 
superimposed on both were particular economic and political discourses. 
The ‘responsible citizen’ is one who performs the proper roles and duties assigned 
to the citizen under the new political settlement of New Labour. Citizens were 
endowed with an array of rights, duties and responsibilities. As noted above, these 
included both taking opportunities for work, education and training created by the 
state, and taking a greater role in decision making and service provision within their 
geographical communities. State-created opportunities for work, education and 
training were designed to reduce the number of people dependent on benefits 
and to boost the economy; it would reduce the financial burden of providing 
benefits and citizens would become economically active. The state as enabler 
rather than provider would ‘refashion the welfare state on the basis of rights and 
responsibilities, with people helped to help themselves, not just given 
handouts’ (Labour Party Manifesto 2001). Taken from the 2001 manifesto, this 
shows the continued emphasis on rights and responsibilities into New Labour’s 
second term. The engagement of citizens in the provision of services would render 
these services more efficient. Here, then, is the economic discourse implicated 
within the ‘responsible citizen.’ Citizens also had an important role to play within 
New Labour’s mission to renew democracy in the UK. The new forms of co-
governance advocated by New Labour necessitated greater involvement from the 
citizen. It impressed a moral discourse, exhibited by the frequent use of ‘duty’ and 
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‘responsibility’ with regard to the citizen, and, in the quote above, the use of 
‘handouts’, a term associated with such derogatory labels as ‘scrounger’. There is 
also a political discourse at play here, as any designation of roles to state and 
citizen and the relationship between the two is necessarily political. 
New Labour’s One Nation, based on ‘equal life opportunities for all’ and 
implemented most prominently by the ‘Welfare to Work’ scheme (a package 
including benefits reforms, training schemes, education programs, contribution of 
the third sector, and wage subsidies), sought to include the excluded (DWP, 2006). 
The state, as enabler rather than provider, was to be refashioned, not to provide 
benefits to those who needed them, but rather to eradicate what was seen to be 
an unnecessary and immoral dependency on benefits by the majority of, if not all, 
recipients. Ultimately, the causal foundation of anyone’s exclusion and or 
dependency on benefits was to be found within the individual themselves. The 
state as enabler created opportunities which would enable citizens; citizens 
themselves could and, based on rational choice theory, would seize these 
opportunities. The creating of opportunities by the state and the taking of these 
opportunities by citizens would render society more equal. The only external factor 
with a causal relation for inequality was lack of opportunity; all other causal factors 
were deemed to reside within the individual and their choices, and in this way the 
citizen was ‘responsibilised’.  As noted above, the form of communitarianism put 
forward by New Labour repositioned the causes of exclusion, poverty and 
inequality. The primary causes did not reside in economic or societal structures but 
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rather in individuals. On this understanding, tackling issues of exclusion, poverty 
and inequality became the responsibility, not of the state, but of the citizen. The 
enabling state would help citizens to meet these responsibilities. 
There is an obvious tension between this ‘responsibilisation’ of citizens and the 
Empowerment Agenda  advocated by Hazel Blears during her time Secretary for 22
State for Communities and Local Government (2007-2009). The creation of the self-
responsible citizen with equal opportunities, which renders the citizen responsible 
for their position within society, implicitly blames the citizen and this, necessarily, 
actively disempowers them. There was an unresolved tension within New Labour’s 
parallel drives for ‘community engagement’ and ‘community empowerment’. The 
‘responsibilised’ citizen, despite a political discourse around partnership and 
decentralisation, and a lack of power being transferred to the citizenry, tended to 
eclipse the empowered citizen. The vignettes used in this project demonstrate this. 
3.22 The Active Citizen 
Encouraging citizens to engage in policy–making processes via an assortment of 
consultative fora, New Labour promoted an active notion of the citizen and yet, 
concurrently, the citizen was designated as a client and consumer of services, which 
is suggestive of something very different. The former relates to moral and political 
discourses around ‘joined-up government’ and citizen engagement, while the latter 
The empowerment agenda was comprised of a variety of White papers and statutory 22
requirements including the White Paper ‘Strong and Prosperous Communities’ (2006) and the 
new statutory ‘Duty to Involve’ (2009)
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relates more to economic discourses around customer or taxpayer satisfaction and 
efficiency maximisation. 
Civic engagement was to be promoted so as to combat the democratic malaise 
manifested in civic apathy of citizens and their disillusion with traditional models of 
representative government (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997; 2001). New Labour 
identified a variety of causes for this malaise, locating it variously within society and 
the social, traditional representative political settlements, a lack of accountability of 
government, and corruption of government officials. Their solution, addressing all 
of the above, was the new roles and relationships of and between the state and the 
citizen, outlined above, and the introduction of new forms of political activity which 
went beyond suffrage and consultation. These new forms included greater 
decentralisation and the accompanying focus on the local and the citizenry, 
discussed below, and a variety of participatory initiatives including elected mayors, 
citizens’ juries and PB. While the discourse around the state-citizen relationships 
and the necessity for new forms of political activity was ostensibly political, it was 
overlaid with a moral discourse which attributed duties and responsibilities to the 
citizen, and an economic discourse where the inclusion of resources residing in the 
citizenry would enhance the efficiency of service delivery. According to Third Way 
pragmatism, this was the only sensible option. 
According to the moral and political discourses, citizens were encouraged to take 
part in the construction of public policies, and were seen to play an important role 
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in the formulation and implementation of a wide range of policy issues and 
initiatives. This reflects an appreciation of the citizen's capacity to help the 
government on two levels: first, by identifying the needs, preferences and choices 
of the citizenry, and second, by shaping policy. This is consistent with, and also 
offered as a justification for, a form of collaborative government, as is illustrated by 
New Labour's recurrent appeal to 'joined–up government' based on a partnership 
between government and civil society, the public sector and the private sector. It 
also suggests that when policy–making is conceived as a shared process, the power 
of the state is no longer monopolised by politicians and administrative 
bureaucracies. Instead, an inclusive deliberative approach allows for information 
gathering from various arenas that generates relevant input for public policy 
formulation. There was a significant emphasis on both ‘consultation’ and 
‘partnership’ throughout the New Labour governments, indicative of the shift 
toward more collaborative models. The notion of an active citizen, where citizens 
are no longer regarded as simply voters but also as policy–makers, is part of a 
particular political discourse associated with deliberative models of democracy 
which emphasises the importance of citizen participation for the restoration (or 
introduction) of democratic vitality in our societies. Citizen engagement is seen as a 
way of revitalising the public sphere and generating political solutions that better 
reflect a collective will and a common good. This was indicative of the ‘new phase 
in the development of democracy… a new phase of experimentation within 
participatory governance, involving a variety of ways of directly engaging citizens 
with government’ (Warren, 2012, p.ix). The expansion of the public sphere, 
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acknowledging the capacity of and affording greater roles for citizens and the 
citizenry, was deemed a necessary condition for the development of democracy 
(ibid). 
The citizen was also identified as a consumer and a client. These identifications 
driven predominantly by an economic discourse focused on efficiency 
maximisation; an assumption that citizens want maximum efficiency lending it some 
additional validity. Here, the state does have a role in providing services. However, 
the concept of an enabling state remains; central government was to enable a 
more effective provision of services at the local level via a series of decentralisation 
initiatives discussed below. Central government was tasked with ensuring taxpayers 
satisfaction with public services and, to this end, New Labour sought to improve 
the efficiency of services by both engaging citizens and by a process of 
decentralisation down to the level of the local. This civic engagement, however, 
was predominantly economically driven and focused on the efficiency of service 
provision as a way to ensure the citizen as customer and client was satisfied. This is 
the idea behind, for example, the ubiquitous value–for–money jargon widely 
employed during New Labour's administration. This suggests that the main task of 
government is essentially an organisational one, that is, finding the most efficient 
solutions to maximise the quality of services at minimum cost. If the satisfaction of 
the consumers is the priority, then individuals are not regarded as citizens, but 
rather as consumers. This was not a new identification, the conflation of citizen, 
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client and consumer was common to all governments in the UK from at least the 
early 1980s (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). 
This consumer–focused approach is grounded in a wider managerial orientation. If 
the right choice is a matter of discovering the appropriate technique or 
organisational solution, then the managers are those best equipped to lead and to 
coordinate the policy process. In contrast to the active model of citizenship, here 
the power lies not in the knowledge of the masses but rather in the specialised 
knowledge of the experts. Managers are rational agents that possess proper 
training and skills that enable them to identify problems, to devise solutions, to 
implement policies and to review their results.  Recognising the inefficiency of an 
overly bureaucratised system of local government, New Labour recruited many of 
these ‘managers’ from the private sector. This was at once both the motivation and 
the justification for the creation of a wealth of new public private partnerships 
(PPPs)  under New Labour. The privatisation or partial privatisation of many 23
services generally eliminates political considerations from their organisation. For 
the most part, private companies follow economic not political imperatives. This 
necessarily depoliticises service provision and, following this economic discourse, 
the primary function of the citizen is that of an information provider. This is 
reminiscent of traditional forms of consultation as the citizen, rather than partner, 
assumes the role of information provider. 
 Under New Labour additional PPPs were introduced across sectors including health, 23
education and transport
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The active citizen, grounded in a moral and political discourse, stands at odds with 
the consumer/client citizen grounded in an economic discourse. In the former, civic 
engagement in decision making processes is prized, while an acknowledgment of 
the economic benefits of expertise in the latter restricts decision making to a few 
experts. Enlightened experts gain legitimacy by virtue of their specific skills over 
collective wisdom dispersed in the masses. Although accountability mechanisms 
are generally set up, it is difficult to see how a managerial rationality can be 
consistent with the political and moral drivers of a responsible and active citizen. 
New Labour’s ‘society’ cannot, as has been argued above, be a political one, in 
Mouffe's sense of the word, as its very existence is predicated on the elimination of 
antagonism and dissent. This unavoidably problematises New Labour's alleged 
commitment to a diverse and pluralistic Britain. If the citizen of New Labour policy 
is to be constructed in response to moral necessity, then the political becomes 
increasingly irrelevant to the identity of the citizen. New Labour invoked an 
economic discourse around efficiency maximisation, a political discourse around 
civic engagement, and a moral discourse of civic responsibility. 
This array of often conflicting interpretations of the citizen necessarily significantly 
impacted on citizen engagement as it designates who engages, in what, how, and 
to what end they do so. PB as it manifested in the UK spoke to several of these 
varying subject positions. This is drawn out by way of the vignettes. What follows 
here is an explanation of the new policy initiatives for citizen engagement which 
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afforded the new formal institutional arrangements which in turn afforded PBs 
assimilation into the formal political infrastructure within the UK. 
3.3 How - Decentralisation in the UK 
Decentralisation was not new to the UK. The notion of decentralisation has a long 
history in the UK and it was the focus of much attention in the decades leading up 
to New Labour’s electoral victory. Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, (1994) provide 
an excellent account of changes in thinking and policy with regard to 
decentralisation and the reorganisation of local government from the 1950s 
through to the early 1990s. Decentralisation can provide both economic and 
democratic goods (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.xiv); it can enhance the 
quality and efficiency of service provision, and it can also strengthen ‘citizen 
involvement in the governing process’ (ibid., p.xiv). Both economic and democratic 
reform were explicit aims for the New Labour government, making decentralisation 
a natural strategy for them to pursue. There are many forms of decentralisation 
including: neighbourhood based decentralisation, devolution of power to voluntary 
groups, involving the public in council decision making, and decentralising to the 
individual service user via market mechanisms (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 
1994, pp.5-6). Regarding UK policy, a very oversimplified distinction can be made 
between decentralisation from central to local government and from local 
government to smaller groups including citizens, voluntary groups and/or the 
private sector.(Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). Clearly within these two very 
general forms there are many variants of decentralisation. 
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Debates about the form, role and nature of local government had all but fallen into 
obscurity in Britain until the changes of the 1980s and 1990s brought discussions of 
this nature back to centre stage (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.3). Blair 
may have implemented new policies and strategies regarding decentralisation but 
discussion preceded their electoral victory and, by the mid-1990s, parties from 
across the political spectrum agreed that decentralisation was desirable, if for 
different reasons and to be implemented in different ways. By the 1990s, interest in 
the ability of decentralisation to enhance service provision and accountability 
spanned across all parties; decentralisation was no longer considered as a radical 
form of reorganisation but rather as the way forward for politics in Britain (Burns, 
Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, pp.3-4). By 1991, even the Conservative 
government, who under Thatcher had done much to reduce the role and power of 
local government as part of an ideological attack on the provision of public services 
and the institutions of local democracy, began to espouse a positive agenda for 
public services (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.5). Burns, Hambleton and 
Hoggett (1994) identify three major strategies pursued in order to tackle the crisis 
of local government in the UK in the late 1980s and early 1990s: the extension of 
markets, new managerialism and the extension of democracy. 
These debates were forced back onto the agenda by economic and political 
concerns at both the domestic and international level. The consequences of the oil 
crisis of 1973 and the declining profitability of Fordism, due in great part to 
 177
growing international competition, and a backlash against the Thatcherite policies 
of privatisation, forced a rethink of the economic structures and strategies of the 
UK; the latter included a rethink regarding the roles and relationships of central and 
local government. (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.8). The Thatcher 
government of 1979 was seen by many to have launched an ideological but also 
very practical attack, especially in terms funding, on both local government and the 
institutions of local democracy (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). The 1990s 
saw various attempts to reinvigorate both. 
As debate around the relationship between central and local government grew in 
prominence so too did debate around public participation. ‘[I]n the 1970s, we can 
note that there was a surge of innovation with public participation and community 
development in the period from 1968’ (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.
15). However, ‘[t]he participatory democracy which some believed to be just 
around the corner did not materialise’ (ibid., pp.15-16). By the early 1990s, issues 
of public participation and democratic innovation were back on central stage. New 
Labour revived the community development ideas of the 1970s. This may well have 
been in part due to the fact that the 1970s advocates of community development 
were now leaders within the Labour party. In addition, given the pride of place 
afforded to community in New Labour rhetoric, albeit rather muddled, an emphasis 
on the potential and development of community is not surprising. 
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Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) outline the three major strategies for public 
service reform occurring during the 1980s and 1990s. All were based on the idea 
that the public service bureaucracies of the 1970s were unresponsive. One strategy 
was to extend markets, focusing on people as consumers who could and would be 
empowered by the removal of government, both local and national. Another 
strategy was that of New Managerialism, which viewed people as customers who 
would be empowered by way of self improvement. The third strategy Burns, 
Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) identify is a project to extend democracy, where 
people are viewed as citizens and empowered by being given voice. We can see 
aspects of all three of these within New Labour’s decentralisation initiatives. 
The decentralisation of political power throughout the United Kingdom was one of 
New Labour’s ten key commitments in their Manifesto of 1997. Decentralisation 
was a pivotal aspect of the new political settlement propounded by New Labour 
which significantly impacted upon the form public participation took during this 
period. New Labour’s enabling state did seek to enable the citizen, but it also 
explicitly sought to enable local government, so that the two could work together 
in a form of joined-up government. This included a commitment to the 
introduction of democratic innovations and as such begins to situate PB within 
policies and institutions, details of which are taken up by way of the vignettes. 
Where the focus of the previous section was on the creation of roles and 
relationships, this section focuses on concrete policies and the formal institutional 
arrangements associated with them. 
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New Labour continued with the already acknowledged necessity to rethink and to 
reorganise the relationship between central and local government and the form 
and function of local government itself. 
In 1997: 
‘Over-centralisation of government and lack of accountability was a 
problem in governments of both left and right. Labour is committed to 
the democratic renewal of our country through decentralisation and the 
elimination of excessive government secrecy…. 
Local decision-making should be less constrained by central 
government, and also more accountable to local people. We will place 
on councils a new duty to promote the economic, social and 
environmental well-being of their area. They should work in partnership 
with local people, local business and local voluntary organisations. They 
will have the powers necessary to develop these partnerships. To 
ensure greater accountability, a proportion of councillors in each locality 
will be elected annually. We will encourage democratic innovations in 
local government, including pilots of the idea of elected mayors with 
executive powers in cities.’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997, no 
pagination) 
And in 2001: 
‘We will decentralise power within a clear framework of national 
standards to increase the quality and diversity of public services and 
meet the challenge of rising expectations.’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 
2001, no pagination)  
 180
‘In all our public services, the key is to devolve and decentralise power 
to give freedom to frontline staff who perform well, and to change 
things where there are problems. Services need to be highly responsive 
to the demands of users.’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 2001, no pagination) 
This commitment was kept, as a variety of decentralisation initiatives and policies 
were implemented throughout both of their first two terms, although this began to 
tail off as it entered its third term. After winning the general election, New Labour 
published a White Paper in 1998 ‘Modern Government: In Touch With the People’, 
which displayed a concern for both ‘improving’ democracy and greater efficiency. 
This White Paper was implemented in 2000 by way of The Local Government Act, 
however, by 2002, there was recognition that the strategy was not working, and this 
is in turn saw the advent of new localism. By 2004, David Miliband was calling for 
‘Power to the People’ and talking of double devolution, 2006 saw the publication 
of both the Lyons Inquiry into local government and another White Paper entitled 
‘Strong and Prosperous Communities’. The aim of this White Paper was ‘to give 
local people and local communities more influence and power to improve their 
lives. It is about creating strong, prosperous communities and delivering better 
public services through a rebalancing of the relationship between central 
government, local government and local people’ (DCLG, 2006, p.22). It explicitly 
supported the use of PB as a way of promoting democracy through participation 
and empowerment, and saw this as key to devolving power to communities. In 
2007, Hazel Blears became Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government, formerly the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and she 
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championed Participatory Budgeting until she resigned in 2009. She went as far as 
to call for their implementation in every local authority by 2012. Concomitant with 
Blears’ role as Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government was the 
2007 Sustainable Communities Act, originally a Conservative bill adopted by 
Labour, which required authorities to inform citizens of how public money was 
being spent in their area. Additionally in 2007, there was the spending review 
which made mention of area-based budgets, the Local Government and Public 
Involvement in Health Act, and the publication of the government’s Review of Sub-
National Economic Development and Regeneration. These endowed councils with 
greater powers explicitly in order to develop local prosperity and economic growth. 
Gordon Brown pledged that his government would continue devolution to local 
government and in 2010 the Decentralisation and Localism Bill was introduced. 
Decentralisation can take many forms and New Labour introduced a variety of 
them; decentralisation was one of the biggest policy initiatives pursued by New 
Labour. The various justifications New Labour gave for the need for 
decentralisation, understood as handing more power to local authorities and their 
communities included: central government was not very good at making decisions 
about local service provision, it would deepen democracy, it would increase 
efficiency and that those at the local level are best placed to understand the needs 
of the local population. Under New Labour's decentralisation, knowledge was the 
oil that kept the machine running. This information was understood to reside at the 
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local level, within local authorities and the populations which they served, and was 
expected to support the running and provision of services. 
The new relationship between the state and civil society was couched in the 
language of decentralisation and participation. However, there was another 
member of this partnership - the private sector.  Driven by an explicit desire to 
improve services and to render them more efficient and more responsive to the 
people they serve, New Labour sought to rearrange their delivery using both 
citizens, predominantly to provide valuable information, and the private sector as a 
more efficient and competitive alternative to the market. Here, then, the political 
aspect of civic engagement was, more often than not, eclipsed  by an economic 
discourse. In addition to this, a moral discourse around duties and responsibilities 
was used as an additional justification for the economic drivers; citizens had a 
responsibility and a duty to help create a ‘better Britain’. 
The push for decentralisation was centrally driven; there was a whole host of 
initiatives, policies and White Papers (as evidenced above) which forced roles and 
responsibilities on local bodies. New Labour’s decentralisation drive displays a 
complex relation of both delegation to, and control of, local authorities. Policy 
initiatives ran alongside a host of performance management indicators (including 
star ratings and financial incentives) and the creation of an Audit Commission which 
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made use of a plethora of Key Performance Indicators (KPI) to inspect councils and 
other public bodies. Under New Labour there were in fact 198 KPIs .   24
New Labour did seek to have services more locally driven. However, it also insisted 
on greater accountability of and efficiency from local authorities and service 
providers. New Labour introduced just under 200 Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs)  in or to monitor local government performance which in effect 25
administered greater central control over local government. Local authorities were 
to carry out new roles and their ability to do so was closely monitored by central 
government. There was constant surveillance from central government in order to 
ensure that best practice, as outlined in their own documents, was being realised. 
Citizens also featured in this complex, controlling, centrally-driven form of 
decentralisation. Blair used what was seen as a universal democratic malaise, 
citizens’ dissatisfaction with governments both local and national, as a justification 
for decentralising to local bodies. This ‘justification’ took the form of a thinly veiled 
threat; people and communities are dissatisfied with the local bodies, therefore 
they must change. If they did not change, and so increase the electorate’s trust and 
satisfaction, then MPs were in danger of losing at the local  elections. They must 
change and become more efficient, more accountable, and more responsive to 
local communities. Here ‘accountable’ was meant as accountable to the local 
  198 was the initial number of KPIs proposed; this number did go down slightly as there was 24
a realisation that not all of them were viable. All 198 are set out in a 488 page document put 
together by the Local Government (DCLG) entitled‘National Indicator for Local Authorities and 
Local Authority Partnerships’ (2008)
 The performance framework principles on which these were based was set out in the 2006 25
Government White Paper 'Strong and Prosperous Communities'
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communities, and was a crucial part of New Labour’s citizen/state relationship 
where the two were to work together for a better Britain. However, the mechanism 
of surveillance measuring the performance of local government meant that the 
accountability was ultimately local government accountability to central 
government. In effect this overrode the stated commitment of greater 
accountability to citizens. 
New Labour did provide large amounts of money for the implementation of their 
centrally-driven decentralisation initiatives. As the local was given money by central 
government to carry out specific policy and initiatives, it was accountable to central 
government and, as noted above, New Labour created several schemes to monitor 
local bodies’ activities and to ensure this accountability. Not only did the initial 
funding for the initiatives come from central government, but also there were 
actual financial incentives available; if local bodies were seen to be displaying best 
practice and realising the goals set out for them by central government, then they 
would be rewarded with additional funding. If local bodies were seen to be 
underperforming, using the monitoring and evaluating methods noted above, then 
funding would be reduced or cut. Under New Labour, then, power was divided, if 
not so much decentralised; it was divided between the economic, in terms of a 
commitment to the market; central government, via its particular variety of 
decentralisation; and society, predominantly by the way in which it cast the state/
citizen relation, and the role of the citizen. Glasman (2010) succinctly states the 
impact of this on the public sphere: 
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If the state becomes the ultimate source of collective power and the 
market that of money, then it is not surprising that society – the third 
sphere, and source of reciprocity and association – finds itself 
impoverished and powerless.’ (Glasman, 2010, p.59, cited in, Corbett 
and Walker, 2013, p.466) 
The three biggest decentralisation initiatives under New Labour were the New Deal 
for Communities implemented in 1998/1999 (NDC), the Neighbourhood 
Management Pathfinders announced in 2001 (NMP) and the Neighbourhood 
Renewal Fund also announced in 2001 (NRF). Each of these initiatives related to 
the development of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and Local Area Partnerships 
(LAP). All of these were developed within New Labour’s conception of an enabling 
state where the state was no longer to provide so much as it was to enable. It 
would enable individuals and communities to be and to do better. Ultimately, the 
NDC, NMPs and NRF all stemmed from New Labour’s Neighborhood Renewal 
initiative, which was a long term strategy to reduce geographical inequality in the 
UK. Noting existing inequality in the UK, New Labour sought to equalise the 
playing field and, as enabler, it would facilitate the creation of equal opportunity for 
all. Having acknowledged that there was inequality in the UK, New Labour focused 
on spatial and geographical inequality i.e. geographical areas of relative 
deprivation as measured by the newly developed  Index of Multiple Deprivation 26
(IMD). The NDC, NMPs and the NRF all bore this out and were all characterised, to 
 In 1998 the Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions (DETR) was tasked with 26
developing a new Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) to replace the existing Index of Local 
Deprivation (ILD)
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varying extents, by a desire to ‘bend the spend’. The thinking was that these 
deprived areas were being underserved and that the relationship between the 
need for services and the provision of services was not balancing in these areas. 
Money was pumped into these areas  of deprivation via the NDC, NMPs and NDC 27
so that equality of opportunity could be realised. It is no coincidence that almost all 
PBs in the UK under New Labour took place in areas designated as some of the 
most deprived in England, as additional funds were available for new initiatives in 
these areas. Despite the drive and push for decentralisation under New Labour, 
there was little to no fiscal decentralisation; New Labour decentralisation centred 
around service provision and shifting this down to local bodies and the 
communities they served. Local initiatives still had to adhere to national policy, set 
by central government. Although significant, this is not what most hampered PB in 
the UK. Given that PB focussed on handing over financial decision making power 
to citizens the lack of fiscal decentralisation under New Labour meant that any PB 
process in the UK at this time would necessarily be limited. 
At one point it almost looked like the UK would enshrine some sort of participatory 
democracy into LSPs. They were meant to have a governance structure behind 
them which was more than just the existing informal partnerships between service 
heads. LSPs had a very explicit agenda and individually they had their own 
agendas. Community Relations Councils played an important role in setting up PBs 
 In the 2001 Manifesto Blair pledged £900 million for  areas of deprivation and between 27
2001 and 2003 that was the amount spent on 88 of the most deprived boroughs via the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund which was part of the New Deal for Communities (Johnstone 
and Whitehead, 2004, p.9).
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in Porto Alegre and LSPs were hoped to be similar sorts of bodies - a strategic 
partnership with a governance agenda and explicit role for the voluntary sector. 
However, in actuality LSPs were cut off just as they were starting to be instituted. 
LSPs were about partnership budgets in the same way as the current Our Place 
schemes; they were the infrastructure built to deal with the following questions: - 
how to target resources and work within a pooled budget? How to reach down to 
front line level and get various agencies involved in front line work and provision? 
How to make collective decisions and ensure the public has a voice in this? While 
all these have explicitly political content, the overlaying of multiple discourses by 
New Labour ultimately circumscribed any political potential. 
Participation was generally a consultation of consumers by the government, rather 
than any meaningful transition of power or decision making capacities to citizens. 
The continued existence of quangos and outsourcing of public service provision to 
private companies prevented any democratisation of large areas of public policy 
and service finance. There was more decentralisation but little or no devolution of 
power to the local level, not least because of the continued exercise of ring fencing 
and capping of local authority spending. The New Localism, introduced in the 
second half (2001 onwards) of the New Labour government, did mark a shift from 
the previous centralism. There was more decentralisation but little or no devolution 
of power.  While the rhetoric changed, the government still pursued privatisation 
policies and decentralisation as a management technique rather than a democratic 
tool. 
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Two motivating factors can be identified with regard to New Labour’s drive for 
decentralisation: a desire to create ‘democratic renewal’ and a desire to improve 
service delivery. Decentralisation would affect democratic renewal by way of civic 
engagement and greater accountability of government and public officials. Giving 
local government greater power and autonomy with regard to service provision, 
combined with greater input from citizens, renders service delivery both more 
responsive to the citizenry and more efficient. Greater accountability, in addition to 
contributing to democratic renewal would also motivate service providers to be 
more efficient. The two motivating factors for decentralisation are then revealed to 
be connected. Furthermore, in line with New Labour’s insistence on equal 
opportunity for all, there was a desire to reduce the geographical inequality in 
Britain; this was apparent in the many of New Labour’s decentralisation policies and 
initiatives. The impetus for all of the above was variously moral, political and 
economic. Accountability was construed as political in that it would strengthen 
democracy by improving trust between citizens and the government, the latter 
being understood as one of the causes of a perceived apathy amongst the general 
population. At the same time, accountability was economic, in that inefficiencies 
would have to be accounted for, thus creating a motivation to improve efficiency. 
Both the focus on geographical inequality and civic engagement were constructed 
as moral, political and economic. Couched in a language of equality for all, this 
spoke of a political ideal at the core of democracy. However, as noted above this 
was a particular form of equality - equality of opportunity. This equal opportunity 
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was, in addition to its aforementioned political construction, a moral and an 
economic construct; a lack of opportunity prevented individuals from contributing 
to the British economy and, concomitantly, individuals had a moral duty and 
responsibility to seize these created opportunities and contribute to the society in 
which they lived, and to societies economic and poltical renewal. Efficiency, in 
addition to its obvious economic construction was constructed as moral. 
Understood as the moral duty and political responsibility of elected officials to 
serve their electorate to the best of their ability, where service is understood as 
being as efficient and responsive to the electorate’s needs as possible, efficiency 
was likewise embedded within a moral discourse. 
Participation and participatory practices did enjoy a surge of popularity from the 
early to mid-1990s, but discussion of the relationship between participation and 
democracy is as old as political thought itself. There had been much attention paid 
to participation and participatory practices in the thirty or so years before New 
Labour came to power. However, quoting from a study of the participatory 
initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s, Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) reveal the 
absence of power shifts accompanying these initiatives. 
though there have been great moves towards public involvement in 
local service provision in recent years, little has been achieved by way 
of a fundamental shift in power, a shift which implicitly underlay the 
radical proponents of participation in the late 1960s. In the end, elite 
perspectives have won out, and participation has served the purposes 
of building up a consensus for the proposals of those in power, thereby 
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legitimating them. (Boaden et al., 1982, p.179, cited in, Hambleton and 
Hoggett 1994, p.23) 
By the early 1990s there was an acknowledged crisis of local government in the UK 
and all parties were looking at strategies for reform (Burns, Hambleton and 
Hoggett 1994). While John Major undertook several reviews and began to instigate 
a moderate reform program when he took over from Margaret Thatcher as prime 
minister in 1991, it was under New Labour, winning the 1997 general election, that 
a more significant overhaul was attempted. This  combined elements of thinking 
drawn from both the 1970s, in terms of community development, and the 1980s, in 
terms of decentralisation.  
Reforming Local Government - Ambivalence and Countervalence 
The New Labour attempts to reform local government displayed the same 
ambivalences and contradictions apparent in so much of the New Labour oratory 
and policy. Stated attempts to decentralise and grant greater autonomy to local 
government more often than not resulted in a more centralised form of 
government and as a consequence of increased surveillance and monitoring an 
actually loss of autonomy for local government. This loss of control at the local 
level may go some way towards explaining why local authorities would be reluctant 
to cede power and control to citizens.   
The promise of change  
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The New Labour victory brought with it a promise of change for local government 
and local/central government relations. The notion of decentralisation has a long 
history in the UK and it was the focus of much attention in the decades leading up 
to New Labour’s electoral victory (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). Debates 
about the form, role and nature of local government had all but fallen into 
obscurity in Britain until the changes of the 1980s and 1990s brought discussions of 
this nature back to centre stage (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.3). These 
debates were forced back onto the agenda by economic and political concerns at 
both the domestic and international level, notably. The consequences of the oil 
crisis of 1973 and the declining profitability of Fordism, itself due in great part to 
growing international competition, and a backlash against the Thatcherite policies 
of privatisation. These forced a rethink of the economic structures and strategies of 
the UK; the latter included a rethink regarding roles and relationships of central and 
local government. (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.8).  
The Thatcher government was infamous for both its ideological and also very 
practical, especially in terms of funding, attack on local government and the 
institutions of local democracy (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994; Sullivan et 
al., 2004, p.245; Travers, 2004, p.90). ‘The absence of a codification of the 
relationship between central and local government means the latter is a creature of 
statute subject to the vagaries and predilections of central political 
administrations.’ (Sullivan et al., 2004, p.245). Blair may have implemented new 
policies and strategies regarding decentralisation but discussion preceded their 
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electoral victory. By the early 1990s there was an acknowledged crisis of local 
government in the UK and all parties were looking at strategies for reform with 
various attempts to reinvigorate both local government and the institutions of local 
democracy (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). Interest in the ability of 
decentralisation to enhance service provision and accountability spanned across all 
parties and was no longer considered as a radical form of reorganisation but rather 
as the way forward for politics in Britain (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, pp.
3-4).  
There were three major strategies pursued in order to tackle the crisis of local 
government in the UK in the late 1980s and early 1990s: the extension of markets, 
new managerialism and the extension of democracy.All were based on the idea 
that the public service bureaucracies of the 1970s were unresponsive (Burns, 
Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). The extension of markets focused on people as 
consumers who could and would be empowered by the removal of government, 
both local and national. New Managerialism viewed people as customers who 
would be empowered by way of self improvement and the project to extend 
democracy viewed people as citizens empowered by being given voice (ibid). 
Although local government had survived the Thatcherite reforms it had suffered 
and by the time New Labour took office in 1997 it was ‘battered and 
bruised’ (Coulson 2004, p.467). The Major government did attempt to restore 
central-local government relationships and  undertook several reviews to begin to 
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instigate a moderate reform program when it took over from Margaret Thatcher in 
1991 Implementation(Burns, Hamilton and Hoggart 1994; Travers 2004). However, 
at that time, there was still much to be done to restore local political power and 
many hoped that the election of a Labour government would return power to local 
government through its implementation of significant reforms (Travers 2004, p.90) .  
The responsiveness and efficiency of local government which concerned the 
Thatcher government (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994) were also amongst 
the issues raised in the New Labour Manifestos of 1997 and 2001. New Labour 
continued with the already acknowledged necessity to rethink and to reorganise 
the relationship between central and local government and the form and function 
of local government itself (Newman 2001; Newman et al. 2004; Travers 2004). A 
big part of this reform process, sold as modernisation, was a commitment to 
decentralisation. The decentralisation of political power throughout the United 
Kingdom was one of New Labour’s ten key commitments in their Manifesto of 
1997. Decentralisation was a pivotal aspect of the new political settlement 
propounded by New Labour and significantly impacted upon the form and 
potential of civic engagement  during this period. New Labour’s enabling state did 
seek to enable the citizen, but also explicitly sought to change the role and 
function of local government. Decentralisation was deemed a necessary strategy 
for remedying the unresponsiveness of local government, enhancing the quality 
and efficiency of service provision and strengthening citizen involvement as can be 
seen from the extracts from the 1997 and 2001 Manifestos below. Although the 
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strategies and emphasis changed over time (this is discussed in more detail below) 
a general commitment to decentralisation remained as the exerts from the 1997 
and the 2001 manifesto, quoted earlier and repeated here, illustrate.  
In 1997: 
‘Over-centralisation of government and lack of accountability was a problem in 
governments of both left and right. Labour is committed to the democratic renewal 
of our country through decentralisation and the elimination of excessive 
government secrecy…. 
Local decision-making should be less constrained by central government, and also 
more accountable to local people. We will place on councils a new duty to 
promote the economic, social and environmental well-being of their area. They 
should work in partnership with local people, local business and local voluntary 
organisations. They will have the powers necessary to develop these partnerships. 
To ensure greater accountability, a proportion of councillors in each locality will be 
elected annually. We will encourage democratic innovations in local government, 
including pilots of the idea of elected mayors with executive powers in 
cities.’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997, no pagination) 
In 2001: 
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‘We will decentralise power within a clear framework of national standards to 
increase the quality and diversity of public services and meet the challenge of 
rising expectations.’ (Labour Party Manifesto,  2001, no pagination)et al. 2004. 
‘In all our public services, the key is to devolve and decentralise power to give 
freedom to frontline staff who perform well, and to change things where there are 
problems. Services need to be highly responsive to the demands of users.’ (Labour 
Party Manifesto, 2001, no pagination) 
The reforms they went on to implement were significant in terms of the sheer 
number of policies and initiatives launched (Coulson 2004; Sullivan et al. 2004; 
Travers 2004; Watson & Game 2011) and those working in local government 
certainly felt their impact (Newman et al. 2004). However the extent to which 
power was returned to local government is questionable as is the extent to which 
there was a significant change in direction in terms of reform to local government 
under Thatcher and Blair. Although their oratories clearly differed, the 
Conservatives favouring a lexicon of ‘competition’ and New Labour one of 
‘modernisation’, (Watson 2003, p.467). There were, at least some similarities 
between the two. Notably in terms of the involvement of the private sector, both as 
a model for the public sector to emulate and as an actual provider of ‘public’ 
services (Travers 2004; Watson 2003; Wilks-Heeg 2009). illustrating the extent to 
which central government exerted its control over local government (Lowndes, 
1999; Newman 2001, Newman et al. 2004; Pratchett 2002; Pratchett and Leach 
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2004; Sullivan et. 2004 al; Travers, 2004; Watson and Game 2011; Wilks-Heeg, 
2009) and showing how both governments used remarkably similar instruments to 
both gain and retain power over local government,’ (Watson, 2003, p. 471).  
New Powers? 
This is not to say that New Labour simply adopted and continued the 
Conservatives approach and policies with regard to local government. There were 
differences and notable structural reforms (Watson 2003; Wilks-Heeg, 2009)some 
of which included new frameworks and new powers for local government (Sullivan 
et al. 2004; Travers 2004; Wilks-Heeg 2011).  
CHECK referencing of interviews! MAYBE delete? 
The three biggest decentralisation initiatives under New Labour were the New Deal 
for Communities implemented in 1998/1999 (NDC), the Neighbourhood 
Management Pathfinders announced in 2001 (NMP) and the Neighbourhood 
Renewal Fund also announced in 2001 (NRF) (Interviewee I). Each of these 
initiatives related to the development of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and 
Local Area Partnerships (LAP) (ibid). All of these were developed within New 
Labour’s conception of an enabling state where the role of the state focussed more 
on facilitation and less on provision, thus enabling individuals and communities to 
be and to do better. Ultimately, the NDC, NMPs and NRF all stemmed from New 
Labour’s Neighbourhood Renewal initiative, which itself was a long term strategy to 
reduce geographical inequality in the UK (Interview, Richard Edwards). Noting 
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these existing inequalities , New Labour sought to equalise the playing field and, 
as enabler, it would facilitate the creation of equal opportunity for all (ibid). Having 
acknowledged such inequalities  New Labour focused on its spatial and 
geographical aspects  i.e. geographical areas of relative deprivation as measured 
by the newly developed Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) (Interviewee J). The 
NDC, NMPs and the NRF all bore this out and were all characterised, to varying 
extents, by a desire to ‘bend the spend’ (Interview Richard Edwards). The thinking 
was that these deprived areas were being underserved and that the relationship 
between the need for services and the provision of services was not balanced. 
(ibid). Money was pumped into these areas of deprivation via the NDC, NMPs and 
NDC so that in effect an equality of opportunity could be realised. It is no 
coincidence that almost all PBs in the UK under New Labour took place in areas 
designated as some of the most deprived in England, these being the specific 
target areas for additional funding and propagation of new initiatives.(Interviewee 
J). 
The push for decentralisation was itself centrally driven in that there was a whole 
host of initiatives, policies and White Papers, which forced roles and responsibilities 
on local bodies. After winning the general election, New Labour published a White 
Paper in 1998 ‘Modern Government: In Touch With the People’. This displayed a 
concern for both ‘improving’ democracy and for greater efficiency and was 
eventually implemented in 2000 by way of The Local Government Act. This 
afforded Local government  new powers and new roles (Sullivan et al., 2004, p.
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246); and granted it both greater discretionary powers ‘enabling a council to do 
almost anything that would enhance the ‘economic, social or environmental 
wellbeing’ of its area.’ (Watson, 2003, p. 470) and also it was accorded a new 
community leadership role (Sullivan et al 2004, p.246). Local government also 
potentially had greater financial freedoms too with the liberalisation of capital 
finance (Travers, 2004; Wilson & Game, 2011), the removal of capping (Travers 
2004; Wilson & Game, 2011, p.176) and an increase in ‘real terms’ funding for local 
services (Wilson & Game, 2011, p.176). However, none of these went unchecked; 
some initiatives like the removal of capping were simply reversed (Travers 2004; 
Watson & Game 2011) while others were checked by additional responsibilities and 
accountabilities and/or other policies and initiatives. 
By 2002 however there was recognition that these initiatives were not working, and 
this is in turn saw the advent of new localism (Interviewee I). By 2004, David 
Miliband was calling for ‘Power to the People’ and talking of double devolution. 
2006 saw the publication of both the Lyons Inquiry into local government and 
another White Paper entitled ‘Strong and Prosperous Communities’. The aim of this 
White Paper was ‘to give local people and local communities more influence and 
power to improve their lives. It is about creating strong, prosperous communities 
and delivering better public services through a rebalancing of the relationship 
between central government, local government and local people.’ (DCLG, 2006, p.
22). It explicitly supported the use of PB as a way of promoting democracy through 
participation and empowerment, and saw this as key to devolving power to 
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communities. In 2007, Hazel Blears became Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government, formerly the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and she 
championed Participatory Budgeting until she resigned in 2009. She went as far as 
to call for their implementation in every local authority by 2012. Concomitant with 
Blears’ role as Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government was the 
2007 Sustainable Communities Act, originally a Conservative bill adopted by 
Labour (Interviewee I), which required authorities to inform citizens of how public 
money was being spent in their area. Additionally in 2007, there was the spending 
review which made mention of area-based budgets, the Local Government and 
Public Involvement in Health Act, and the publication of the government’s Review 
of Sub-national Economic Development and Regeneration. These endowed 
councils with greater powers explicitly in order to develop local prosperity and 
economic growth (Sullivan et al. 2004) Gordon Brown pledged that his government 
would continue devolution to local government and in 2010 the Decentralisation 
and Localism Bill was introduced. 
In addition to some of the additional powers noted above New Labour made 
extensive use of targets, regulators and inspectors (Coulson 2004; Travers 2004; 
Watson 2003; Wilks-Heeg 2009; Wilson & Game 2011). The use of both positive 
and negative reinforcement performance related incentives (Stewart 2003; Stoker 
2003). There was emphasis, on the one hand, for a need for democratic renewal 
and, on the other, one  for enhanced efficiency (the latter specifically with regard to 
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service provision) (Newman et al. 2004; Pratchett 2002; Wilks-Heeg 2009). New 
Labour simultaneously promoted greater central control and greater local power 
and autonomy (Lowndes, 1999; Newman 2001; Newman et al. 2004; Pratchett 
2002; Pratchett & Leach 2004; Sullivan et. 2004 al; Travers, 2004; Wilks-Heeg, 
2009; Wilson & Game 2011) and also greater citizen involvement (Needham 2002; 
Newman 2004; Smith 2009; Sullivan et al. 2004), All of these strategies were 
designed using  a multi actor approach which variously included some combination 
of local government, central government, the private sector, the voluntary sector 
and citizens (Newman et al. 2004; Sullivan et al. 2004; Travers 2004; Wilks-Heeg 
2009; Wilson & Game 2011). New Labour self termed this approach to local 
government as a program of ‘modernisation’. 
Ambivalence 
Although the emphasis varied there were common themes that ran through New 
Labours approach to local government in terms of ideology, oratory, policy and 
implementation. However, many of these did not sit comfortably with one another 
and generated significant tensions in both policy and practice, these themes being 
riddled with incongruities and contradictions; the one common denominator being 
a lack of coherence (Travers 2004).  
As previously noted much of New Labour’s oratory and policies involved the 
overlaying of multiple, often contradictory, discourses and this is also true of New 
Labours relationship with local government, whose reform program displayed 
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numerous ambivalences. There is a rich literature assessing the extent to which 
New Labour marked a continuation and/or rupture with previous government 
policy regarding local government and the extent to which New Labour variously 
empowered and constrained it.  (Lowndes, 1999; Newman 2001, Newman et al. 
2004; Pratchett 2002; Pratchett and Leach 2004; Sullivan et. 2004 al; Travers, 2004; 
Watson & Game, 2011; Wilks-Heeg, 2009). However, the general consensus is that 
the result was a form of hybrid which generated significant tensions in terms of 
agenda (Newman et al. 2004; Pratchett 2002; Travers 2004), policies and initiatives 
(Stoker 2003; Travers 2004; Watson & Game 2011) and also central/local 
government working relations (Travers, 2004; Watson & Game 2011). In practice all 
three of these areas implicated one another in a variety of ways. The 
aforementioned tensions filtering their way down into specific policies and 
initiatives in a variety ways. 
Control and Constraint 
Some changes, often faltering, were implemented. However, despite commitments 
made by Labour to reduce particular constraints on local government action, 
(Travers 2004, p.91) the extent to which these changes involved greater power and 
autonomy for local government is questionable (Atkinson & Wilk-Heeg 2000; 
Needham 2002; Newman et al. 2004; Pratchett 2002; Smith 2009a; Stewart 2003; 
Stoker 2003; Sullivan et al. 2004; Travers 2004). ‘In characterising the nature of the 
Labour government’s agenda, the prevalent view is one of ‘constraint’ or even 
‘control’.’ (Pratchett and Leach 2004, p. 366). It could even be argued that in some 
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ways local government was even more constrained by New Labour than had been 
by the Conservatives (Pratchett & Leach 2004; Stewart 2003; Watson 2003; Wilks-
Heeg 2009; Wilson & Game 2011). While new governance arrangements ‘may have 
helped to loosen the taut central–local relationship in England by providing 
opportunities for localities to operate beyond the central state…. [It] does not, 
however, mean that the state’s influence is ebbing away.’ (Sullivan et al., 2004, p. 
263).  
The extent to which there was an increase in freedom and flexibility varies from 
author to author but the fact is that there was a marked increase in control and that 
this control more often than not trumped any possible increase in choice 
predominates (Pratchett and Leach 2004) as does an appreciation of the conflicting 
motivations (i.e. effecting efficiency and renewing democracy) behind the 
modernisation agenda (Newman et al. 2004; Pratchett 2002; Travers 2004; Wilks-
Heeg, 2009). Below explores some of the many countervalents /counterbalances to 
these small increases in power and freedom and illustrates ways in which local 
government was constrained and controlled under New Labour. 
Capital finance was liberalised, allowing greater autonomy and sovereignty for local 
government, but at the same time the power and jurisdiction of local government 
was restricted by greater reliance on the private sector, significant ring-fencing of 
local government expenditure and the transfer of services from local to central 
government (Travers 2004; Watson & Game 2011). Planning procedures demanded 
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by the reforms were cumbersome and often incongruent with themselves, coming 
down from various central government departments and potentially did so with 
other policies surrounding community strategies (Stewart, 2003, p. 218). There 
were also tensions between other congruent policies and initiatives, for example 
between enhancing efficiency and the additional bureaucracy many initiatives 
brought with them. Compulsory Competitive Tendering was another case in point, 
itself abolished to be replaced by a Best Value regime which was considered to be 
even more bureaucratic and interventionist (Wilson & Game, 2011, p.176). 
Concerns around the effectiveness and efficiency of local government were used as 
justifications for central governments involvement as the previous examples show. 
New Labours aim was, ‘to convey an image of fiscal and administrative 
responsibility’ (Travers 2004, p.92). Stewart (2003) argues WC that the 
modernisation program was an attempt to reconcile New Labours commitment ‘to 
strong local government with a deep suspicion of many actual local 
authorities,’ (ibid., p. 4). 
‘The requirement to use public money wisely became the justification for a cascade 
of initiatives designed to ensure efficiency and effectiveness within Whitehall 
departments, appointed bodies and local government. … [Performance] targets 
were then imposed on most central and local service deliverers.’ (Travers 2004, p.
92). 
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Many in central government not only saw local government as generally 
problematic, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness (Travers 2004) and specifically 
with regard to the services it provided (Stewart 2003; Travers 2004), but also held 
those working in local government in low esteem (Travers 2004; Wilson & Game 
2011). The introduction of a variety of accountability, efficiency measures and 
targets and the introduction of new regulators (Travers 2004 REF) acted as a form 
of central government surveillance of local government (REF). Not only was local 
government under constant watch  there were also very real rewards and 
punishments attached to their performance (Stewart 2003) REF. Central 
government confirmed  that it would strengthen local authorities but only when 
and if they modernised (Stewart, 2003, p. 4). This ‘carrot and stick’ style 
governance was dangled over local authorities, the implicit being that 
modernisation would be rewarded with greater powers and a lack of it punished by 
their withdrawal.  (Stewart, 2003, p. 5). In addition to this economic justification 
there was also apolitical argument was introduced  around areas of equality. There 
existed  a strong line of thought that central involvement was necessary in order to 
guarantee public service quality and uniformity (Travers 2004, p.93). The argument 
was ‘that social democracy requires central government to take an activist role in 
redistributing resources and securing equal service provision from place to place 
(Walker 2002). … [Meaning] there is an important role for the centre in laying down 
detailed standards. (Travers 2004, p.93). 
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As such The New Labour government ‘took new powers to intervene in the 
workings of individual authorities.’ (Stewart, 2003, p. 206). Central government, by 
way of the Secretary of State, was afforded general powers of intervention in local 
government for the first time under New Labour with the passing of the Local 
Government Act (Stewart, 2003, p. 206). The powers that this Act afforded were 
extensive and in effect gave the Secretary of State complete control over local 
authorities in that the Secretary of State, or his nominee, could take over specified 
functions of any authority perceived to be ‘failing’ (Stewart, 2003, p. 207). Although 
this control was not often exercised the potential threat it exised had much the 
same effect; it forced acceptance of government proposals.  (Stewart, 2003, p. 
207).  
‘The Labour government took more interest in the performance of local councils in 
the delivery of their core services than any previous government.’ (Watson, 2003, p. 
468). New freedoms and flexibilities were granted to authorities based on positive 
assessment of their performance (Stewart, 2003, p. 207). ‘Performance indicators 
can provide incentives to improve performance but they are ‘staff intensive, and 
draining, and subject to diminishing returns. … [Additionally] any system of 
performance measures will bring forth a range of dysfunctional behaviour,’ (Watson, 
2003, p. 469). This is because resources are directed towards improving scores 
which target specific areas rather than overall performance. (ibid., p.469).There was 
‘an explosion of new national performance measures’ (Watson, 2003, p.34) and by 
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‘2004, even the Treasury itself agreed that the ‘target culture’ had got out of 
control (HM Treasury 2004).’ (Travers 2004, p.92 )’. 
In addition to ‘top down’ control, constraint, measurement and inspection, local 
government was mandated to work more closely with the communities they served 
and be both more accountable and more responsive to ‘bottom up’ demands from 
the citizenry. The tensions between New Labours ‘‘top down’ prescriptions and 
apparent support for ‘bottom up’ consultation’ (Needham, 2002, p.704) meant that 
local government was being simultaneously pulled in different directions both in 
terms of accountability and responsiveness. In addition to the obvious ideological 
tensions there were also feasibility issues; local government was placed somewhat 
between a rock and a hard place in that it was increasingly accountable to central 
government via a series of initiatives which increased its workload (Stewart 2003; 
Travers 2004; Wilson & Game 2011) while at the same time it was mandated to 
spend more time and energy working with the citizenry (Needham 2002; Newman 
2001; Newman et al. 2004; Pratchett 2002; Travers 2004; Watson 2003; Wilks-Heeg 
2009; Wilson & Game 2011). It is hard to see how this could be achieved without 
additional resources which for the most part were not forthcoming (Travers 2004; 
Watson 2003; Wilks-Heeg 2009; Wilson & Game 2011). ‘Although New Labour 
appeared genuinely to support localism, a number of countervailing influences 
obstructed the path to local freedom. … [There was a] conflict between efforts to 
achieve greater local autonomy while at the same time guaranteeing public service 
quality and equity from the centre’ (Travers, 2004, pp.92-93).This squeezing of local 
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government, between central government on one side and the citizenry on the 
other has even been construed ‘as part of the same process of stripping control 
away from local politicians.’ (Needham, 2002, p.704). 
The hope that the election of a Labour government would return power to local 
government (Travers 2004) was dashed by the introduction of the variously 
controlling, centralist and interventionist strategies noted above. In fact ‘new public 
management auditing systems introduced under Conservative governments were 
developed into a fully comprehensive system of targets, inspection and audit, 
arguably more centralising than anything that went before it.’ (Wilks-Heeg, 2009, p.
37). Behind New Labours modernisation program lay significant ‘centralising (and 
hence authoritarian) tendencies: it gave them the excuse to tell local authorities 
what to do, and to mould them in its image.’ (Watson, 2003, p. 472). It seems as 
though there was far more stick than carrot; the balance was clearly tipped towards 
controlling and constraining local authorities with little reward, in terms of the 
promised greater flexibility and freedom, for even top performing authorities 
(Pratchett and Leach, 2004, p.367). 
In New Labours attempts ‘to be seen as a party of high quality public 
services’ (Travers 2004, p.92) they put so many demands upon local government, 
via a host of new targets and regulators, that the ‘demands of the centre which, of 
course, provided three-quarters of council revenue income, over-rode conventional 
local democratic claims.’ (Travers, 2004, p.92). Here again is an example of the 
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overlaying of multiple discourses, in this instance  the economic in terms of 
efficiency and the political in terms of democracy. The next chapter takes up the 
issues of both community development and the centrality of power regarding 
different types and forms of participation. 
Conclusion 
Drawing on Heater (1990), Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) remind us that 
‘[t]he theory and practice of citizenship are continually changing in response to 
particular economic, social and political circumstances (ibid., p.46). Where Chapter 
One looked at the context out of which PB grew in Brazil, this chapter explores the 
context in the UK which made for such a comfortable fit with initiatives like PB. 
Clearly ‘[d]ifferent countries, regions and cities have different regimes of 
governance reflecting the different histories and cultures’ (Burns, Hambleton and 
Hoggett, 1994, p.11). The changes occurring in the UK in the decades leading up 
to the time when PB was introduced were clearly not on the scale of those 
occurring in Brazil (i.e. from authoritarian rule to new democracy) but they were 
significant all the same. 
Ultimately, New Labour is here viewed as a communitarianism-inspired, social 
democratic form of neoliberalism. The ‘who’ was explored via the new political 
settlement New Labour propounded and the way in which this constructed the 
identity(ies) and role(s) of the citizen and community. This was explored via an 
examination of New Labour’s articulation of the state/citizen relationship and the 
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roles afforded to each, focusing on New Labour’s articulation of an active and 
responsible citizen and citizenry. This was revealed as a complex relation where 
overarching ideology both constitutes a specific construction of the citizen and is 
also constituted by this construction.  The ‘how’ detailed the policy and process of 
decentralisation under New Labour. This begins to explain how PB came to be such 
an easy fit with New Labour policy; the impact that this had on the processes 
themselves is brought out in the UK vignettes. Decentralisation under New Labour 
was shown to be a highly centralised form of decentralisation. While New Labour 
did actively pursue strategies to decentralise, specifically from both central to local 
government and from government to the communities they serve, concomitantly 
there was a centralising of power where ultimately more power resided with the 
central state than with local government. This in turn impacted upon the amount of 
power devolved to the citizen and community. New Labour implemented a form of 
decentralisation which called for greater involvement from citizens and where 
central government both supported local government, by way of initiatives and in 
some cases funding, but also held local government accountable through the 
implementation of numerous performance indicators. The concentrating of power 
is significant given this project’s argument that the form participation takes 
ultimately depends on the nature and amount of power participants have. The 
practical import of this is revealed in Chapter Four by way of two vignettes. 
New Labour policy and discourse involved the overlaying of many discourses which 
did not easily fit with one another (Newman 2001) and, in consequence, was 
 210
characterised by contradiction and paradox. After briefly exploring some of the 
ways in which New Labour both did and did not represent a fundamental shift in 
thinking and policy, this chapter, following Newman (2001) and Lister (2001), resists 
viewing New Labour in terms of it exhibiting or not exhibiting a fundamental shift 
and instead explores some of the processes and discourses of New Labour and the 
consequences this had for civic engagement. 
The various moral, political and economic discourses at play within New Labour 
ideology and policy are revealed, not as part of one coherent ideology, but rather 
as concomitant aspects which variously supported and subjugated one another. 
Despite an identifiable political discourse, the co-existence of an overarching 
commitment to a Third Way more often than not effectively sounded the death 
knell for the political aspects of New Labour ideology. New Labour, then, far from 
being devoid of ideology, is revealed as overburdened by a variety of competing 
discourses. The way in which New Labour constructed decentralisation and greater 
citizen involvement did have a political dimension. However, the overlaying of 
political with moral and economic discourses weakened the political aspect and, as 
Mouffe (2005) has argued, the preclusion of alternatives served to depoliticise 
whatever political there was. 
Material practices are embedded in symbolic structures that impart meaning to 
social action. Under New Labour, civic engagement was overburdened by the 
interplay of numerous conflicting discourses, and the political nature of civic 
 211
engagement was diminished due to an allegiance to non-political and 
depoliticising discourses. This promoted a weak interpretation of civic engagement 
as inclusion with permitted restricted power shifts rather than transformation. As 
Rocke (2014) notes ’the introduction of new ideas in public administrations is often 
a very difficult undertaking potentially provoking a wave of protest from civil 
servants who consider these new ideas as acts of aggression against their way of 
doing things.’ (ibid. p24). This accompanied by the loss of control at the local level 
may go some way towards explaining why local authorities would be reluctant to 
cede power and control to citizens generally and specifically vis-a-vis PB processes. 
This is explored in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PB in the UK 
Introduction 
This chapter begins to look at the way in which PB was affected by the discursive 
environment in operation in the UK. Chapters One and Two noted that as PB 
moved away from its social movement origins and became a formalised institution 
the political and normative claims it makes appear to have been minimised. 
Without strong claims of this sort being contained within PB itself there is a danger 
of it becoming a politically neutral management tool. Certainly, the relatively 
neutral and adaptable form PB has come to take has facilitated its translation to the 
UK. The previous chapter discussed various notions of civic engagement and 
citizenship at play in UK policy and rhetoric. This chapter details two PB processes 
in the UK and begins to assess the way in which PB manifested in the UK and the 
way in which PB was effected by overarching policy and discourse on civic 
engagement and citizenship. The previous chapter explored New Labour policy 
and rhetoric around civic engagement. This chapter explores the way in which PB 
fitted into this context, and details two concrete PB processes that were induced 
within this context. 
4.1 Beyond Brazil 
Brazil’s Participatory Budgets are a much admired and replicated way of rendering 
representative democracy more participatory. Since their inception in 1989, they 
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have spread across Brazil, South America, North America and Europe. Today PB is 
in operation on every continent except Antarctica. It has been implemented by 
local communities and authorities and been backed by community groups, local 
government, national governments and the World Bank. Participatory budgeting 
processes and those involved and affected by them are not uniform either across 
time or across Brazil, and these differences are likely to be magnified as the 
processes are taken up by different groups with different agendas in different parts 
of the world. 
Even when problems are common, solutions are often different and context 
dependent; the problems associated with implementing ‘one size fits all’ policies 
have been well documented by the Development Studies literature and more 
recently by those looking at PB (see for example Wampler (2007)). Historically, it is 
the North that exported ideas and policies to the South in the name of 
development. The global spread of participatory budgeting processes has effected 
a change in direction: the North is importing from the South. While Brazil and 
Britain share some concerns with regard to democracy and representation, 
accountability, transparency and legitimacy, they also have very specific issues to 
tackle and discrete political, economic and social situations. In addition, the infancy 
of processes in Britain and the lack of uniformity of PB across Brazil forecloses the 
possibility of comparisons between participatory budgeting processes in the two 
countries. Despite the issues in direct comparison, considering the similarities and 
differences can help frame questions and shed light on both common and specific 
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obstacles. As Chapters One and Two showed, initially the PBs in Brazil were overtly 
political and part of a left-wing political project. The discussion below shows how 
PB in the UK slotted into an already existing political project and one based on a 
very different ideology from that of the early PT. PBs in Brazil came out of bottom-
up social movement thinking and action. Although PB may have arrived in the UK 
through community activists and charities, it very quickly became part of top down 
government initiatives. The type of participation promoted by the early Brazilian 
PBs and UK PBs is radically different. Crudely put, it is the difference between 
participation as transformation and participation as inclusion. Where the social 
movements in Brazil demanded a reconfiguration of the public sphere, with new 
forms of citizenship and new state/citizen relationships, PB in the UK functioned 
within a project to include more people into already existing political 
arrangements. By the time PB came to the UK it had become a formal institutional 
process. 
There have now been in excess of two hundred and fifty  PB processes in the UK. 28
However, the individual processes often bear little resemblance to one another. 
The organising and instigating bodies vary, as do the number of people involved, 
the amount of funds involved, the types of budgets available, the way in which 
decisions are made, and the type of decisions that are made open to PB processes 
and which aspects of the Porto Alegre model (outlined in Chapter Two) are used. 
 The exact figure is not known. Two hundred and fifty plus is the figure used by members of 28
the PB Network Steering Group and PB Partners. In addition to a lack of available data matters 
are further complicated by issues of definition which are discussed below.
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After briefly discussing the way in which PB came to the UK, and some general 
features of PB in the UK, this chapter focuses on two concrete PB practices in the 
UK: You Decide! in Tower Hamlets and Voice Your Choice in Manton. There are 
important institutional design differences between PB in Brazil and PB as it 
manifests in the UK which warrant discussion. However, the primary concern here is 
not with the way in which UK processes do or do not measure up to the Porto 
Alegre exemplar; the disparity is so evident and so great that this type of 
comparative analysis is neither appropriate nor particularly illuminating. The 
processes detailed below are then analysed on their own terms and are considered 
in relation to their aim to enhance civic engagement. By the time PB came to the 
UK, it had become a formal institutional process. This process of formalisation and 
institutionalization itself, as distinct from the actual form the processes themselves 
take, has a bearing on the form of civic engagement it is capable of promoting. 
Ultimately, the two vignettes discussed below reveal the way in which PB can 
function as a neoliberal technology of governance whose implementation can 
serve to further an existing political project.   
4.2 Import to the UK 
It was a confluence of individuals, organisations and their associated interests that 
facilitated the initial import and early advocacy of PB in the UK (Hall, 2011; 2014, 
pers. comm.,). Relationships between Oxfam, Church Action on Poverty (CAP) and 
Community Pride Initiative (CPI) and individuals from these organisations 
subsequently moving to positions within UK government were instrumental to PBs 
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transition to the national agenda. All of these organisations had shared concerns: 
poverty, inequality and social justice. CAP, a national ecumenical Christian social 
justice charity, was heavily influenced by liberation theology, Freirean critical 
pedagogy and Saul Alinsky-type community organising; all were concerns shared 
by CPI (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.,). This confluence brought together individuals and 
organisations with different political and ideological backgrounds: 
that of a local community activism based on ideas of capacity building 
and social capital, of a faith-based activism against poverty rooted in 
Liberation theology, and of radical leftist activities aiming at a greater 
amount of bottom-up participation of ordinary citizens and the 
transformation of power relations. (Rocke, 2008, p.10) 
PBs started life in Britain with an interest from a Manchester-based NGO, 
Community Pride Initiative (CPI), supported by the charity Church Action on 
Poverty, working on issues of community empowerment. Members of this NGO, 
together with Oxfam's UK Poverty Programme, set up a learning exchange 
between Manchester and Porto Alegre in 2000 and, as a result of this exchange, 
the first initiatives to set up PB processes in the UK came into being (Hall, 2011, 
pers. comm.,). Initially, this took the form of a feasibility study supported by Salford 
City Council in 2003. Subsequently, both CAP and CPI applied for government 
funds (ibid.). The government amalgamated the two bids and in 2005 what was 
then the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (it went on to become Department for 
Community and Local Government, DCLG) funded the creation of the PB 
Unit(Interviewee B, 2011, pers. comm.,). Until this point, support for PB in the UK 
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had relied heavily on individuals and church networks (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.,). 
Much has been made of the importance of mayors with regard to the development 
of PB both in Brazil (Wampler, 2010) and subsequently in Portugal and Italy (Rocke, 
2014). In the UK, it was relationships between individuals within church networks, 
including advisors to government ministers, rather than political networks, that 
facilitated the promotion and implementation of PB. Church networks were 
instrumental in the development of PB in Bradford and also subsequently in the 
further promotion of PB by Hazel Blears as part of a national agenda  (Hall, 2011, 29
pers. comm.,). However, the PB Unit, formed as it was using government funding, 
was very conscious of the fact that it was paid by the government to deliver a 
government-based agenda. Distinct from CPI’s and CAP’s origins as community 
activists and movements for greater social justice, the PB Unit presented 
themselves as consultant experts aiding the promotion and development of PB in 
the UK. The PB Unit consciously tried to reflect policy in an attempt to appear 
relevant to current debates, not least in order to maintain continued support and 
funding from government (ibid.). 
‘The Values Principles and Standards of PB’ (PB Unit, 2009) set out by the PB Unit 
centred around eight values: Transparency, Accessibility, Deliberation, 
Empowerment, Local Ownership, Mainstream Involvement, Representative 
Democracy and Shared Responsibility. This document was explicitly set within a 
framework of community development and empowerment which was easily 
 It was Ed Cox, advisor to Hazel Blears, advocate of PB and church minister who was 29
responsible for introducing PB to Hazel Blears (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.,).
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assimilated into existing  government rhetoric. This document promotes PB as a 
way of meeting the requirements of the Comprehensive Area Assessment (DCLG, 
2009) and the Duty to Involve (2009, DCLG) (ibid., 2009, p.3). 
There has been a greater recognition of the value of PB in meeting the 
requirements of the Comprehensive Area Assessment and the Duty to 
Involve. PB is beginning to be seen as a way of engaging with 
communities at a time when resources are tight and as a way of 
renewing local democracy and giving a greater role to local councillors 
and community leaders and champions. There has been greater media 
interest in PB as an answer to the dramatic decrease in trust in 
representative democracy following the MPs expenses scandal (PB Unit, 
2009).  
This, coupled with the fact that the appendix to this document ‘Community 
Development Values and Standards’ was taken from the ‘Community Development 
Challenge’ (CLG, 2006) is evidence of the way in which PB was promoted as a 
natural ally of current government policy and rhetoric. 
The creation of the PB Unit was crucial to the development of PB in the UK. Prior to 
its creation, advocacy of PB in the UK was essentially reliant on the work of a 
handful of committed individuals (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.,). Government funding 
of the PB Unit enabled the development of the first five PB pilots in the UK 
(Interviewee B, 2011, pers. comm.,). The first larger scale PB process in the UK was 
set up in Bradford in 2005, followed by Sunderland (2005), London-Harrow (2005), 
Newcastle (2006), and Coedpoeth (2006) (ibid). Unlike in Brazil, in the UK there was 
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no major civil society movement for greater civic engagement. PB had political 
support in both Brazil and the UK. However, while PB was seen, at least for a time, 
as the main axis of government for the PT, in the UK PB was deliberately 
constructed around existing government policy and discourse. In order to get initial 
funding, PB has to appeal to current government initiatives, and, once funded, it 
was charged with delivering a government-based agenda (Hall, 2011; 2013, pers. 
comm.,). Rather than a form of public sovereignty, PB was cast as a tool for public 
sector agencies wishing ‘to engage more often, more meaningfully and effectively 
with the public than traditional approaches allow’ (SQW, 2010, p.4). In the UK, PB 
was seen as 
a mechanism through which communities and citizens can play a 
greater role in local decision-making processes and aims to improve the 
quality of this participation. Participatory Budgeting will enhance 
community empowerment and engagement by encouraging residents 
to have more of a say in what happens in relation to budgets and the 
prioritisation of services. (SQW, 2010, p. 14) 
PB has been associated with numerous government-led community engagement/
empowerment publications including: Why Neighbourhoods Matter (2005), the 
Local Government White Paper, Stronger and Prosperous Communities (2006), the 
joint CLG/LGA Community Empowerment Action Plan (2007) and Communities in 
Control: Real People, Real Power (2008). 
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This collection of literature illustrated the Government’s growing 
support of Participatory Budgeting as a mechanism for empowering 
communities to help set local priorities for spending and thereby create 
the opportunity for them to influence council budgets and policies. 
(SQW, 2010, p.25) 
Indeed in 2007, the then Communities Secretary, Hazel Blears, announced that 
within five years every local authority in England should have set up PB processes 
(DCLG 2009). Although this never materialised, and was always a wildly ambitious 
plan, along with the other various papers noted above, this confirms that there was 
some government support for PB in the UK. It was supported, however, for its 
ability to further existing government policy, rather than for any intrinsic value it 
may have had. 
Hazel Blears championed the use of PB in the UK. However, she promoted it as an 
aid to existing New Labour drives towards decentralisation and community 
empowerment, rather than as pertaining to a fundamental reorganisation of state/
citizen relationships. Blears commonly referred to PBs as ‘Community Kitties’. ‘A 
‘kitty’ usually relates to a small amount of money and implies a one-off fund to 
spend, and thus no transformation at all of the existing institutional framework of 
representative democracy. Blears vision of PB was not the grand Porto Alegre 
vision; it was about small community self-action. It was hoped that a small amount 
of seed money would instigate capacity building within communities and further 
the development of social capital (Rocke 2008, p.12,). Indeed, PB in the UK has 
generally used ‘small amounts of money taken from national policy programs (like 
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neighbourhood renewal money ) rather than municipal budgets; participation was 30
confined to a very local level (often one or several city areas) and processes did not 
imply a more general discussion about city-wide priorities or general planning 
issues’ (ibid. p.12). This has led some to question whether any of the UK processes 
actually constitute PB at all. 
4.3 PB(?) in the UK: Definitions and models 
Despite the UK being one of the early adopters and there now having been 
hundreds of instances of PB in the UK relatively little has been written about PB in 
the UK. There is only one report, the DCLG-commissioned SQW report, that covers 
multiple cases. This report, referenced above, is essentially a form of government-
funded cost-benefit analysis and, as such, rather myopic in its approach. However, 
being commissioned by the DCLG, it does offer an insight into the motivators for 
the government's support and interest in PB. Academic articles are few and tend to 
focus on one or two processes. One possible reason for the lack of articles on PB in 
the UK, despite the number of instances, is that many would question the extent to 
which these instances are really PB at all. It is difficult to speak of ‘PB in the UK’ as, 
despite the number of instances, the individual processes often bear little 
resemblance to one another. The amount of funds available varies from £500 as a 
one off (Hampton Bishop in Hereford) to £5.6k over two years in (Tower Hamlets in 
‘In June 2003, the UK Government launched Neighbourhood Renewal - People and Place. 30
Neighbourhoods (DCLG, 2003) in which the most deprived 10% of wards across Northern 
Ireland were identified using the Noble Multiple Deprivation Measure. Following extensive 
consultation, this resulted in a total of 36 areas, and a population of approximately 280,000 
(one person in six in Northern Ireland), being targeted for intervention. In essence this was a 
programme to provide additional funds to particularly deprived areas in order to create more 
opportunities for the people living in those areas. (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. comm.,)
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London).  Organising bodies and the related budgets vary between Home Office 
funds, parish councils, city councils, borough councils, police forces and voluntary 
organisations. In some places, PB has run for a number of years (for example, 
Durham and Newcastle) whereas in many others it was simply a one off event (for 
example, York and Gateshead) (Interviewee A, 2013, pers. comm.,). These variables 
also suggest another reason why it is difficult to speak of PB in the UK; the models 
and practices deployed, collectively and individually, diverge significantly from the 
Porto Alegre model which is generally taken to be the exemplar, and was in fact 
the inspiration, for the initial import of PB to the UK. Additionally the Porto Alegre 
model, held up as an exemplar, was itself divorced from its social movement 
origins. 
4.31 Definitions 
By the time PB was implemented in the UK it had already been analysed and 
promoted by the World Bank, UNESCO and various other international agencies; it 
was already becoming instituted as a tool rather than as a set of values or an open 
space or forum. Although PB does demand the creation of some sort of space, PB 
had by this time become associated with formalised spaces with rigorously defined 
agendas, even within Brazil (Baiocchi, 2006). Rather than the open spaces where 
anything, including issues of social justice, the nature and role of citizenship, and 
current structures of power and oppression, could be discussed, PB had become a 
tool to improve decision making processes. By the turn of the century, international 
understandings of PB had little in common with its Brazilian social movement 
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origins. This is reflected in the three definitions most commonly used as guides for 
the design and implementation of UK practices. 
World Bank (Shah, 2007) describes PB as: 
It (PB) is a tool for educating, engaging and empowering citizens and 
strengthening demand for good governance. The enhanced 
transparency and accountability that participatory budgeting creates 
can help reduce government inefficiency and curb clientelism (sic), 
patronage and corruption. 
The Local Government Information Unit (UK) defined PB as: 
A process for bringing together local communities to the decision-
making process around public budgets that makes new connections 
between residents, political representatives and local government 
official.  (Cox, cited in, SQW, 2010, p.12) 
As noted in Chapter Two The PB Unit in the UK gives the following definition of PB 
which shows the ideally common features of UK experiences of PB: 
Our agreed definition with the Department for Communities and Local 
Government  is: 31
Participatory budgeting directly involves local people in making 
decisions on the spending and priorities for a defined public budget. 
PB processes can be defined by geographical area (whether that’s 
  The inclusion of ‘Our agreed definition with the Department for Communities and Local 31
Government’ was because the wording originated from civil servants in Hazel Blears 
department. Members of the PB Unit did not feel completely comfortable with this definition, 
they wanted it to have a closer connection to issues of empowerment and bringing the 
government closer to the citizenry (Hall, 2016, pers. comm.,). This supports the argument that 
PB in the UK was being shaped to fit with current government policy. 
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neighbourhood or larger) or by theme. This means engaging residents 
and community groups representative of all parts of the community to 
discuss and vote on spending priorities, make spending proposals, and 
vote on them, as well giving local people a role in the scrutiny and 
monitoring of the process and results to inform subsequent PB 
decisions.  (PB Unit, 2008, p.11) 
These vague and minimal definitions leave PB open to multiple interpretations. 
Devoid of strong normative and political claims, PB was being promoted as a 
managerial tool for the efficient administration of government, rather than as a 
political project or process aimed at popular sovereignty. Despite this, PB, even in 
the form of managerial tool, was still credited with the ability to empower citizens 
and to revitalise democracy in the UK. This is indicative of a more general 
conflation of ‘effecting efficiency’ and ‘deepening democracy’ which pervaded UK 
government policy and rhetoric at the time. 
All two hundred and fifty plus PB processes in the UK would, by the vague and 
minimal definitions above, count as instances of PB. Conversely, according to the 
bulk of academic literature on PB, which focuses on issues of institutional design, 
none of the UK processes would qualify as PB. 
4.34 Models 
Although transformed by implementation, the basic aims, goals, and format of 
participatory budgeting processes in Brazil do share commonalities. Generally, it is 
PB in Porto Alegre that is taken as ‘the exemplar’ of participatory budgeting and 
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the exemplar of common values, principles and standard for PB processes. These 
commonalities or modified replications of the Porto Alegre experiences are what 
have been taken up by other countries and organisations which are then in turn 
transformed by the agenda of those implementing them. Although almost all of 
them take inspiration from it, none of the processes in the UK follow the standard 
Porto Alegre model. 
There are typically three different models of PB in the UK, the Community Grants 
model, the Pooled Budgets model and the 1% Budget/Top Slicing model. Below is 
an abbreviated version of how the PB Unit defines each of these models. 
Community Grants 
This is the most common model of PB in the UK at present, and the 
model originally adopted by the pilots in 2005. It usually involves small 
pots of money that may have already been identified for community 
grants, and involving residents in voting for which community projects 
should receive the funding. 
Pooled Budgets 
This approach involves citizens in allocating pooled budgets from a 
range of providers on a particular theme or neighbourhood. Typically, 
the budgets will be reallocated to the organisations or services involved 
in the original pooled budgets, rather than to community groups. The 
aim is to encourage individual citizens to address an issue or a 
neighbourhood’s needs from the perspective of the community as a 
whole, and provide more coherent and tailored suite of services to 
meet the those needs. These approaches are more closely aligned with 
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the original Brazilian model [than the Community Grants approach] and 
may involve other techniques such as community-led commissioning, 
community planning and the budget matrix.  
The 1% Budget/Top Slicing 
This is an approach which advocates top slicing a percentage of a 
public body's investment budget to be allocated by citizens across a 
range of services and the local organisation's catchment area. The 
budget may be then devolved to wards or area committees or may be 
kept at the broader level. A budget matrix or cycle linked to the main 
budget cycle may also be adopted. Usually the budget is used for 
reinvestment in services that the public organisation provides or 
commissions. This model most closely resembles the type of PB 
developed in Brazil, where a percentage of the overall budget for an 
area is identified for PB. In Porto Alegre, this percentage rose to as 
much as 18% (PB Unit, 2008, no pagination). 
The most commonly used model in the UK is the Community Grants model (Hall, 
2011; 2015, pers. comm.,). Some would cite this as the reason for there being so 
little literature on UK PB,  i.e. rather than a lack of uniformity of PB across the UK as 
noted above, the problem is rather that too many UK PBs follow one very limited 
model. In effect, PB in the UK has not attracted as much attention as it has 
elsewhere because of the scale at which they operate (i.e. in very small 
neighbourhoods, for a limited time and with small amounts of money). Some UK 
processes have moved beyond the Community Grants model, and there have been 
various instances of Pooled Budgets PB processes in the UK (PB Partners, 2013, no 
pagination). Some have made use of Pooled Budgets at the neighbourhood level, 
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for example, Voice Your Choice in Manton and Voice Your Choice in Scarborough. 
Others have focused on services based on a particular theme or issue. These have 
included Children and Young People (e.g. The Children’s Fund, Newcastle and It’s 
UP2U, Tameside), Police (e.g. Acorn’s Your Voice, Your Choice Ballot, Scunthorpe 
and currently Manchester Police Force), Housing (Your Call PB, North Lincolnshire), 
Health and Wellbeing (e.g. ‘Your Health, Your Community, Your Vote’, Thornhill, 
Southampton) (PB Unit, n.d., no pagination). To date only You Decide! in Tower 
Hamlets has used the 1% Budget/Top Slicing model , and Voice Your Choice in 32
Leicestershire. The majority of PB cases, regardless of the model used, have 
focused almost exclusively on the part of PB in which citizens decide on which 
projects get what funds, and pay very little attention to other parts of the PB cycle 
like the selecting of priorities, the development of a Budget Council, or a Budget 
matrix or any stage that would occur pre- or post-voting on which projects and 
services get funding. Without these and other aspects of the Porto Alegre model, 
PB in the UK ultimately boils down to citizen involvement in the ‘decision day’. The 
‘decision day’, which may occur over a period of weeks or months, is that part of 
the process which occurs after groups and individuals have applied for funds, and 
is when citizens vote on which projects receive funds. This voting part of the 
process would, in the Porto Alegre model, be preceded by deliberation amongst 
citizens about which projects and services should receive funding. This deliberative 
aspect is considered by many to be a distinguishing and essential feature of PB. 
 There may have been other places that have used a 1% model on a very small scale. For 32
example, 1% of a parish budget but nowhere else has used anything approaching this model 
on an authority wide scale (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.,).
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For the most part, deliberation is afforded minimal importance in UK PBs and more 
often than not it does not occur at all. The PB Unit went to great efforts to 
advocate and support the implementation of Porto Alegre-style PB processes in 
the UK, developing a whole suite of documents detailing the various stages and 
their importance as well as information on how to design and implement them (PB 
Unit, 2010). These documents include information on some of the features that 
have been highlighted as distinct and distinguishing features of PB processes, 
including the annual cycle of PB, the way a PB matrix works, or the development of 
a Budget Council. Despite the advocacy and support of the PB Unit, there has yet 
to be a PB process which uses the annual cycle or a PB matrix to target investments 
into areas with greater populations or with higher deprivation, or a Budget Council 
(a deliberative body of elected representatives from the local community which is 
distinct from but works with the local council), in the way in which they are used in 
Porto Alegre, let alone all three. A number of places have run PB numerous times. 
Southampton, for example, has now been running PB for seven years. However, the 
form PB takes in Southampton, and in other areas which have repeatedly run PB, is 
one of distinct events run in consecutive years, rather than a continuous and rolling 
process as is the case in a Porto Alegre-style annual cycle . While some PB 33
processes have attempted to form types of proto-Budget Councils to help facilitate 
PB grant processes, none has implemented a fully articulated and formal Budget 
 This issue also impacts upon the question of how many PB processes have taken place in the 33
UK. PB has taken place in over 130 distinct locations but with numerous locations running 
several processes the number of processes can be said to be in excess of two hundred and fifty. 
Given the lack of continuity between processes in the same geographical area, to the extent 
that even the budgets opened to PB derive from different bodies from year to year, this project 
views them as distinct processes hence stating over two hundred and fifty PB processes having 
taken place in the UK. 
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Council along the lines of the Porto Alegre model. Furthermore, no UK PB has 
made use of a budget matrix. This had led some to question whether any of the 
processes in the UK actually constitute PB at all. 
Despite the concerns over these practices, those designing, implementing, running 
and taking part in UK processes would strongly contest this view, and are adamant 
that what they have done or are doing is definitely PB and, based on the vague 
and minimal definitions of PB noted above, almost all UK processes, be they 
Community Grants models, Pooled Budgets models, or 1% Budget/Top Slicing 
models, would qualify as PB. This speaks to the elasticity of PB which has 
undoubtedly facilitated its now global translation. While the Porto Alegre model 
still holds its place as the exemplar of PB, it is evoked as inspiration rather than for 
imitation, at least in the UK. Clearly the nature of processes affect what they can 
achieve and there is a wealth of literature exploring the various institutional design 
issues that affect PB. Here, the concern is not with the way in which UK process do 
or do not measure up institutionally to the Porto Alegre exemplar. The PB Triangle 
proposed in Chapter Two can be of use here too. 
A PB Triangle 1.3 - Illustration 4 
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!  
The three corners remain the same and the Porto Alegre Model remains squarely in 
the centre of the triangle. However, the star appears, not on the left hand side as it 
did in Chapter Two (where it represented the earlier Brazilian PB) but rather on the 
right hand side. This suggests that there is no longer any association with radical 
politics and that PBs in the UK focus on neoliberal governance and resource 
distribution. The fact that PB in the UK was supported and in many cases 
implemented by government, and that it fitted within the existing policy framework 
rather than altering the narrative, explains its focus on neoliberal governance. The 
fact that PB was often implemented in more deprived areas and focused on 
engaging deprived and marginalised communities would suggest at least some 
focus on resource distribution. Each individual UK process will sit in a slightly 
different place, some focusing more on neoliberal governance and moving towards 
the right hand corner, others focusing more on resource distribution and so moving 
more towards the top corner, and others still, which more closely resemble the 
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Porto Alegre model, would move towards the centre. This triangle allows for some 
analysis and categorisation of processes which call themselves PB but which would 
not generally meet the criteria set out in most of the academic literature, even the 
simple and basic five requirements outlined by Sintomer (2008) listed in Chapter 
Two and repeated below. 
1. The financial and/or budgetary dimension must be discussed; PB is 
dealing with the problem of limited resources  
2. The city/region level has to be involved, or a (decentralised) district 
with an elected body and some power over administration (the 
neighbourhood level is not enough)  
3. It has to be a repeated process (one meeting or one referendum on 
financial issues are not examples of participatory budgeting)  
4. The process must include some form of public deliberation within the 
framework of specific meetings/forums (the opening of administrative 
meetings or classical representative instances to 'normal' citizens is not 
PB)  
5. Some accountability on the output is required  
(Sintomer, 2008, no pagination) 
Sintomers (2008) list is far less stringent than the criteria suggested by other 
authors noted in Chapter Two but even by these standards most UK PB processes 
would not count as PB. The processes below arguably meet 1. and 4. to some 
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extent, although the funds available in Manton were limited and the space for and 
quality of deliberation in both processes was relatively minimal. They do not meet 
the other three criteria at all. The processes above, and again most UK PB 
processes, certainly do not resemble the more mature and complex processes in 
Porto Alegre as outlined by Sintomer (2008). They do not span the executive, 
legislative and civil society. They are not both territorial and thematic nor do they 
cover the three levels of the neighbourhood, district and city. 
The next section explores two specific UK processes. They are assessed in terms of 
the way in which they do or do not impact upon civic engagement, the nature of 
citizenship and the role of the citizen and also explore where they may sit within the 
triangle above. 
4.4 Two Vignettes 
Given the number of and disparity between PB processes in the UK, no attempt at 
a comprehensive overview is made here. The choice to focus on these two 
processes was driven by a desire to find counter hegemonic processes that might 
contain a meaningful democratic potential. The search initially began with 
extensive conversations with various members of the PB unit; I took their advice on 
which were the most interesting processes and specifically which showed the 
greatest potential for meaningful civic engagement and showed the greatest 
democratic potential. Ideally I would have observed and investigated live 
processes which would allow for participant and process observation. However, at 
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the time of the fieldwork I was advised, by the PB Unit, that there were no live 
processes which exhibited significant potential in terms of increased civic 
engagement and displayed something different to previous non PB initiatives. 
Newcastle, Bradford and Salford would all have been of interest to this project. 
However, these processes had already been well researched and documented by 
Blakey (2015) and Rocke (2014). There were one or two very intreating processes 
like the one in Scarborough. However, these processes were extremely small in 
scale and the design of them was very far removed from what is generally 
understood to be PB. They may have used the name PB but upon investigation it 
was clear that they were PB in name alone. Later the research shifted its focus to 
what was limiting its potential in the UK. The Porto Alegre myth revealed itself 
more explicitly as understanding grew into what it was that limited the potential of 
PB and this data began to reshape the research questions toward what limits the 
potential of PB. PB in the UK faces a plethora of contextual obstacles. These 
include policy frameworks, discursive environments and institutional design. 
Given the scarcity of literature on individual PB cases , almost nothing having 34
been written about the majority of processes, any overview of PB in the UK would 
require much more extensive fieldwork. Two processes, You Decide! in Tower 
Hamlets and Voice Your Choice in Manton are discussed in detail below. Despite 
numerous differences between them, almost all PB processes in the UK have been 
 The obvious exceptions being Blakey 2008; SQW 201; Rocke 201434
 234
implemented and run by a local government body or initiative  (e.g. Local 35
Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), Councils, Borough Councils, Pathfinders and Unitary 
Authorities). Tower Hamlets was run by an LSP and Manton was run by a Pathfinder. 
As noted above, the vast majority of UK PB processes have made use of 
Community Grants models. Tower Hamlets use of mainstream funding took it 
closer to the 1% Budget/Top Slicing model than other UK processes. It did not, 
however, make use of a Budget Matrix or a Budget Council. Manton made use of a 
combination of the Community Grants and Pooled Budgets models. The fact that 
both Manton and Tower Hamlets moved beyond the minimal Community Grants 
model would suggest that they, more than other places, had the potential to make 
a larger impact. 
4.41 Background 
The two processes outlined below vary in many ways and most notably in terms of: 
aim, geography, amount of money involved, number of people involved, issues 
brought and decisions made, where funding comes from, the diversity and 
background of those involved. The process in Manton was run by Manton 
Community Alliance (MCA) a Government Neighborhood Management Pathfinder 
(Pathfinder/NMP) and in Tower Hamlets it was run borough-wide and implemented 
by The Tower Hamlets Partnership, a Local Strategic Partnership (LSP). The purpose 
of choosing these two is not to compare them, but rather to illustrate the way in 
which the policy environment in the UK impacted on two very different processes 
  There is evidence suggesting that one or two voluntary organisations have made use of PB 35
type processes. These are, however, very much the exception rather than the norm.
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both labeled as PB. While the extent to which PB processes are top down may vary, 
PB in the UK has become an almost universally top down process, run by various 
arms and bodies of local government, and as such the general policy context has 
not only an indirect impact upon the processes but also a very direct one as the 
vignettes below illustrate. 
Manton is a large estate in the south east ward of Worksop in Nottinghamshire. It 
has a population of over 6500 residents, predominantly of White British origin. The 
estate is an ex-pit village, built around a mine that itself closed in 1994 (Interviewee 
E, 2011, pers. comm.,). Tower Hamlets is a Borough in the East End of London. 
Despite being only about 5 miles across it contains nearly 220,000 people speaking 
110 different languages, which gives some indication of the diversity and complex 
issues of pluralism faced by this borough. Both exhibit high levels of deprivation 
(SQW, 2011). In the 2004 National Index of Deprivation (DCLG, 2004), Tower 
Hamlets ranked 4 out of 347, where 1 displays the highest levels of deprivation. 
Bassetlaw was ranked 82 in the same indexand, while this is much higher than 
Tower Hamlets, Manton and overall Bassetlaw has a moderate level of deprivation, 
there are pockets of significant deprivation (DCLG 2004). Manton is considered to 
be the most deprived area across the Bassetlaw district (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. 
comm.,) and the Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2004 identified Manton as one of 
the most deprived areas in the country. While no PB in the UK has yet used the 
matrix system of Brazil’s PBs, one function of which is to focus attention on areas of 
significant deprivation, many UK PBs have been set up in areas of increased 
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deprivation in order to promote engagement with more deprived and marginalised 
sections of the population within an area (SQW, 2011). While Tower Hamlets has a 
history of activism and community networks, Manton has a history of very little 
engagement with politics on both the local and the national level. In general 
elections, Manton has traditionally had one of the lowest levels of voter turnout in 
the country. In 2005 the average turnout across the UK was 61% (UK Political Info, 
2005), but in Manton it was only 22% (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. comm.,). 
In order to help assess the impact of PB processes in the UK, the SQW reports 
(2010; 2011) detail the way in which funding decisions were made prior to the 
introduction of PB. Both reports illustrate the way in which PB was considered as an 
additional tool in ongoing policy and practice rather than as a radically different 
approach. PB was understood as a natural progression for both the LSP in Tower 
Hamlets and the Manton Community Alliance. Both show a history of involving 
citizens in decision making processes; the steering groups referred to in the 
paragraph below about Tower Hamlets were actually public steering groups. 
Tower Hamlets: 
Prior to the introduction of Participatory Budgeting in 2008-09, 
budgetary decision making processes were largely undertaken by the 
relevant members and officers of the council, which included members 
of the Cabinet and the directors of services based on professional 
assessments of need and performance. Residents were not involved in 
high-level budget setting exercises. Additions or supplements to the 
central process include a range of annual consultation and engagement 
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processes run by the Tower Hamlets Partnership, through either the 
Neighbourhood Management team or the Participation and 
Engagement team. In addition to the above large-scale consultation 
processes, Tower Hamlets also previously devolved funding from the 
council to the Local Area Partnership Steering Groups. Funding was 
rarely spent on council services and instead focused on supporting 
local community groups to facilitate activities that sought to address 
local prevailing issues. This process was the pre-cursor to Participatory 
Budgeting in Tower Hamlets. (SQW, 2011, p.126) 
Manton: 
Previously Manton Community Alliance’s Board would have set the 
priorities for service delivery in the area and allocated resources in 
order to help bring about enhanced mainstream service delivery for 
Manton. The Manton Community Alliance Board comprises local 
residents, Councillors and officers from mainstream service providers. 
The decision to introduce Participatory Budgeting into Manton was 
taken as part of Manton Community Alliance’s broader approach to 
building social capital and Participatory Budgeting was seen as another 
tool for engaging and empowering the local community to improve the 
relationship between residents as consumers of services and service 
providers. Again, however, as with the previous two examples, the 
resources involved were relatively small. (SQW, 2011, p.115) 
Existing local structures and policies facilitated the adoption of PB in both these 
cases (SQW, 2010; 2011). The initial promotion and implementation in the UK (from 
2005-2012) relied on central government funding in the form of the PB Unit 
(Interviewee A, 2011, pers. comm.,). Having been employed by the government to 
work within their agenda, the framing of PB in the UK was one of a practice which 
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would complement existing policy and initiatives. Those working for the PB Unit 
hoped that PB, while complementing the government agenda around civic 
engagement and improved service delivery, would also facilitate greater citizen 
empowerment than was allowed for by existing government policy (Hall, 2011, 
pers. comm.,). While promoting PB as in keeping with central government 
directives, it was hoped that it could also usher in conversations around the nature 
of civic engagement and state/citizen relationships (ibid.). This, as the vignettes 
below illustrate, did not come to fruition in either Tower Hamlets or Manton, and 
there is no evidence that it did elsewhere either. In addition, although the use of 
PB, in both Manton and Tower Hamlets, certainly involved more citizens than the 
prior processes noted above, the extent to which it gave citizens greater control 
over decisions remains questionable as is illustrated below. 
4.42 How PB came to Tower Hamlets and Manton? 
Despite central government funding for the PB Unit and Blears announcement that 
every local authority should be running PB by 2012 the uptake and spread of PB in 
the UK relied for the most part on the church, community activism and social justice 
networks that first brought the idea to the UK, personal relationships and almost 
chance encounters (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.,). 
Shazia Hussain, Director of Tower Hamlets Partnership, first came across the idea of 
PB while attending an Institute of Development Studies ‘Champions of 
Participation’ event in 2000 (Hussain, 2011, pers. comm.,). The event was centred 
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around ideas and practices for engaging citizens in local governance, something 
local government was increasingly being tasked with in the UK, and PB was 
highlighted as one of the most empowering initiatives. Shazia Hussain took the 
idea of PB back with her to Tower Hamlets and, over the next two years, the 
Partnership developed a way in which they felt they could usefully implement PB in 
the borough (ibid.). By the time Tower Hamlets introduced PB they already had 
several years of Neighbourhood Renewal Scheme (NRS) initiatives running, which 
had localised some funding to residents through local forums (Hussain, 2011, pers. 
comm.,). The NRS funding was conditioned upon the involvement of local 
communities (ibid). LSPs were set up in 2000 in some of the most deprived areas of 
the country. They brought parts of the public, private, voluntary and community 
sectors together, to work at a local level to improve the quality of life in an area and 
deliver public services more effectively. Tower Hamlets designed PB as a way to go 
beyond the traditional methods of grant giving and commissioning to local 
communities and local priorities of NRSs (Hussain, 2011, pers. comm.,). Tower 
Hamlets wanted to use PB to start involving local people in mainstream funding 
decisions. PB was seen as a way to build on a ‘strong history of participation... and 
engagement’ (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.,) within the borough and take this 
‘up a notch’ (ibid.). Tower Hamlets PB is so far the only PB in the UK to use 
mainstream funds, making the actual amounts of money open to the PB process 
much greater than in any other process in the country to date. 
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In 2004/2005 MCA was attempting to instigate forms of community engagement in 
the area. Historically a very passive community, there was a lot of energy being put 
into reinvigorating community engagement. Richard Edwards, MCA Pathfinder 
Manager, read an article about PB and saw it as a possible tool for making 
engagement more meaningful; he viewed PB as a way of ‘giving people power by 
handing over one of the leaders of power - money’ (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,). 
At this point, PB was not on the CLG agenda, but the purpose and remit of 
Pathfinders was very clearly spelt out by central government. Pathfinders were set 
up in areas of particular deprivation to trial approaches, aimed at improving 
services by bringing the local community and service providers together, before 
they became general practice (SQW, 2008). This afforded them greater freedom 
than the LSPs or Local Area Agreements (LAA), which were also introduced at this 
time as part of a general strategy to develop a relationship between service 
providers and the communities they served (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,). 
4.43 Models and Processes 
The only large scale evaluation of PB in the UK to date are the DCLG 
commissioned SQW reports (2008;2010;2011). In line with New Labour’s fetish for 
targets and an almost universal predilection for the scientific method, they are 
essentially a cost-benefit analysis of PB in the UK. This in itself displays a concern 
for PB as a management and efficiency technique as opposed to a democratic 
process or tool. Cost-benefit analysis may be a wholly inadequate way to assess 
democratic processes; however, the details of the number of people involved in PB 
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processes, and the amount of money, its origin and what it is available for, are 
pertinent. This is not least because many of the claims to innovation with regard to 
PB rest on the fact that it gives real financial control to citizens and that this 
engenders a more empowering form of participation. 
The table below provides a brief overview of the PB processes in Manton and 
Tower Hamlets. The information in the table was collected from Tower Hamlets and 
Manton’s own promotional materials, SQW reports (2010; 2011) and interviews with 
several individuals: Richard Edwards, Shazia Hussain, Interviewee E and Interviewee 
F.  
Table 4 
Voice Your Choice You Decide
Where Manton - Large estate in the south east 
ward of Worksop in Nottinghamshire 
within Bassetlaw District Council
Tower Hamlets - East London Borough 
Political Control Conservative Labour
Year(s) 2007, 2008 2009, 2010
Organisation Manton Community Alliance (MCA) - A 
round two Government Neighbourhood 
Management Pathfinder (Pathfinder) 
independent from but part of Bassetlaw 
District Council.                                                                     
- Voice Your Choice was run by MCA
Tower Hamlets Partnership -  A Local 
Strategic Partnership (LSP). Members 
include: the council, police, the Primary 
Care Trust, public services, voluntary and 
community groups, faith communities, 
local businesses and residents.                    
- You Decide was run by the 
Neighbourhood Management teams within 
the Local Area Partnerships
Level of 
operation
Pathfinder - across the area i.e. The 
estate of Manton
Local Area Partnership - across the area 
i.e.Borough wide                                              
Covering 8 LAP areas 
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Aims 1. Enhance the development of social 
capital 
2. Increase community engagement and 
empowerment                                                          
3. Build trust within the community 
Over the longer term: 
1. Reduce levels of deprivation 
2. Increase local democratic activity so 
that residents exercise meaningful 
influence and are an integral part of local 
decision making 
3. Achievement of NI 4 [1]
1. Improve perceptions and performance 
of local services                                                                            
2. Develop proper participation within the 
Tower Hamlets community                                                          
3. Generate social capital
Amount of 
Funding 
available to be 
decided by PB
£50,000 per annum.                                             
Year 1: £50,000 from MCA budget                                        
Year 2: £40,000 from MCA budget +
£10,000 Bassetlaw PCT
£5.6 million over 2 years                                     
Year 1: The cabinet allocated £2.38 million 
of the council budget.                                                   
Year 2: The cabinet allocated £2.38 million 
of the council budget + £300,000 from 
Tower Hamlets PCT






Primary source was the Neighbourhood 
Management Pathfinder supplemented 
by PCT, Nottinghamshire County Council, 
Community Safety Partnerships funding
Primary source was Council budget - 
from the council’s General Fund. Money 
was set aside for PB by the Cabinet 





Participants Year 1: 498                                                                   
Year 2: 1056                                                                    
Year 1: 815                                                                  




Year 1: 6.30                                                                
Year 2: 13.37
Year 1 : 0.38                                                                





Year 1: £100.40 
Year 2: £47.35
Year 1: £2920.25 




Information provision followed by 
voting                                           Year 1: 
Information was presented competing 
projects at a live event                                      
Year 2: Information was presented by 
competing projects on a DVD 
Deliberation followed by voting






YES                                                           
Residents were involved in issue groups 
which identified a list of 42 issues, 
residents were also on the scrutiny panel. 
Unlike the voting events these were not 
open events as such. Residents self 
selected to become involved in the issue 
groups and the scrutiny panel. 
NO No resident input on the menu in year 
one MINIMAL Residents were invited to a 
menu review session. 20 residents took 
part in this.  The menu was drawn up 
according to the 6 priorities of the LSP.  A 
menu of services was presented at 
decision-making events. The menu 
shaped by the Cabinet’s priorities. 
Although developed by the LSP it was the 
Cabinet and not the LSP or the residents 
had final say over the content of the 
menu. 
Stages involved 1. Menu Setting
-  MCA used knowledge collected from 
issue groups to develop a sheet of 42                                        
- Citizens were asked to number their top 
5 priorities from the sheet of 42 leading to 
a list of 10 priorities. The format for this 
was ‘Budget Bingo‘  (see appendix for 
example of Manton’s Budget Bingo 
Sheet)- Budget Bingo forms were 
promoted at local events and activities, 
local schools, shops and community 
centres, in the Manton Newsletter and 
online on the website of Manton 
Community Alliance. About four weeks 
was allowed for this stage. 
2. Identifying Projects                                             
- Local organisations, groups and 
services were invited to bid for the money 
by offering projects that would address 
the priorities.                              - A 
scrutiny panel reviewed the bids and 
shortlisted projects for the project voting 
stage.
3. Voting Events                                                                 
- Year 1 included presentations by 
approved projects followed by voting. 
Voting events took place in various 
locations over a period of several weeks.                                                                      
- Year 2 the live presentations were 
replaced by DVDs. Again voting events 
took place in various locations over a 
period of several weeks.                                   
3. Project Delivery
1. Menu Setting
- The Council developed menus of 
services that met the priorities produced 
by the LAP
- The wider menu of services then had to 
be approved by the cabinet
2. Voting Events
- Eight public ‘You Decide!’ events were 
held by the council. Each event lasted half 
a day and contained 3 elements:
Service presentations, deliberation and 
voting.
3. Delivery Decisions
- Following on from the decision making 
events, the successful services visited the 
Local Area Partnership meetings to 
discuss with residents what they wanted 
out of the services
4. Services Delivery
Voice Your Choice You Decide
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[1] NI 4 National Indicator 4: The percentage of people who feel they can influence 
decisions in their locality. 
In Manton, citizens were in involved in three distinct stages of the process (1) the 
setting of priorities for Manton, (2) voting on how much money should be spent on 
these priorities, and (3) deciding who delivers the projects designed to tackle these 
priorities (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. comm.,). In Tower Hamlets, the involvement of 
citizens was more restricted. In addition to the limited input of citizens in the menu 
setting stage, in Tower Hamlets, the way in which priorities and the subsequent 
menu was designed meant that ultimately citizens could only influence the way in 
which services were provided, rather than decide which service would be provided 
and how (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.,). Decisions about which services would 






Play Area, Athletic Club Changing Rooms 
and 
PCSO Cameras
Placement of mobile speed reduction 
signs, street lighting, languages offered for 
the Early GCSE in Mother Tongue
Publicity Tools PB was promoted in a variety of ways 
including:  marketing in local employer’s 
canteens, pubs and bookmakers, MCA 
newsletters and events, the MCA website, 
leaflets in schools and shops and word of 
mouth.
PB was promoted in a variety of ways 
including:  posters, banners, press 
adverts, articles in the council newspaper 
(which is circulated to all homes across 
the authority), radio adverts, TV adverts 
(on Bengali TV stations) and leaflets, as 
well as through word of mouth, councillor 
contacts in their wards, local social 
networks and community groups, 
mosques, churches etc.
Voice Your Choice You Decide
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Cabinet and, in addition, the Cabinet held the power to override any decisions 
made by either the LAPs or citizens; the Cabinet made explicit use of this power on 
at least one occasion (ibid.). In effect citizens had no influence on priorities in Tower 
Hamlets. 
To an extent the numbers speak for themselves in terms of how much money was 
available for allocation via PB and how many people were involved in the process. 
Manton had much less money available for PB than Tower Hamlets, partly because 
the Tower Hamlets PBs was run by the LSP, which has more control over 
mainstream service provision and was able to open up this much larger area, both 
in terms of projects and finances, to PB. MCA does not provide or have jurisdiction 
over provision of mainstream services and so could not, even if it wished to, open 
up such large projects or sums of money for PB (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. 
comm.,). Its partnership with the PCT did, however, allow it to make inroads into 
more mainstream service provision. Participants in Manton very clearly had strong 
views about the way in which issues which fall under the purview of mainstream 
budgets should be prioritised; as part of the 2008 process, for example, it was 
actually voted to allocate part of the budget to pay for extra policing (Interviewee 
E, 2011, pers. comm.,). This was somewhat controversial, as policing should have 
been paid for out of mainstream Council budgets. However, the participants in 
Manton felt so strongly about the issues they decided to provide additional 
funding to this mainstream service so that the police could carry out additional 
drug raids (ibid.). 
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Given that the arguments for PBs innovation and ability to render participation 
empowering rely heavily on the fact it hands over financial control to citizens 
superficially, one could assume that the greater the amount of money involved, the 
greater the power given to citizens. However, there are arguments for PB to start 
with smaller projects. One of the initial reasons why people became so involved 
with PBs in Brazil was their ability to physically see the outcomes of decisions made 
by the PB process (Abers, 1995, p.200). So, while some of the projects in Manton 
may have been relatively small, the placing of a new bin for example, they were 
visible and had a direct effect on the physical environment of those who took place 
in the PB process (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,). 
Voting and the general process of PB is very simple. This removes many of the 
barriers to entry present in traditional grant giving schemes. Applying for grants 
can be time consuming, intimidating, and a difficult process which requires certain 
skills and capabilities; this is not the case with PB, which is a very easy process to 
understand and in which to take part. While the actual voting processes may be 
easy for residents to understand, in both areas under consideration the history of 
deprivation would likely result in low levels of political knowledge and expertise 
within the community. This would render some of the more complex power issues 
and processes at play difficult for participants to navigate and to understand. As 
projects become larger, the physical impact on a geographical area becomes less 
visible. Additionally, experiences in Brazil show how starting small enables people 
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to gain knowledge and experience (Abers, 1995; 2000). They do not feel 
overwhelmed when considering larger projects where issues of funding and 
implementation become more complex and also have a less visibly direct impact 
on individuals’ day to day lives (ibid.). In effect, having control over smaller 
projects, involving smaller sums of money, at least initially, may result in greater 
feelings of power and empowerment for citizens. Acquiring a small amount of 
power may result in a disproportionate increase in feelings of empowerment, 
particularly where little or no power has been held before. 
Although the sums of money involved in the Tower Hamlets processes were much 
larger than those in Manton, the situation was reversed in terms of the control over 
what happened with those sums. In Manton, participants were given fairly 
extensive control over the development of a menu from which to choose. Although 
attached to the council, MCA was self-governed by a combination of local people 
and public sector officials; it was not directly controlled by either the council or 
central government (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,) in the same manner as Tower 
Hamlets LSP. In Tower Hamlets, there was no citizen involvement in the menu-
setting stage for the first PB; superficially this was because of a lack of time allowed 
for the lead (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.,). They only allowed five months 
from the decision to implement PB to the running of the actual voting process 
(ibid.); this in itself shows a lack of concern for citizen involvement in the menu-
setting stage of PB. Citizens were minimally involved in the menu-setting process 
for the second PB; twenty people attended a form of menu-reviewing session 
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(Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.,). In both PBs in Tower Hamlets, the menu was 
restricted to the six priorities of the LSP and ultimate control of the menu lay with 
the Cabinet (ibid.). The menu was first and foremost based on the Cabinet’s 
priorities for the upcoming year, council members and service providers were then 
asked to make contributions to the menu in line with the Cabinet’s priorities, and 
finally the menu was sent to the Cabinet to be signed off. In at least one case the 
Cabinet made alterations to the menu before sign off  (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. 36
comm.,). So, based on the sums of money and scale of projects involved, it may 
appear superficially that the participants of the Tower Hamlets PB had more power, 
a closer inspection of the actual processes involved suggests otherwise. The Tower 
Hamlets process, then, appears to be little more than a legitimation of Cabinet 
priorities. While the participants were unaware of the behind-the-scenes menu-
setting process in Tower Hamlets, the lack of involvement in menu setting and the 
restriction of choice over projects would have been apparent (Interviewee F, 2011, 
pers. comm.,) and arguably would have had a negative effect on feelings of 
empowerment. In fact, people did complain about the lack of involvement in the 
menu-setting stage of the first PB in Tower Hamlets, and this is why they were 
invited to a menu-reviewing session in the second PB (ibid.). However, they were 
only asked to review the menu not help construct it (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. 
comm.,) and given the other processes outlined above their ability to control the 
menu remained practically non-existent. 
 One of the original menu had included some funding for a healthy living project which 36
would have been run with the Primary Care Trust (PCT). This item was in all the drafts of the 
menu until it went to the Cabinet. The project leads were later told that the Cabinet had 
removed the provision because they did not want any council money going from this process 
outside of the council (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.,)
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Manton actually developed a tool, budget bingo, specifically to involve local 
residents in the construction of a menu (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,). In Manton’s 
first PB, citizens were asked to number their top five priorities from a bingo sheet of 
forty-two that MCA had identified using knowledge collected from issue groups 
(ibid.). Although the format of this stage altered slightly, predominantly to include 
the service providers from the public sector as a way to seduce them into 
becoming involved in PB, and to allow it to impact more mainstream services 
beyond the remit of MCA, in subsequent PBs the contribution of citizens in this 
stage remained significant(Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,) . Involving service 37
providers at this stage gave the agencies a vested interested in being involved, 
and MCA also hoped it would give them a sense of legitimacy and credibility 
(ibid.). This change to stage two represents the concrete introduction of co-
production practices which had been developing as ideas to complement the 
original social capital model used by MCA (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,). MCA 
understood coproduction as ‘tools and methods that create opportunities for 
people and agencies to learn and work together in designing services which 
become subsequently more effective and efficient’ (ibid.).  
 Manton’s third PB saw a greater concern for including the public sector. They wanted to 37
ensure that the public sector was ‘seduced’ into being involved. In year three there were five 
themes in Stage One including a health theme, an employment theme and a young person's 
theme. Within that at the voting for priorities stage there were ten choices to make and voters 
had to pick the top. Five of those ten in each theme were what the agencies wanted to do and 
five of those ten were what the residents had identified as being important. In Stage Two MCA 
contacted all the agencies involved with the selected priorities and asked all the agencies and 
say here are the priorities and what they wanted to do in response to them. (Edwards, 2010, 
pers. comm.,)
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As noted above, only twenty people attended the menu-reviewing session in Tower 
Hamlets. The council expected around sixty people to turn up (Interviewee F, 2011, 
pers. comm.,). Sixty is still a very small percentage of the number of people who 
took part in the voting events, and an extremely small percentage of those eligible 
to take part in PB overall. This suggests that it was not considered to be a major 
part of the PB process and, as such, not much time and energy was devoted to 
developing it; despite a £100,000 publicity budget, Tower Hamlets relied upon 
word of mouth to promote their menu-reviewing sessions (ibid.). 
There is another issue around how much people actually want to be involved. 
‘[E]mpirical evidence produced by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister found 
that most citizens did not want to participate more than they did (ODPM 2005, p.
73), and Meadowcroft’s (2001) study into participatory mechanisms employed by 
UK local governments recorded a similar lack of desire for increased participation 
(Meadowcroft, 2001,p.40, cited in, Davidson and Elstub, 2014, p.379). This 
suggests that people want to know they can influence the way in which services are 
provided and run, but are less interested in actually exerting that influence, let 
alone in co-designing and running a scheme of this kind. There are also the issues 
of complexity and time with regard to this form of participation. This is especially 
true when people have had no experience of being directly involved in decision 
making about service provision by their council. Service provision can be complex 
and becoming informed about all aspects in order to make meaningful decisions 
can be time consuming. It is not obvious that citizens have the time or inclination to 
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take on such burdens. Davidson and Elstub (2014) themselves note that the studies 
they cite with regard to a lack of appetite for increased participation in the UK ‘do 
not take into account the fact that much of this participation has little or no 
influence on decisions’ (ibid. p.379). They also suggest that ‘if UK citizens did have 
the opportunity to participate meaningfully in deliberating over and making 
important decisions that affect their lives, they may well desire more opportunities 
to participate’ (Davidson and Elstub, 2014, p.379).  In Manton, citizens did have far 
more control over the menu but the issues and projects were smaller, not as 
complex, and had visible impacts on their day-to-day lives. PB proved far more 
popular with citizens in Manton than it did with citizens in Tower Hamlets, as is 
evidenced by the dramatic increase (113%) in the number of people attending the 
2008 PB process compared to that organised in 2007. In contrast, Tower Hamlets 
saw roughly the same number of people attending in 2009 and 2010 with, if 
anything, a slight decrease in 2010. 
Manton included a far greater percentage of the population able to take part in PB 
in each process than did Tower Hamlets. As Manton’s process potentially involved 
far fewer people than that in Tower Hamlets, it was easier to contact potential 
participants directly and to encourage them to become involved, and MCA was 
actively involved in canvassing. The fact that Manton could extend their voting 
period (up to two months in the third round) beyond one-day events, and that the 
total population covered by the Manton PB allowed for door-to-door canvassing 
(Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,), while this was not appropriate for Tower Hamlets 
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given the far greater population goes some way to explaining the much higher 
percentage of the population taking part in Manton. However, the continued 
increase in numbers of people taking part in Manton, compared to the actual 
decrease in Tower Hamlets, also reveals how attractive and meaningful PB was 
seen to be in each location. Publicity and advertising obviously play their part in 
attracting people to take part, and Tower Hamlets had a much wider area to cover, 
but Tower Hamlets did have significantly greater reserves to draw upon for this 
than Manton. In addition, the existence of community networks and organisations 
and a history of activism within the borough of Tower Hamlets (SQW, 2010) would 
suggest a more fertile ground for participation and engagement initiatives than the 
traditionally passive population of Manton (SQW, 2010). 
The funds available for PB in both Manton and Tower Hamlets were revenue spend 
rather than capital spend as is generally the case in Brazil’s PBs. Crucially, capital 
spend enables PB to be a rolling process with cycles but no definite end, each 
cycle feeding into another and creating ongoing participation in all areas and 
projects. Secure funding enables PB in Brazil to be an ongoing process which 
promotes knowledge acquisition and capacity building in participants through 
simply repeating the process and allowing them to become more familiar with the 
issues raised. As revenue spend is exhausted at the end of each year there is no 
guarantee that the process will continue beyond a one-off event. Tower Hamlets 
had funding for two years but there was a big question mark over whether it would 
happen for a third time (Interviewee A, 2011, pers. comm.,). Despite having moved 
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beyond the small grants model of PB, both Manton and Tower Hamlets were 
ultimately reliant on grants from central government. Reliance on grants 
depoliticises the processes and makes it harder for residents to argue against a 
process or the way in which it is constructed; citizens are put in an obliged and 
dependent position with regard to the council. Although the money in theory 
belongs to the residents, it is still held by the council who rely upon central 
government to give it to them. 
Much has been made of the deliberative aspects of the Porto Alegre model with 
regard to its innovatory status and the type of participation it affords. Many would 
consider deliberation as a distinguishing feature of PB. The Porto Alegre model has 
deliberation built in to various aspects of the process; the Budget Councils create a 
space for discussions about issues of social justice and local priorities, there is also 
space for discussing spending priorities in wider forums and finally deliberation 
about funding. ‘In the transfer of Participatory Budgeting to the Northern 
Hemisphere, deliberation seems to have lost out to an emphasis for reaching set 
targets for community cohesion and urban renewal’ (Ryan, 2009, p.8 cited, in 
Davidson and Elstub, 2014, p.378). Community cohesion was an important 
consideration for both Manton and Tower Hamlets. Like almost all UK PB 
processes, the main emphasis in terms of citizen engagement was on the voting 
rather than the deliberation stages of PB. Community cohesion was an aim, 
explicitly stated as such in Tower Hamlets and it was also cited in MCAs own 
literature on PB, of their PB processes. PB voting days in Tower Hamlets were seen 
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as events that would bring people from across the community together and create 
interaction between groups and thereby promote cohesion (Interviewee F, 2011, 
pers. comm.,). Cohesion was a goal in both areas both due to underlying 
community issues and because greater cohesion enhances social capital. In Tower 
Hamlets sectionalism is a problem (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.,) and in 
Manton there are still rifts in the community that date back to the miners’ strikes 
concerning who did and did not cross the picket line (Edwards, 2010, pers. 
comm.,). The emphasis on community cohesion meant neither MCA nor Tower 
Hamlets LSP wanted to highlight the differences within their community for fear this 
would actually damage community cohesion. In addition, radical or dissenting 
views are unlikely to get expressed when you have got a set menu of projects that 
people are deciding between. 
While the Manton process made no specific provisions for deliberation at all, Tower 
Hamlets felt that deliberation was an important part of the process and that it was 
not possible to get good decisions without good deliberation (Interviewee F, 2011, 
pers. comm.,). Arguably, this could facilitate a better understanding of different 
views within the community. Deliberation was very much built into the Tower 
Hamlets processes. The PB event to decide where the money went was designed 
to last three hours, with only the last twenty-five minutes allocated for voting, while 
the first two and a half hours were for information sharing, deliberation and 
discussion (ibid.). In addition to the generous time allotted for discussion, the event 
was heavily staffed; there was one member of staff per ten residents sitting on a 
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table facilitating deliberation and then other staff to explain the technical aspects 
of the projects(Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.,). Despite these relatively large 
efforts made by Tower Hamlets, there were several obstacles to achieving 
meaningful deliberation. Like-minded people with similar concerns and needs 
tended to sit together and would object to sitting elsewhere (ibid.). In addition, 
there were cultural obstacles; there existed groups where one person decided for 
everyone, as traditionally the group looked to this person for guidance (Interviewee 
F, 2011, pers. comm.,). Despite big efforts, the Tower Hamlets events were unable 
to create or facilitate much substantial deliberation and there was almost no space 
for dissent because the process was so structured (ibid.). There was an element of 
conflict in the first PB between the youths and the adults who attended. It was felt 
that the youths ‘just voted for what they wanted’ (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. 
comm.,). Rather than being seen as a vibrant expression of views, and as a 
challenge to navigate disparate and competing views, the presence of the youths 
was deemed disruptive and undesirable. In order to avoid any further disruption, 
the second PB ran a separate youth event and anyone under eighteen was 
prevented from attending the adult PB (ibid.). 
After the first PB process in Manton, there was a concern that voting decisions were 
being influenced by the quality and nature of presentations on the day (Interviewee 
E 2011, pers. comm.,). In order to help ensure votes were being cast on issues 
rather than personalities, there were no presentations and not even any communal 
final voting events in Manton’s second PB (ibid.). Instead, people read about 
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projects and proposals and made a decision based on this (Interviewee E 2011, 
pers. comm.,). While arguably this facilitates more objective issue-based voting, it 
also precludes the possibility of deliberation in the process. This is likely to result in 
a lessening of the opportunity to understand competing and conflicting views. The 
literature needed, time required and sophistication of readers needed for this is 
very high. The pamphlets developed in Manton were deliberately kept short and 
simple so that people would not be put off by a large and lengthy document 
(Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,). This could help tackle the issue of reader 
sophistication but hinders the development of detailed knowledge of projects. 
Given the lack of a Budget Council in either Manton or Tower Hamlets, coupled 
with limited options between which to choose, especially in Tower Hamlets, and 
the general structure of PB in both places, the possibility of deliberation about 
issues of social justice was eclipsed. 
The motivation for implementing PB obviously shaped the way in which the 
processes were designed and run. Both Manton and Tower Hamlets had very clear 
and specific reasons for implementing PB. Both the general aims of the bodies 
implementing PB, and the specific aims they had in mind for the processes 
themselves, had agency in this respect. 
4.44 PB: Specific Aims 
The table below (reproduced from the table above) lists the aims of each PB 
process as outlined in their own promotional material. 
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Table 5: Specific aims 
[1] NI 4 -National Indicator 4: The percentage of people who feel they can 
influence decisions in their locality 
The first three in each case are very similar and very much in keeping with central 
government policy at the time. The longer term aims  of the Manton project make 38
it distinct not just from Tower Hamlets but also from almost all other PB processes 
in the UK; Manton’s concern with democratic activity makes it distinctive among UK 
processes. Unfortunately, it is simply not possible to assess Manton PB’s impact 
with regard to its longer term aims; there is not enough data about the 
consequences of the PB processes themselves and there are innumerable other 
Aims 1. Enhance the development of social 
capital 
2. Increase community engagement and 
empowerment                                                          
3. Build trust within the community 
Over the longer term: 
1. Reduce levels of deprivation 
2. Increase local democratic activity so 
that residents exercise meaningful 
influence and are an integral part of local 
decision making 
3. Achievement of NI 4 [1]
1. Generate social capital                                                                           
2. Develop proper participation within the 
Tower Hamlets community                                                          
3. Improve perceptions and performance 
of local services  
Mansfield is another example where one of the aims of PB was to enhance the democratic 38
process. Where there have been explicit concerns with democracy in UK PB processes these 
have generally been directed at meeting requirements of The Duty to Involve Statute 1 and/or 
(NI) 4
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variables which could impact upon these aims. The long term aims  were a 39
consideration in the establishment and design of, and the decision to implement 
PB, however, it was the initial three shorter term aims that had the most influence 
on the form PB took. 
Both projects, Manton and Tower Hamlets, wanted to use PB to build trust within 
the community, and both saw PB as a tool to increase participation and community 
cohesion. In addition, Tower Hamlets saw PB as a way to promote the Partnership, 
its profile, its priorities, and its activities. Both were focused on building models of 
co-production and developing social capital, but, while Manton had an eye on 
democratic issues, Tower Hamlets PB was very explicitly about efficiency and 
service provision, ‘their concern with democracy was merely that decisions be 
made by a voting process’ (PB Officer in Tower Hamlets). PB was seen by both as a 
tool to further co-production. The thinking was that if you can empower people to 
make decisions in their locality, then they might take more responsibility. PB was 
used as a mechanism to involve citizens in the design of services. It was primarily 
implemented as a way to address existing issues and to further policy initiatives, 
rather than because of its potential with regard to participation or democracy. 
There was an interest in issues of empowerment; empowering individuals to make 
decisions for themselves and their locality. The ideological ground from which 
these concerns grew, however, was economic, they revolved around co-production 
and social capital, rather than political. Both projects also hoped to raise the profile 
 As MCA ceased to exist in 2011 they themselves did not have the time or resources to follow 39
up on this.
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of the Pathfinder or LSP involved generally, as a form of PR, and specifically to 
further local resident understanding of their role and activities. 
4.45 LSPs and Pathfinders 
Manton Community Alliance is the local brand name for the government’s 
department of Communities and Local Government (CLG) Neighborhood 
Management Pathfinder initiative (Pathfinders). Pathfinders came about from what 
used to be called the Social Exclusion Unit, a part of the cabinet, as a way to 
improve public services. They specifically wanted to test the idea that managing 
public services at a more local level would bring substantial benefits. There were 
two rounds of the Pathfinder approach; MCA was part of the second round of 
Pathfinders. The key difference between the thirty round one and the fifteen round 
two Pathfinders is that the round two Pathfinders were deliberately given less 
money to see if Pathfinders could influence public services without money 
(Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,). Like all round two Pathfinders, MCA was given 
seven years to prove its worth, and the object was to test new ways of working as 
part of the reform of the public sector (ibid.). There was, however, a general aim: 
‘To enable deprived communities and local services to improve local outcomes, by 
improving and joining up local services, and making them more responsive to local 
needs’ (SQW, 2008, p.6). Pathfinders were given relatively free rein as to how they 
would achieve these goals, so each one of the thirty-five total pathfinders in the 
country was acting independently (Edwards,2010, pers. comm.,). The vast majority 
of them adopted a traditional neighbourhood renewal approach i.e. pump priming 
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(ibid.). MCA rejected that approach viewing it expensive, inefficient and ineffective. 
Instead, they set up their own social capital model of renewal which focused on 
changing people’s behaviours as a means of sustaining growth in the community 
(Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,). 
Both LSPs and Pathfinders came into being in 2000 and 2001 respectively. They 
appeared against a backdrop of broader aims to change the relationship between 
citizens and the state, the central tenet being that citizens are part of the solution 
and not just passive consumers of public services. Citizens are viewed as a valuable 
resource for the development of more responsive and more efficient services. The 
drivers behind this are economic and the hope was that input from citizens can 
replace some capital input; a rise in social capital can offset a fall in traditional 
capital (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,). Although relevant to their particular 
geographical areas, the aims were shaped by the specific purpose of Pathfinders 
and LSPs as put forward by central government, as well as by central government 
policy and initiatives more generally (for example the Localism Agenda). PB fitted 
very neatly into and complemented many existing policies and initiatives in the UK. 
LSPs and Pathfinder initiatives had similar goals in that they were both developed 
to bring communities and service providers together, to combat a culture of silo 
working and improve local services (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,). The main 
differences, which affected their operation and processes, were that LSPs dealt with 
larger areas (both in terms of geography and service provision) and larger sums of 
money, and were general practice across the UK, while Pathfinders dealt with 
smaller amounts of money over geographically smaller areas, and were selectively 
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implemented in areas of particular deprivation (ibid.). Both LSPs and Pathfinders 
were initiatives developed in a general policy framework to improve services and 
their delivery. The underlying assumption was that this could and would be 
achieved by greater community involvement and a drive towards localism. This was 
accompanied by a rhetoric of bringing the government and citizens closer together 
and giving local people ‘more say’ in the way in which local services were run. 
Although never clearly defined, the development of social capital and co-
production models underlined much of the policy and rhetoric around 
empowerment and localism. This reveals the sense in which the fundamental 
concerns of the projects were economic rather than political. The driver for this 
approach is an attempt to provide more effective services with less money (Boyle, 
Coote, Sherwood and Slay, 2010). Social capital, however it is defined, is generally 
deemed to be at least desirable, if not necessary, predominantly due to its 
economic value. The relationship between economic development and democracy 
may be mutually beneficial particularly with regard to minimalist conceptions of 
democracy. The subversive aspect is to use political and democratic language and 
ideals to pursue economic ends and thereby diffuse actual political issues and 
demands. As the previous chapter illustrated this is exactly what happened as a 
consequence of the overlaying of multiple discourses by New Labour. 
The Blair government’s language expressed a renewed interest in community, 
neighbourhood, citizenship, exclusion, and empowerment, and saw the 
introduction of The New Deal for Communities, introduced in 1998 and the 
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Neighbourhood Renewal Schemes introduced in 1997, to name just two. However, 
the continued existence of quangos and the outsourcing of public service provision 
to private companies prevented any democratisation of large areas of public policy 
and service finance. Participation was generally a consultation of consumers by the 
government, rather than any meaningful transition of power or decision-making 
capacities to citizens. In short, there was more decentralisation but little or no 
devolution of power to the local level, not least due to the continued exercise of 
ring fencing and capping of local authority spending. The New Localism of which 
Hazel Blears was a strong advocate, introduced in the second half of the New 
Labour government, did mark a shift from the previous centralist policies to more 
direct participation. PBs held at least the potential to genuinely shift power, if only 
minimally initially, into the hands of the people affected by policies, and they were 
very much in line with the rhetoric of the New Labour government. While the 
rhetoric changed the government still pursued privatisation policies and 
decentralisation as a management technique rather than a democratic process. 
Underlying all of this was a construction of a new relationship between the state 
and civil society that, while couched in the language of decentralisation and 
participation, fundamentally rested on co-production rather than power sharing. As 
national policy began to scale down the amount of power to be devolved to local 
government and communities, the amount of power possible to open up via PB 
also shrunk. 
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Traditional partnership models for local government were being replaced with 
collaborative action models (Interviewee, E, 2010, pers. comm.,). Collaborative 
action models illustrate a form of co-production where citizens are seen to be 
valuable resources (ibid.). While resident engagement may lead to better public 
services, as it affords more information on the needs and wants of the communities 
to which they deliver, and a quicker sense of where things are working and where 
they are not working. However, the addition of responsibility for citizens to co-
produce these services, or to ensure that they are responsive to need in the 
community, does not automatically follow. Citizen engagement does not require 
that this responsibility rest on the residents involved. The responsibility shift from 
the government and service providers to citizens is part of the way in which the 
new state/citizen relationship was conceptualised. 
PB fitted very neatly into and complemented many existing policies and initiatives 
in the UK.  Rather than ushering in a radical and/or new form of citizen 
engagement, PB was reconfigured so as to become the natural development of 
existing policy initiatives. PB also sits very well with Neighbourhood Charters (later 
to become Neighbourhood Agreements) an initiative in the Strong and Prosperous 
Communities - The Local Government White Paper (DCLG 2006). These Charters/
Agreements were aimed at getting local people to sit down with the public sector 
and decide together what level of service is to be delivered. MCA were part of the 
national pilot scheme for the Neighbourhood Agreements and used PB as a tool to 
enact them. As part of PB in Manton is about local people setting their priorities, 
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the Neighbourhood Agreement should actually mirror what people expect to get; 
MCA married the two together and made them into one entity, so everything that 
is decided through PB goes into a written agreement/contract (Interviewee E, 
2011, pers. comm.,). While this is not general practice for PB in the UK it does 
illustrate the way in which PB can and was used as a tool to enable central 
government policy, rather than as an initiative in and of itself. 
The Porto Alegre exemplar of PB and the two vignettes discussed here are clearly 
very different in many ways. PB in Porto Alegre, and now across Brazil, has become 
a formal institution. This institutionalisation can be seen as a double edged sword; 
it may lead to ossification but it can also serve to strengthen PB and its potential. 
Earlier chapters, particularly chapter two, highlighted some of the potential 
limitations that formalisation and institutionalisation can impose upon PB 
processes. Smith (2009) very clearly illustrates the various ways in which the details 
of institutional can design influence the democratic potential of participatory 
practices. The vignettes above illustrate just how influential institutional design and 
institutionalisation can be. The absence of both, not just in the case of the 
vignettes but with regard to PB across the UK, is one of the factors that has 
contributed to the lack of development of PB processes in the UK and significantly 
weakened their potential when they have taken place.  
Smith (2009) asks ‘[t]o what extent can different designs express theorists’ 
democratic hopes and expectations?’ (ibid p.6). PB is an example of what Smith 
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(2009) terms democratic innovations; these are ‘institutions that have been 
specifically designed to increase and deepen citizen participation in the political 
decision making process.’ (ibid, p.1). He reminds us that institutional design of such 
processes is itself an object of investigation. 
‘All of them [including PB] are representative of a growing and widespread interest 
in finding new ways of engaging citizens in the political decision-making process, 
and it is the aim of this book to offer an evaluation of the democratic potential of 
these different institutional designs.’ (Smith, G. 2009, p.2) 
Smith (2009) bases his analysis on four democratic goods: inclusiveness, popular 
control, considered judgement and transparency; these are accompanied by two 
institutional goods – efficiency and transferability. There are numerous design 
elements of mature Brazilian PBs that are absent from the vignettes above. The 
inclusion of some of these elements would almost certainly strengthen the 
potential of these processes. This sentiment has also often been expressed by a 
number of UK PB practitioners and members of the PB Unit including Jez Hall, 
arguably the leading expert on and practitioner of PB in the UK. The features of the 
mature Brazilian PBs that would likely have made the biggest difference to the 
vignettes include: regional budget forums, the COP, delegates and councillors 
associated with the regional assemblies and the COP, a budget matrix and an 
annual cycle repeated year upon year. Each of these features infix particular 
institutional characteristics that facilitated the realisation of various democratic 
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goods in different ways in Porto Alegre. (Smith 2009). The incorporation of these 
design features into the vignettes would arguably have enhanced their ability to 
more fully realise all six of Smiths goods and made for much stronger participatory 
initiatives.  
The Possibility of Transformation? 
It is worth noting that, in contrast to the vignettes detailed here, there are 
examples of where agency played a role in turning an essentially non-
transformative policy into a practice that had unintended transformational 
consequences. Wainwright (2003) details the Marsh Farm New Deal for Community 
project. Wainwright cites this as an example of how even when the government 
policy and institutional design is not intentionally transformational - indeed maybe 
even  intended to diffuse transformational impulses under the guise of 
commitments to change - well-organised, consciously transformational, citizen’s 
organisations have potentially the capacity to 'occupy the rhetoric’. This led to 
unintended, transformational consequences (unintended by New Labour at least). 
The New Deal for Communities involved the devolution of 50 million pounds to be 
spent over 10 years through a 'community led' process of decision-making. The 
Marsh Farm alliance of tenants, community groups, the Exodus collective and 
sundry vicars struggled more or less successfully to realise this promise of money 
for community led processes (Wainwright 2003). The Marsh Farm project was part 
of the New Deal for Communities; as previously noted PB (or at least the promise 
of it) featured in the New Deal for Communities. The vignettes illustrate a variety of 
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the obstacles and limits some of these community led processes faced; Marsh Farm 
illustrates that, despite all of these, transformational processes are sometimes 
possible (Wainwright 2003). A wider study of various participatory initiatives 
(Newman et al. 2004) also acknowledged that while central government policy and 
control often generated institutional constraints and limited the capacity of 
participation initiatives to shape policy and practice from below there did exist 
some spaces for change (ibid).   
‘[C]entral government policies on participation, while not necessarily 
bringing citizen and user voices closer to the centres of decision-making 
power, were producing a culture of change as some strategic actors seized 
policy opportunities in order to introduce new ways of working and used 
the enhanced legitimacy afforded to the participation agenda to bring 
about change.’ (Newman et al., 2004, p.210).  
The vignettes detailed here highlight some of the difficulties that participatory 
initiatives faced. Alone they may suggest that change was almost impossible. 
However, as shown above, there were cases where at least some form of change 
was realised.  
There are also studies of other UK PB processes which suggest PB has greater 
potential than the two vignettes here suggest. As noted above the two main 
academic authors who have written about PB in the UK are Blakey and Rocke. The 
various studies conducted by both suggest PB does have at least some 
transformational potential. The reasons for this are various and include: case 
selection, conceptual framework, methodology and the questions posed by their 
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research. Their work is conceptually very different, to one another and to this work, 
but there are at least some non-conceptual similarities worth noting. Both 
conducted a significant number of participant interviews, undertook diverse 
participant observations and both observed the PB processes they investigated 
(Blakey 2015, Rocke 2014). This enabled them to observe change and 
transformation in individuals during PB processes; something this work was not 
able to do. However neither researcher was able to follow up with individuals to 
ascertain whether the change was enduring, that it lasted beyond the buoyancy of 
the often very buoyant PB processes. Additionally both researchers investigated 
early adopters of PB and both researchers were dependent on, if not heavily 
involved with, PB activists for their non-participant based information. The point 
about studying early adopters (Salford, Bradford and Newcastle) is that these 
processes occurred before the PB Unit became government funded and as such 
were less bound by government policy and therefore possibly closer to the activist 
and social justice orientation of CAP and CPI. The early UK PBs were set up and run 
by self proclaimed community activists and advocates of PB; relying on such 
individuals for information is bound to produce a certain bias. Blakey (2015) is 
explicit about the fact that her research is advocacy-driven and very frank about her 
normative commitments and about her activist identity and motivations which 
inevitably invoke a certain cognitive bias. This is not to say that the processes 
investigated by Blakey and Rocke did not display greater potential than the 
vignettes above but it does go some way towards explaining how and why they 
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were able to find more evidence of change than was found during the investigation 
of the vignettes.  
Conclusion 
The investigation of actual UK PB processes reveals that the only concrete import 
to the UK processes analysed here was the idea that citizens be given a say in how 
budgets are allocated. This vague and general abstraction leaves PB open to a 
profusion of disparate interpretations and implementations. The way in which PB 
manifests is then dependent on innumerable variables including both the design of 
practical processes and the context in which these processes operate. Discussion of 
context and its impact illustrates how, in the UK, PB did not influence or change the 
narrative around participation but rather was incorporated into it. This is made 
explicit by an account of who implemented PB and why. The introduction of PB into 
the UK is then seen not as a radical and innovative participatory practice, an 
idealism created by the myth of PB, but rather as an additional tool to further a 
particular political project and as such displays minimal shifts in power and 
superficial forms of participation. New Labour deployed a consensus-driven and 
technical managerial interpretation of participation based on business models 
which were only rhetorically concerned with citizen empowerment. 
The exploration of the two vignettes above does suggest that they would sit along 
the right hand side of the triangle. Arguably, Manton did place slightly more 
emphasis on politics, if only in terms of a desire to increase voter turnout in 
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elections. However, his emphasis on politics did not develop in any other respect 
throughout the project. Again arguably it could be said that Tower Hamlets was 
slightly closer to the Porto Alegre model in terms of the budget that was available 
for PB. That said, given that many aspects of the Porto Alegre cycle were missing, it 
was not actually an ongoing cycle at all, and the limited control participants had 
over how the funds would be spent, means that it remains very far from the Porto 
Alegre model. 
Given the number of citizens involved in the PB processes outlined above, even the 
far weaker claim that participation was improved by including greater numbers of 
people is somewhat questionable. In neither case did PB dramatically impact upon 
popular sovereignty even at the very micro level; in Manton, PB was not used for 
mainstream services and, in Tower Hamlets, authority over both the initial priorities 
and the final decisions lay not in the hands of citizens but those of local and central 
government. Although the processes did include more people than previous 
engagement initiatives did, citizen involvement, albeit that of a select few, in the 
types of issues addressed by PB in both Tower Hamlets and Manton was not novel. 
There is little evidence that these PB processes did usher in conversations around 
the nature of civic engagement and state/citizen relationships. 
PB, with its focus on citizen control over public budgets and social justice, does 
have the potential to address issues of sovereignty and equality; these were taken 
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up to an extent in the UK, for example, the areas which got funding to carry out PB 
were some of the most deprived in the country. 
The New Labour citizen is rational, active and responsible, while for the Brazilian 
social movements the achievement of citizenship is dependent on the formation of 
a critical consciousness. The types of participation befitting each will necessarily be 
radically different. One mode of participation appropriate to the New Labour 
citizen is co-production. The vignettes presented here reveal PB as a management 
tool capable of creating opportunities for people and agencies to learn and work 
together in designing services which subsequently become more effective and 
efficient. There may well be a lack of appetite among citizens in the UK for this type 
of participation, but that does not mean there is no appetite at all. Apathy is often 
cited as one of the causes of the current crisis of representative democracy. It is 
highly unlikely that the UK population has suddenly become apolitical - indeed five 
minutes talking to anyone on the street would challenge this assumption. What is 
more likely is that they are disillusioned with the current state of representative 
democracy. Maybe they are also disillusioned with the types and forms of 
participation being put forward by government. Despite the lack of potential 
displayed by the vignettes here it is important to note that there are other 
instances, Marsh Farm and the PB processes explored by Blakely and Rocke, where 
some form of change and/or transformation may be possible. The next chapter will 
explore different types and kinds of participation including a contrasting of what 
was demanded by the social movements in the UK and what has been put forward 
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by government, this leads to a discussion of the relationship between the 
prevailing hegemony and critique. Finally the last chapter will explore the 
relationship between participation and representative democracy: can participation 
remedy the ills of contemporary representative democracy? 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Participation and Representation  
Introduction 
This chapter reflects on some of the questions that arise out of previous chapters. It 
attempts to make sense of a recent trend in politics, namely the emphasis on 
participation. It asks what accounts for this trend? Is it a development and mutation 
of neoliberalism? Is it a response to criticisms, contentions and challenges to 
neoliberal hegemony? Does it illustrate a triumph or a defeat of political struggles 
and social movements? What is the relationship between participation, specifically 
civic engagement and representative democracy? The turn towards participation 
reconfigures the traditional relationship between state and citizen in classical 
theories of representative democracy. This impacts on the role and function of both 
the citizen and the state. There are many different understandings of participation, 
what it is, what it should be, and to what ends it should be implemented. Part One 
of this chapter problematises of the concept of participation. Then Part Two looks 
to the recent turn towards participation asking what accounts for this trend. 
Drawing on Chapter Three, it explores the ways in which neoliberalism’s turn 
towards participation can be understood as a reaction to counter-hegemonic 
demands (in both theory and practice) for greater citizen participation in political 
decisions. It explores the ways in which neoliberalism has co-opted participation 
and incorporated it, so that it functions to reinforce the hegemony of neoliberalism 
rather than, as its radical roots would have it, question the hegemony itself. 
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Finally, it reflects on the consequences of understanding hegemony and counter-
hegemonies as standing in a relation of co-constitution. It explores what 
significance the difference between participation-as-insertion and participation-as-
transformation has for our understanding of the relationship between participation 
and representative democracy and reflects on the understandings of participation 
that are more likely to have a positive democratic impact. 
PART ONE: Problematising Participation  
5. 1 Participation 
Understandings of participation are extremely varied. At one end of the spectrum 
are understandings based on process and Freirean pedagogy which emphasise 
empowerment and critical consciousness raising; this literature focuses on the 
participants. At the other end, there are those who focus on the state and the ways 
in which participation may aid the function of the state. Clearly there are a 
profusion of authors and disciplines which could be drawn upon to explore the 
concept and as such no attempt at a comprehensive exploration is made here. 
Authors and disciplines have been chosen and drawn upon to illustrate the variety, 
complexity, and antithetical nature of meanings signified by the one word 
‘participation’. The briefest investigation of the multifarious meanings of 
participation highlights the multiplicity of aims, and the subsequent consequences, 
embedded in the concomitant meanings. After briefly evidencing the longevity of 
the debates around participation and democracy, this chapter quickly turns its 
attention to more contemporary debates. 
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There may be a renewed interest in participation in contemporary politics and 
political theory, for a variety of reasons, some of which are explored below, but an 
acknowledgement of the relevance and importance of participation in relation to 
democracy is not as new as much of the literature on participation (both academic 
papers and policy documents) seems to suggest. Academic work on the 
relationship between participation and democracy can be traced back at least as 
far as Aristotle (Gaventa, 2006). It was also an area of reflection and contestation 
within modern philosophy. Carole Pateman (1975) highlights the differences in 
thought on participation with regard to democratic theory by drawing upon the 
works of classical theorists including Mill (father and son), Bentham, and Rousseau. 
Although ‘participation’ may currently be almost universally seen as an 
unquestionable good, Pateman (1975) reminds us that this was not always the case. 
Her work, and that of the authors she draws upon, helps to draw out some of the 
fundamental tensions between democracy and participation which appear to be 
somewhat glossed over by more contemporary thought. Such thought often starts 
from the assumption that participation is necessarily good for democracy in one 
way or another, and immediately jumps to questions pertaining to the form 
participation may take to further certain multiple and divergent aims, from gaining 
information for the state (so that it may attempt to be more responsive to the 
needs of the citizenry and/or enhance the efficiency of its policies, for example) to 
the empowerment of citizens. A return to the work of classical theorists illustrates 
the underlying tensions which often go unacknowledged or unexplored within 
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contemporary work on the subject (Pateman, 1975, pp.1-2). Whether the primary 
incentive is the maintenance of stability of the political system, as in the work of 
Mill senior and Bentham, or whether it has an explicit political goal and makes a 
contribution to democracy rather than just stabilising it, as displayed in the work of 
Rousseau (Pateman, 1975, p.24), will have an impact on the form participation 
takes . 40
Pateman (1975) dispels what she calls ‘the myth’ of there being one classical theory 
of democracy by showing the differences in thought on democracy and 
participation in the work of James Mill and Bentham on the one hand and J. S. Mill 
and Rousseau on the other. She illustrates how Bentham and Mill senior share a 
focus on institutional arrangements necessary for democracy, and participation is 
accorded a solely protective role. It protects the interests of individuals and is there 
to keep the government in check, used as an accountability tool; its primary threat 
is the removal of officials from office via the electoral system. Each person  can 41
participate in the choice and the removal of elected officials by means of their vote. 
A surfeit of participation, i.e. anything beyond participating in the choice of 
representatives via election, was seen as potentially detrimental to the smooth and 
effective running of the political system, and as a threat to stability where stability 
of a political system was prized above all else (Pateman, 1975, pp.18-19). She 
classes theorists of this ilk as proponents of representative democracy. By contrast, 
Rousseau, unlike other classical theorist, also expressed an interest in the psychological 40
impacts and educative potential of participation (Griffith 1998). 
 Depending on the extent of suffrage.41
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due to the wider function afforded to participation in their works, she labels J. S. 
Mill and Rousseau as proponents of participatory democracy (Pateman, 1975, pp.. 
24-39). Arguably, this would more accurately be termed a more participatory form 
of representative democracy. Today, few are suggesting a full participatory 
democracy that does not heavily rely upon representation. In the work of Rousseau 
and J. S. Mill on democracy, participation is ‘central to the establishment and 
maintenance of a democratic polity’ (ibid., p.20) which extends beyond institutional 
arrangements to a ‘participatory society’ (ibid Pateman, 1975, p.20). Rousseau 
recognised and valued the psychological and educative aspects and consequences 
of participation. 
Referring to Berelson (1954) and his comments on classical theory, Pateman (1975, 
pp.6-7) notes the assumed necessity of homogeneity in many classical theories of 
democracy and the accompanying desirability of minimal participation. While 
Berelson, whose work Pateman classes with Dhal as an example of the 
contemporary theory of democracy, acknowledges the existence and necessity of 
heterogeneity, he still maintains that consensus is the goal and places the stability 
of the system at the hierarchical apex such that ‘limited participation and apathy 
have a positive function for the whole system (of democracy) by cushioning the 
shock of disagreement, adjustment and change’ (Pateman, 1975, p.7). Participation 
then is seen as a possible arena of conflict and, given the primacy afforded to 
stability and consensus in contemporary theories of democracy , it is to be 42
Pateman notes that Berelson does not name the theorists he refers to as ‘classical’42
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minimised, ‘the amount of participation that actually obtains is just about the 
amount that is required for a stable system of democracy’ (ibid., p.7). 
Referring to Dahl’s classic text on democracy, Pateman (1975, pp.8-10) highlights 
the narrow interpretations and limited roles assigned to equality and participation 
which continued to dominate what she calls contemporary theories of democracy. 
In contemporary theories, equality refers primarily to suffrage and an equal right to 
vote, and participation is limited to the use of this right to vote to participate in the 
choice of representatives. There is also an unacknowledged normative aspect to 
contemporary theories, specifically with regard to Western democracy as the ideal, 
and the desirability of consensus and stability which as Pateman (1975, p.16) notes 
is not argued for. 
‘Contemporary’ theories of democracy with their emphasis on suffrage and limited 
participation continued to dominate. The 1960s saw a well acknowledged and 
much written about surge in interest in participation, which saw people questioning 
the traditional elitist models of mainstream contemporary democratic thought and 
practice. The theories developed during this period still have import today. There 
was a new energy to political debates regarding people’s ability to affect decisions 
which impacted on their lives. There was a call to be able to participate in much 
more than the election of representatives. The debates were accompanied by 
protest groups and social movements led predominantly by students. Public 
dissatisfaction with the lack of influence they had over issues and decisions 
affecting their lives forced participation back onto the political agenda. The text of 
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Arnstein (1969), explored below, and that of Pateman (1975), noted above, were 
written in the 1960s and 1970s when these movements were at their most vocal. 
Despite recent developments in our understanding of participation, these texts 
explore the origins of the contemporary debates. In addition, Arnstein is still used 
by many in British local government and national government when it comes to 
implementing participatory practices and policies, and as such still has influence on 
policy formation. 
The Port Huron Statement (Students for a Democratic Society, 1962) is a good 
example of the more radical ideas developing around participation at this time. 
Although arguably more radical than most of the population, the student 
movements of the 1960s did raise the issue of participation into the consciousness 
of the general population. The movements were conspicuous and impacted upon 
the feelings and views of everyday people, which obviously had an impact on 
political parties competing for their votes, during the 1960s and in the decades 
that followed. The Port Huron Statement speaks of democratic ideals and 
specifically mentions the need for greater active participation in democratic 
institutions. It displays a belief that participation, and not just suffrage as put 
forward by traditional (referred to as “contemporary” in Pateman 1975) minimalist 
elitist conceptions of democracy, is not only desirable but necessary for the 
existence of democracy. It called for a participatory democracy in which citizens 
were more active in political processes, and criticised the then current dominant 
political and economic structures and institutions for being managerial and 
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technocratic and (as they saw it) creating or reinforcing what they saw as problems 
within society . Not everyone agreed with the issues and the claims and 43
statements made in the Port Huron Statement, and those that agreed did not 
necessarily feel strongly about them, but they nevertheless brought issues up for 
debate both among theorists, politicians and the general populations of countries. 
Obviously, the debates around participation were not brought about solely by the 
Port Huron Statement or the student movements, but they do serve to highlight 
the way in which traditional conceptions of democracy and participation were 
being challenged at this time. These debates continued and developed over the 
next few decades; demands for greater choice and greater voice persisted. 
By the 1990s, there had been a noticeable shift in mainstream thinking from 
minimalist-elitist conceptions of representative democracy, where the masses are 
deemed incapable of acting in accordance with democratic principles for the 
greater good of society, and where mass mobilisations are seen as a threat to 
democracy, towards a view where the inclusion of the masses and the 
democratisation of all aspects of life is not just seen as desirable but necessary in 
order to address the crisis of representation and legitimacy faced by contemporary 
existing democracies. Calls for greater participation were now part of the 
mainstream agenda and no longer the preserve of social movements and left-wing 
thinkers and activists.  There had been a recognition that elites are just as likely to 
act out of self interest as ‘the masses’. Elite democracy assumes that governing 
 It was particularly critical of inequality specifically with regard to the apartheid of the 43
Southern States and for the use of the Cold War to promote apathy for politics at home.
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bodies will adhere to democratic principles, but experience demonstrates they are 
just as likely to act out of self-interest as anyone else, thus undermining the 
argument that the masses cannot manage resources because they act out of self-
interest. As it is possible that both elites and the masses act in this way, it becomes 
a common problem, and not one which is solved by handing over management to 
elite elected individuals or bodies. Acting out of self interest, and therefore 
contrary to democratic principles, cannot be eradicated by transferring governing 
to elites rather than the masses. An appreciation of the knowledge and abilities of 
the masses came from all directions, including a variety of political theorists, 
politicians and practitioners from across the theoretical spectrum. Hilary Wainwright 
(2003) talks of mass sense, and Elinor Ostrom’s 2009 Nobel Prize-winning work  44 45
can be seen as an answer the tragedy of the commons, showing how mass 
management of resources is not only possible but also has many potential political 
and economic benefits. If old elitist notions are retained, then it makes sense to 
implement consultative forms of participation which act to validate and legitimise 
elite decisions, whereas if elitist conceptions are relinquished and the potential of 
the masses is admitted then more devolutionary forms of participation which 
actually hand over decision-making become appealing. Theories of representation, 
It was this book, along with connections forged through liberation theology, that were the 44
inspiration for the very first PB process in the UK, which took place in Bradford in 2005. 
Bradford was done independently of the UK PB Unit; there was a correlation but not a 
connection (J. Hall, 2011, pers. comm., March 14th). 
 ‘Elinor Ostrom has challenged the conventional wisdom that common property is poorly 45
managed and should be either regulated by central authorities or privatized. Based on 
numerous studies of user-managed fish stocks, pastures, woods, lakes, and groundwater basins, 
Ostrom concludes that the outcomes are, more often than not, better than predicted by 
standard theories. She observes that resource users frequently develop sophisticated 
mechanisms for decision-making and rule enforcement to handle conflicts of interest, and she 
characterizes the rules that promote successful outcomes’ (nobelprize.org).
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and the necessity (or not) of elite representation, inform the forms which 
participation takes. Elitist conceptions of democracy reduce sovereignty to the 
choosing of governing bodies. Elitist arguments on democracy can be found in the 
work of academics like Schumpeter who argue that, once individuals have been 
elected, the involvement of the population in political action ceases. These Elitist 
notions are no longer dominant and are contested by more recent work on 
democracy and participation. Minimalist conceptions of representative democracy 
are being replaced by more participatory and deliberative ones. 
In the 1960s, concern and interest around participation came mainly from citizens, 
but by the 1990s mainstream institutions were paying much more attention to 
participation and its potential. During the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, 
the UK and US, along with the big international development agencies, began to 
focus not just on the spread of democracy, as had been their previous focus, but 
also to the ‘deepening of democracy’. The titles of the Human Development 
Reports during the 1990s, and culminating in the 2002 report entitled ‘Deepening 
Democracy in a Fragmented World’ (UNDP), clearly display the global interest in 
this area. The long-fought crusade to spread democracy across the world was 
accompanied at the turn of the century by a renewed surge to ‘deepen’ already 
existing democracies. Increasingly, the challenge now facing many countries is to 
develop institutions and processes that are more responsive to the needs of their 
citizens, especially the poor (UNDP, 2002). Deepening democracy, the buzzwords 
of the late 1990s and early twenty-first century, have become inextricably linked 
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with the notion of participation in one guise or another. Participation was a key 
element of the ‘good governance agenda’ developed in the 1990s by the major 
international development agencies . 46
By the turn of the century, the question of whether or not an increase in 
participation was desirable was off the agenda, and attention was on the differing 
forms of participation and their implementation. However, just because the 
desirability question was off the agenda, it is not clear that an underlying desire for 
stability had disappeared, and many tensions and conflicts seem to pass 
unacknowledged and or unresolved. Despite this, participation did come to be 
seen as a panacea able to address the deficits of democracy (particularly in terms 
of legitimacy, representation and apathy which may lead to the development of a 
‘quiet authoritarianism’ ), as experienced by modern pluralist societies. 47
The term participation has been so overused that its meaning has been completely 
obscured and obfuscated. Additionally, in much of the literature, terms like 
participation and empowerment are used to explain, rather than themselves being 
explained or adequately analysed (Nederveen Pieterse, 1992, p.10). ‘The various 
 Many aspects of the good governance agenda became central to UK government policy and 46
rhetoric as illustrated earlier in this project.
 The term ‘quiet authoritarianism’ is used by Graham Smith, (2006) to illustrate the dangers of 47
the deficits in democracy experienced in the UK. ‘The risk of quiet authoritarianism: The 
increasing failure of large sections of the population to engage with the political process may 
lead to a situation where governments are no longer effectively held to account. Over a period 
of time, this could encourage a gradual growth of ‘quiet authoritarianism’ in Britain where 
policy and law is made in consultation with a small coterie of supporters and with little 
reference to wider views and interests. Under such circumstances, the processes of democracy, 
including general elections, become empty rituals. The more critical commentators argue that 
this has already happened’ (Smith, 2006, p.35). 
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definitions of emancipation, liberation, participation and empowerment show a 
tendency towards circularity, one being defined in terms of the other’ (ibid., p.11). 
A more rigorous analysis of these terms, and an appreciation that in use they are far 
from politically or theoretically neutral, is necessary in order to assess the ways in 
which they may or may not deepen democracy. 
The simplest possible definition of the verb participate could be ‘to share in 
something’ so participation would be ‘the sharing in of something’. This 
immediately raises questions: the sharing of what, by who, and how? More 
complicated definitions seem only to raise more questions. Work and debate on 
participation now generally adds an adjective to participation, as it has become 
clear that there are so many variants. This does not entirely clarify the issue 
because, as Nederveen Pieterse (1992), quoted above, argues, the accompanying 
adjectives, e.g. empowered or emancipatory, raise just as many questions as the 
term they attempt to qualify. Empowerment, for example, may be examined 
through several different levels: 
increasing one’s authority and control over the resources and decisions 
that affect one’s life. As people exercise real choice, they gain increased 
control over their lives. Other writers explore empowerment at the 
personal level, involving a sense of self-confidence and capacity; 
relational, implying ability to negotiate and influence relationships and 
decisions; and collective. (Sidorenko, 2006, p.2) 
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Despite the above noted complications with the qualification of participation, a 
typology is the simplest way to begin exploring the various meanings, even if a 
further exploration of the additional terms is also latterly required. 
Around the same time as the student movements and protests, and their 
accompanying debates, Arnstein developed the first widely acknowledged 
typology of participation: Arnstein’s ladder. Arnstein’s simple typology has been 
much elaborated on, and much more complex typologies have been developed, 
but it remains a useful heuristic. The ladder differentiates between eight forms of 
participation and then classes them as nonparticipation, tokenism or citizen power. 
A Ladder of Citizen Participation (Arnstein 1969) - Illustration 5 
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Fig 1. Originally published as Arnstein, S 'A Ladder of Citizen Participation,' JAIP, 
Vol. 35, No. 4, July 1969, pp. 216-224. Image taken fromhttp://lithgow-schmidt.dk/
sherry-arnstein/ladder-of-citizen-participation.html - accessed 13/03/1 
Arnstein drove straight to the heart of the matter: power. ‘[P]articipation is a 
categorical term for citizen power’ (Arnstein, 1969, p.216). Practices or theories 
centred around illustrating the way in which people’s opinions or desires are taken 
into account without providing people with the power to ensure their opinions and 
desires affect policies or processes are enabling techniques to ensure the 
maintenance of the status quo (ibid.). They function as tools of legitimation. The 
last two rungs of the ladder ‘have been contrived by some to substitute for 
genuine participation. Their real objective is not to enable to participate' (Arnstein, 
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1969, p.217). Participation proper only occurs when there is a transfer of power; the 
top three rungs of the ladder classed as displaying varying amounts of ‘citizen 
power’.   
Despite neither analysing or suggesting solutions, Arnstein (1969) does note the 
main obstacles to achieving a shift in power both from those with more power and 
those with less or none. She identifies the main resistance from those with power 
coming from ‘racism, paternalism and resistance to power distribution’ (ibid., p.
217) and from those with less or no power as being ‘inadequacies of the poor 
community’s political socioeconomic infrastructure and knowledge base, plus 
difficulties of organizing a representative and accountable citizens group in the face 
of futility, alienation and distrust’ (Arnstein, 1969, p.217). While some, specifically 
racism, may have been more conspicuous issues in 1960s America, the problems 
she lists are still pertinent today. Alienation and distrust, often translated into 
apathy, are some of the deficits in democracy identified in the mainstream literature 
which a deepening of democracy, via assorted practices, seeks to address. 
Forms of, and what legitimately constitutes, participation in politics or political 
participation are many and varied, from flash mobs to general elections; for 
example, Blaug (2002) has a much broader view of what may count as political 
participation than does Smith (2006). Some of what Blaug (2002) would classify as 
participation others would name as activism. There are differences between 
demanded and invited participation; for example, PB in Brazil was demanded by 
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social movements and activists, but has since become part of the formal political 
system and would now be considered invited. There is also a difference between 
declarative forms of participation, like marches, petitions, and die-ins, and 
participation as engagement with the state, whether it takes the form of 
consultation or joint policy formation. The concern here is with the formal 
participation of citizens in policy formulation and decisions within representative 
democracy and considering what the relationship is between participation and 
representative democracy. Despite the surge in interest around participation, its 
forms, roles, and potentials, for the most part people are not advocating that we 
relinquish representative democracy in favour of participatory democracy. Rather 
than attempting to render representative democracy more democratic, we should 
be looking to some hybrid form of participatory and representative democracy. 
There are some, for example Laclau (2002) for whom representative democracy is 
not simply the best but actually the only possible form of democracy. Others 
advocate hybrids, which are more often than not based on practical concerns 
around the possibility of participatory democracy on a large scale incorporating 
millions of citizens in national decisions. Representative democracy is and always 
has been predicated on the existence of the nation state. Despite changing and 
possible weakening, the nation state persists; it is, in fact, the nation state which 
often sets up and maintains many of these multinational arrangements. These 
changes and potential weakenings do, however, bring into question the authority 
of our representatives at both the local and national scale. This may be one of the 
factors motivating representatives’ drives towards greater participation i.e. a re-
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legitimisation of their position and authority in new times. The nation state has 
clearly undergone significant changes, however, despite these changes, it is still the 
basis on which our representative democracies work and it does not look set to 
disappear in the near future. The place of representative democracy based on 
notions of the nation state is clearly debatable in the current globalised systems of 
power. This is not, however, the focus of this chapter, save noting it as a possible 
motivating factor for national representatives it is not explored; there is a wealth of 
literature which does this. It is important to note it as a possible motivating factor, 
as this suggests a particular goal which increasing participation may hope to 
achieve. However, given it will not address root causes associated with shifts in 
power, it will not be able to resolve the problem which is about the state and place 
of the nation state in the contemporary world. Acknowledging it may have an 
impact vis-a-vis the ability of participatory initiatives to meet particular goals, this 
chapter focuses on the relationship between representative democracy and 
participation within the nation state.   
The aims and goals of an increase in participation are many and varied, they 
include: the promotion of inclusivity, social cohesion, the legitimation of policy, the 
gaining of information in order to enhance the efficiency of policies, the state’s 
ability to be more responsive to the demands of the citizenry, and a desire to 
deepen democracy and to reduce the responsibility of the state. In addition to 
questions surrounding the role and function of participation, there are also 
questions regarding who participates and why. Swyngedouw(2005) makes use of 
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Schmitter (2000) to highlight some of the issues surrounding who participates and 
why by distinguishing between:  
Right-holders [who] participate because they are members of a national 
political community. Space-holders [who] participate because they live 
somewhere affected by the policy. Knowledge-holders [who] participate 
because they have particular knowledge about the matter concerned. 
Share-holders [who] participate because they own part of the assets 
that are going to be affected. Stake-holders [who] participate because, 
regardless of their location or nationality, they might be affected by 
change. Interest-holders [who] participate on behalf of other people 
because they understand the issues and [S]tatus-holders [who] 
participate on behalf of other people because they are given a specific 
representative role by the authorities. (Smitter 2000, no pagination, 
cited in, Swyngedouw, 2005, p.1996) 
The surge in participatory practices facilitates the examination of both stated 
objectives and also the way in which practices manifest and the actual effects they 
have. Smith (2005) identified 57 different democratic innovations around the world. 
He classified them as variously electoral innovations, consultation innovations, 
deliberative innovations, co-governance innovations, direct democracy innovations, 
and e-democracy innovations.  Smith focuses on the importance and effect of 
institutional design. Technical and or institutional analysis more often than not 
focuses on outcomes, and has been associated with a desire for harmonious 
relationships between state and civil society. At the other end of the spectrum, 
there are those who focus on process rather than outcome. Much of the 
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development studies literature on participation focuses on issues of pedagogy, 
psychological development, and the capacities of citizens, rather than the design 
of practices. Participation is frequently associated with a relationship of resistance 
to and an antagonism towards the state, rather than co operation with the state; it 
looks to the reform of society, often via a process of critical consciousness raising, 
rather than reform of institutional spaces and practice. 
What perhaps sets the ascendancy of participation apart from other co-
opted development concepts are its radical roots. Arising from the 
emancipatory pedagogy of Paulo Freire, the Marxist-oriented school of 
Participatory Action Research (PAR), the principal objective of the 
participatory paradigm was not development – or ‘poverty alleviation’ – 
but the transformation of the cultural, political, and economic structures 
which reproduce poverty and marginalisation. ‘The basic ideology of 
PAR’, according to Mohammed Anisur Rahman (1993:13), ‘is that a self-
conscious people, those who are currently poor and oppressed, will 
progressively transform their environment by their own praxis’. Or, in 
more Freirean terms, development can only be achieved when humans 
are ‘beings for themselves’, when they possess their own decision-
making powers, free of oppressive and dehumanising circumstances; it 
is the ‘struggle to be more fully human. (Freire, 1970, p.29, cited in 
Leal, 2010, pp. 540-541) 
Fung and Wright (2003) make their own contribution by elucidating on both their 
concept of Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) and the conditions 
necessary for its realisation. EPG is, in their view, the model for meaningful 
participation. Fung and Wright’s (2003) ’EPG, is a model of governance ...... that 
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seeks to connect a set of normative commitments for strengthening democracy 
with a set of institutional design prescriptions intended to meet that 
objective’ (Shane, 2005, p.4). The authors identify ‘seven elements that characterize 
this kind of democratic process; the first six concern aspects of the internal design 
of empowered participatory governance institutions; the seventh concerns the 
importance the socio-political environment of such institutions which contributes to 
their robustness and stability’ (Fung and Wright, 2003, p.113). Before going on to 
explore these characteristics, it is worth noting that here we are already dealing 
with participation as inextricably linked with governance and, more importantly, 
democratic processes. This assumes participation is itself a political concept and 
can be used to realise a variety of political goals. This is not always the case as has 
been shown above. 
The characteristics Fung and Wright (2003) give for EPG are : bottom-up 
empowered participation, pragmatic orientation, deliberation, devolution and 
decentralization, recombinant decentralization, state centered institutionalization 
and countervailing power. Although they stipulate that participation should be 
‘bottom up’, they do not insist that it be ‘demanded’ (i.e. from those wishing to 
have more power) rather than ‘invited’ (i.e. institutions, in the case of this project 
local government, inviting those not participating to participate), a distinction that 
this project deems crucial. Fung and Wright’s (2003) pragmatic orientation 
characteristic insists the focus be on concrete problem-solving, where all involved 
have a common interest in solving the problem, but where there may also be 
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differences in desires about how it is solved, and many other areas not directly 
related to the common problem. Amongst others, arguments will be made for the 
necessity of difference in order for there to be real choice and therefore radical 
participation. This also relates to the issue of ‘demanded’ versus ‘invited’ 
mentioned above, vis-a-vis participants being invited to enter into already existing 
power structures versus their ability to challenge the very nature of existing 
structures and institutions; whether participation is about the insertion of the citizen 
into already existing systems and structures, or whether participation is about the 
ability and power of citizens to transform the systems and structures. 
Recombinant decentralization, where central authorities both support and hold the 
local institutions accountable, begins to touch upon the complicated relationship 
between the central state and local government. This was elaborated on in this 
project with reference to the decentralisation policies implemented in the UK over 
the last few decades which also relates to Fung and Wright’s (2003) next 
characteristic, state centered institutionalization. This last form comes close to the 
idea of participation as insertion, an idea explored more fully in the second part of 
this chapter. 
Although their focus is mostly on participation, Fung and Wright are amongst those 
who explore participation in terms of its relationship with democracy. The 
exploration of this relationship has led to a host of new terms including: 
empowered participatory governance (Fung and Wright, 2003) incumbent and 
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critical democracy (Blaug, 2002), expansive democracy (Gaventa, 2006), deeper 
democracy (most often found in policy documents), agonistic democracy (most 
often developments of an idea put forward by Mouffe), and deliberative democracy 
(most often developments of the idea put forward by Habermas). The projects for 
deepening democracy derived from these different theories are extremely 
different. Some claim that the way to deepen democracy is via the building and 
development of civil society, others through participation and participatory 
governance, others through the creation and development of deliberative fora 
(Gaventa, 2006). The radical democracy project of Mouffe (2000; 2005; 2013), 
developed out of her theory of hegemony, would suggest that the ability to form 
counter-hegemonies is crucial for participation if it is to function so as to deepen 
democracy. The next section will deal specifically with the relationship between 
participation and neoliberal representative democracy as the dominant hegemony 
of the day. The merits of Mouffe’s approach are made clear through the 
examination of this specific relationship. It brings to light the importance of 
hegemonic struggle, where the dominant hegemony may be contested and 
challenged by others, for the existence of a vibrant and meaningful form of 
democracy. This chapter attempts to make a distinction between participation-as-
insertion and participation-as-transformation. Participation-as-insertion takes place 
within, and is run by, the dominant hegemony and does not afford space to 
question or challenge its ideology. Participation-as-transformation necessitates that 
there at least be the possibility to challenge and question ideology, systems and 
structures not just the policies conceived within them. The focus on Mouffe and 
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hegemony does not dismiss the other approaches but rather suggests that, 
whatever approach is taken, the importance and influence of hegemony should not 
be overlooked. Indeed, deliberative democracy, initially developed as an attempt 
to question and to revitalise dominant thought on democracy, may itself have 
suffered at the hand of the dominant hegemony; although in practice seems to 
have been co-opted into the mainstream. 
Both the social movements of the 1960s and early 1970s and the so-called 
deliberative turn attempted to challenge traditional views of liberal representative 
democracy; they both questioned the minimalist suffrage-based concepts of 
participation. The deliberative turn also attempted to set out theoretical 
developments regarding the way in which we view the relationship between 
participation and democracy; it was also supplemented by a burgeoning literature 
on the institutional requirements for meaningful citizen participation in political 
decision-making processes. This literature, at least initially, tended to focus on the 
decision making process and the importance of deliberation within this process. 
For a time, agonistic theorists were critical of deliberative theories for their inability 
to deal with conflicting views. Agonist theories criticised deliberative ones for an 
overbearing focus on, and desire for, consensus. However, as deliberative theories 
developed and looked to deal with these criticisms, Mansbridge et al. (2010) for 
example, the debate moved on. There is now far less dialogue between the two as, 
rather than criticising deliberative understandings for their lack of appreciation 
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regarding the plurality and inherently conflictual nature of the social, agonistic 
theorists turned their attention to other issues, including the nature of citizenship, 
for example, Tambakaki (2010) and Tully (2014). These new areas of interest for 
agonistic theorists tend to focus not on the institutional arrangements (and the 
ways they may or may not allow for dissensus) but broader issues concerning the 
context in which contexts determine the role and function of the citizen; the way in 
which the citizen is constructed, and the impact this has on democracy. The nature 
and shape of participatory practices are crucially, although not exclusively, informed 
by the form which the practice takes, institutional design, subjectivities of 
participants, and the environment in which all these take place; in short, it is 
overdetermined. 
Conclusion 
The place, role, aim and form of participation within democracy, then, are not new 
debates. At one extreme, participation is to be used as minimally as possible, that 
is, just enough to ensure the stability of the system. At the other extreme, it has an 
educative, psychological, emancipatory and democratic role and impact. 
Participation can be used to realise a variety of other goods too, for example, the 
provision of information for the more efficient and effective running of services, or 
the reduction (or at least change) in the role of the state. Despite the longevity of 
the debates, they seem to have recently gained a greater prominence than ever 
before, in that these debates are no longer the preserve of a few, but rather 
pervade all policy and debate and include a variety of actors from academics and 
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politicians to citizens and charities. Also, despite the almost universal agreement 
that participation is beneficial, many of the underlying tensions, not least the type 
and form of participation, remain unresolved. 
PART TWO: Neoliberalism and Participation 
5.21 Introduction 
This section takes a more detailed look at the already noted recent trend in politics, 
namely the emphasis on participation. It asks what accounts for this trend? This 
chapter explores the changes in neoliberalism, what they are, what prompted them 
and the consequences they had in more detail. Was the emphasis on participation 
a development and mutation of neoliberalism? Drawing on the work of Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2007) it asks: is it a response to criticisms, contentions and 
challenges to neoliberal hegemony? Does it illustrate a triumph or a defeat of 
political struggles and social movements? What is the relationship between 
participation and representation and the consequences this has for understandings 
of the relationship between civic engagement and representative democracy? In 
addition, drawing on Part One of this chapter, it argues that there are important 
distinctions between participation as transformation, participation as inclusion and 
participation as insertion.  
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Drawing on and developing the arguments of Chapter Three, Part Two argues that 
the emphasis on participation reconfigures the traditional relationship between 
state and citizen in classical theories of representative democracy. This impacts on 
the role and function of both the citizen and the state. The emphasis on 
participation restructures state/citizen relations and the roles and responsibilities 
both accorded to and ascribed to each. Many have illustrated the way in which 
participation can be used as a rubber-stamping exercise to legitimate policy. 
Ultimately neoliberalism’s emphasis on participation does not just legitimise policy, 
it legitimises a particular type of citizen and a particular form of the state. 
Where Chapter Three explored the advent of a more social democratic form of 
neoliberalism in the UK, here the focus is on the development of a more 
participatory form of neoliberalism, This development is, following the advances 
made by Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), understood as a reaction to criticism. Here 
the focus is on the criticisms and demands of the new social movements of the 
1960s and 1970s around greater civic engagement in politics, and demands for a 
greater voice (for the voices of repressed, marginalised and disenfranchised to be 
heard) and choice (freedom and autonomy) for citizens. It explores the extent to 
which these social movements were successful in terms of reforming the dominant 
order of neoliberalism and some of the ways in which neoliberalism delegitimised 
these demands by variously co-opting, subverting or neutralising them. It will be 
argued that, although the recent emphasis on participation can be seen as a partial 
success for some of these movements, for the most part it has functioned so as to 
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reinforce the hegemony of neoliberalism. The discussion below shows the way in 
which, in the past, participation was frequently associated with progressive politics, 
an association which does not hold with regard to the relationship between 
neoliberalism and participation. Neoliberalism has subverted the more progressive 
aspects of the demands of and criticisms made against it by new social movements 
in such a way as to divorce them from their progressive aspects. Neoliberalism's 
emphasis on participation began in the 1990s and signified a shift in neoliberalism 
which re-articulated the role and function of both the state and the citizen and the 
relationships between the two. In order to be effective in their challenges, critique 
must respond to this new form, rather than remaining critical of a form that no 
longer exists.  
5. 22 An appeal to Boltanski and Chiapello 
Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) describe the way in which capitalism, the dominant 
order and prevailing common sense, has maintained its dominance and responded 
to criticisms lodged against it. Without using Gramscian terms, they describe the 
relationship between the dominant hegemony (for them capitalism) and counter-
hegemonic demands and challenges (for them the artistic critique and the social 
critique).  
To be sure Boltanski and Chiapello never use this vocabulary but their 
analysis is a clear example of what Gramsci called ‘hegemony through 
neutralization’ or ‘passive revolution’ to refer to a situation where 
demands which challenge the hegemonic order are recuperated by the 
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existing system by satisfying them in a way that neutralizes their 
subversive potential. (Mouffe, 2008, no pagination)  48
Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) outline the various ways in which the dominant 
hegemony may respond to criticisms lodged against it. The dominant order may 
variously and partially satisfy, subvert, displace or neutralise critique and the 
dominant order may be affirmed or disrupted by its opposition (Boltanski and 
Chiapello 2007). Critique may function so as variously to challenge, to refashion or 
even to bolster the dominant order (ibid.).  Following Boltanski and Chiapello 
(2007), delegitimation serves to strip old forms of their effectiveness, reform 
involves a positive improvement by incorporating  
some of the values in whose name it was criticised and displacement 
eludes the requirement of strengthening demanded by critique 
whereby ‘the old world at which critique was aimed disappears and a 
new world is created which is hard to decipher and therefore hard to 
critique at least in the first instance. (ibid., pp.28-29) 
Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007) detailed exploration and explanation of these 
mechanisms with regard to the relationship between capitalism and critique in 
France makes advances on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. These advances may be 
used to further our understanding of the relationships between hegemony and 
counter-hegemony in different contexts; they provide a rich explanation for the 
 Both Mouffe and Boltanski acknowledge similarities in their approach vis-a-vis hegemony 48
and counter hegemony; Boltanski focuses on the economic and Mouffe on the political 
(Boltanski 2015; Mouffe 2015).
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continued dominance of hegemony in the face of significant criticisms. Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2007) illustrate the ways in which capitalism has been able to 
capture critique and make it work so as to reinforce it. 
In their book, The New Spirit of Capitalism (2007) they bring to light the way in 
which capitalists managed to use the demands for autonomy made by the new 
movements that developed in the ‘60s, harnessing them in the development of a 
post-Fordist networked economy and transforming them into new forms of control 
(Mouffe 2013, p.72). 
Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) highlight the necessity of opposition, not least in 
order to provide justification via constraint and the adaptability of hegemonic 
orders. They illustrate the importance of change and provide an account of 
domination via change. The mechanisms and concepts developed by Boltanski and 
Chiapello (2007) are here used to explore the continued dominance of 
neoliberalism (the dominant) hegemony and its interaction with criticisms (counter 
hegemonic movements) lodged against it, arguing that adaptations to neoliberal 
representative democracy are borne out of contestations and criticisms to it. 
‘[H]egemony has come to be conceived as a ‘dimension’ of power of particular use 
to the analysis of contemporary societies where consent rather than force is the 
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normal mode of governance’ (Martin, 1998, p.166) . Boltanski and Chiapello 49
(2007) move from a notion of power maintained by force, à la Gramsci, to a theory 
where the reinforcement of power and ideas is a reciprocal relationship, and 
domination is secured by change which occurs as a consequence of the unending 
relationship between hegemony and counter-hegemony. Hegemony and counter-
hegemony stand in a relationship of dynamic co-constitution. It is ‘spirit’ which they 
argue is the organising principle of the capitalist state. ‘This study of changes in the 
spirit of capitalism has revealed a major re-organisation in dominant value 
systems’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p.162). It is change that has enabled 
capitalism to maintain its supremacy. Chapter Three detailed the new political 
settlement put forward by New Labour which reconfigured state/citizen roles and 
relationships. This new settlement was shown to be a mutation and adaptation of 
the hegemony of neoliberalism; the changes which transformed neoliberalism into 
a more social democratic form of neoliberalism enabled neoliberalism to maintain 
its hegemonic dominance. Neoliberalism, like capitalism, underwent significant 
changes and it was as a consequence of these changes that it was able to secure 
and maintain its position as the dominant order. This is not domination by force or 
coercion so much as domination by change. Viewing domination as secured by 
change provides a rich account of the interactions between hegemony and 
counter-hegemony and also helps to explain the difficulties of forming an effective 
counter-hegemony. The road to salvation for capitalism is found in the criticisms it 
 Martin (1998) draws heavily on, and is faithful to, a Mouffian understanding of hegemony. 49
This is important as the term has been/is used by a variety of authors who attribute a diverse set 
of properties and meanings to it. 
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faces (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p.163). Here it will be illustrated that this is 
also the road to salvation for neoliberalism understood as the political counterpart 
to late capitalism. Not only are the demands of counter-hegemonic groups and 
movements absorbed or diffused as change occurs, but also the ‘new’ hegemony 
presents a new reality; a constructed contingent reality which masquerades as the 
(and therefore unassailable) reality. This means that successful movements first 
need to appreciate this contingency and then unpack and understand the nature of 
the new reality before they can effectively contest it. Not only does hegemony 
capture counter-hegemony, it also shifts the ground on which we live. 
Echoing Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007) description of capitalism, as the dominant 
order, neoliberal hegemony, is here seen as amorphous, adaptive, contingent, 
contested and defined/constructed by ‘other’ as well as defined/constructed by 
criticisms. The changing face of neoliberalism, here specifically referring to the birth 
and development of its more participatory manifestation, is seen to have enacted a 
passive revolution inasmuch as it was a revolution from above which was actually 
reform rather than revolution (Showstack Sassoon, 1987): ‘The process is therefore 
not literally ‘passive’ but refers to the attempt at ‘revolution’ through state 
intervention, or the inclusion of new social groups within the hegemony of a 
political order’ (ibid., p.210). Revolution tends to be associated with a radical break 
or rupture rather than reform. However, reformism may be considered a form of 
passive revolution (Showstack Sassoon, 1987, p.211). Of specific concern is 
Gramsci’s concept of transformismo ‘as one of the historical forms of … passive 
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revolution’ (Gramsci, cited in, Hoare and Smith, 2005, p.295) which speaks directly 
to acts of cooptation and absorption, and relates to processes which exhibit a less 
radical break than is often associated with revolution. As noted by Mouffe (2008), it 
is these specific aspects and understandings of Gramsci which are echoed in the 
work of Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) and Boltanski (2011). The New Spirit of 
Capitalism (2007) also echoes the advances made by Laclau and Mouffe (2001) with 
regard to hegemony, and specifically the way in which ‘the hegemonic link 
transforms the identity of hegemonic subjects’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.xii) and 
that what is perceived as ‘the only natural or possible societal order, is the 
expression of a certain configuration of power relations’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 
p.xvi). All societal orders are constructions, they are not given; they are contingent 
constructions, not necessary expressions, and these contingent constructions are 
always hegemonic. Exploring the work of Mouffe, Martin (2013) explains that 
‘Dispensing with class as the essential agent of radical change, she [Mouffe] argues, 
Gramsci conceived hegemony as the generation of new subjective identity - a 
‘collective will’ - and not simply the imposition of a class ideology’ (Martin,2013, p.
7). Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) explore capitalism as a form of common sense in 
a Gramscian sense (i.e. the Gramscian notion of ‘common sense’ is always the 
result of a given hegemony; ‘Common sense’ both literally, in that it is common 
and pervasive, and colloquially, in that we unthinkingly accept it as the way to be, 
the way to do something and/or our place within the world). However, this 
‘common sense’ is contingent and constructed. The common sense of the day, 
capitalism for Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), and here neoliberalism (the political 
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counterpart to capitalism), is dictated by the dominant hegemony; it articulates a 
particular subjective stance which comes to be perceived as legitimate, objective 
and universal.  
5.23 Participation: Its radical roots 
As noted in Part One of this chapter, the 1960s saw a well acknowledged and much 
written about surge in interest in participation, which saw people questioning the 
traditional elitist models of mainstream contemporary democratic thought. In the 
1960s, various social movements questioned the representative orientations of 
democratic theory, arguing that participation went beyond universal franchise and 
the equal right to vote. Vibrant political debates emphasised people's ability and 
legitimacy to effect decisions which impacted on their lives. They claimed that 
representation was elitist and minimalist and failed to acknowledge the role of the 
citizenry. There were demands that people be able to participate in much more 
than the election of representatives. Public dissatisfaction with the lack of influence 
they had over issues and decisions impacting their lives forced participation back 
onto the political agenda. 
The idea that greater civic engagement would render democracy more legitimate, 
responsive and accountable inspired a new focus on political practices whose main 
orientation was the ‘deepening of democracy’ (UNDP, 2002). Elitist conceptions 
were being relinquished and the potential of the masses admitted, and more 
devolutionary forms of participation which actually hand over decision-making 
power become appealing. Deeply political and hotly contested, civic engagement 
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now enjoys widespread support from across the political spectrum. The question is, 
as Newman and Tonkens (2011) put it  
whether new government policies on inclusion and participation, choice 
and responsibility, might be considered the crowning achievement of 
the social movements of the second half of the twentieth century or 
whether such policies ‘devoured’ the political energies and potential of 
such movements. (Newman and Tonkens 2011 p.198). 
Various political struggles and social movements with a variety of differing claims 
can be identified in the UK. Newman and Tonkens (2011) separates the UK 
struggles into two broad categories: expansive and transformative struggles. 
‘Newman and Clarke (2009) suggest that citizenship struggles can be understood 
as expansive or transformational. Expansive struggles focus on questions of access 
and inclusion to a more or less public realm of citizenship rights and entitlements. 
Transformative struggles seek to remake the relationship between the public realm 
and the ‘private’ realm of personal and domestic life, and to challenge structured 
forms of domination and subordination. Many social movements had a significant 
role in transforming the meanings and practices of citizenship, changing the public 
domain itself rather than simply demanding access to it and a voice within it, and in 
the process changing the boundaries between what are deemed to be public, 
private and personal matters.’ (Newman and Tonkens, 2011, p.15)  
This echoes the distinction made in earlier chapters between ‘inclusion in’ and 
‘transformation of’ the political sphere. Participation-as-insertion is concerned with 
specific issues whereas participation-as-transformation is concerned with the 
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conditions and relations which engender the issues in the first place. Insertion starts 
from assertions about the way the world is, globalised, complex and plural for 
example, and then sets out ways in which to navigate issues based on these 
assertions. Transformation operates on a different level where ‘the way the world is’ 
is not given, but contingent, and can always be otherwise. Insertion issues 
prescriptions based on the way the world is whereas transformation is concerned 
with the way the world should be. Participation-as-insertion can offer new channels 
for civic engagement understood as inserting more people into an already existing 
sphere, which at best broadens the sphere. Participation-as-transformation relates 
to a new or at least deeper sphere populated by new political subjects. However, 
as explored in Chapter Three, the way in which civic engagement was constructed 
by New Labour meant that citizens were incorporated into state discourse and 
included as citizens according to the specific understanding of citizen and 
citizenship (i.e.. active and responsible) put forward by the state, rather than as 
political subjects on their own terms. This incorporation more closely resembles a 
form of insertion than inclusion. Inclusion suggests including more people, and 
possibly other actors like economic agents, in the democratic process. Insertion, on 
the other hand, is about the construction of a particular citizen, its nature and its 
roles and functions with regard to its relationship with the state, so that their 
insertion may reinforce the dominant hegemony project, in this case that of 
neoliberalism. Inclusion is not problematic per se; rather it is the manner of 
inclusion that is potentially problematic. Where inclusion tends towards insertion, 
rather than inclusion as expansion, it will likely simply reinforce the dominant 
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hegemony. Participation-as-transformation entails reconfiguration of the political 
sphere, the construction of a new political subject for, and a departure from, 
traditional minimalist understandings of the nature of democracy itself. The social 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s were challenging the dominant hegemony, 
they were demanding an expansion of the political sphere, and they were 
demanding a broader and deeper form of political subjectivity for citizens. 
Neoliberalism’s appropriation of participation strips it of its normative content (Leal, 
2010). It has come to function as a politically minimal management tool, that inserts 
participants into existing structures, rather than a part of political struggles aimed 
at challenging the status quo.  
For participation to become part of dominant development practice, it 
first had to be modified, sanitised, and depoliticised. Once purged of 
all the threatening elements, participation could be re-engineered as an 
instrument that could play a role within the status quo, rather than one 
that defied it. Co-optation of the concept depended, in large measure, 
on the omission of class and larger social contradictions…. 
‘liberated’ from their transformative elements, are still, in fact, political, 
since they inevitably serve to justify, legitimise, and perpetuate current 
neo-liberal hegemony. As such, by having been detached from its 
radical nature, participatory action was consequently re-politicised in 
the service of the conservative neo-liberal agenda… (Leal, 2010, p.95) 
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The quote above begs the question: What exactly do we wish to participate in? 
Can we continue to accept a form of participation that is simply added on to any 
social project, i.e. neo-liberal modernisation and development… Or should 
participation be re-located in the radical politics of social transformation by 
reaffirming its counter-hegemonic roots?  (Leal, 2007, pp. 543-546). 
Issues and decisions are the objects of participation as insertion. Socioeconomic 
conditions and relations are both the subject and object of participation as 
transformation. Participation-as-insertion can be applied as a technique or tool for 
decision making about specific issues and or policies. As insertion, participation is 
concerned with the finding of answers to problems; participation-as-transformation 
is concerned with transforming the political sphere and its relationship with the 
state. Insertion is concerned with problems that arise out of the system, 
transformation is concerned with the nature of the system which creates the 
problems. Rather than addressing inequalities created by the existing economic 
and social systems and relations, neoliberalism emphasis on participation looked to 
create easier access to those structures. For example, as Chapter Three detailed, 
exclusion, poverty and inequality were not seen as a result of the economic or 
societal hierarchies inherent in neoliberalism, but as due to the inability of 
marginalised individuals to take part in these hierarchies. People were to be helped 
and encouraged to take part in systems that had been, at least in part, responsible 
for that very lack of social capital, and not to participate in their own governance 
but to be complicit in their own exclusion. 
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Citizens may be the objects and or subjects of policy. As objects, they are ascribed 
specific roles in the formation of policy. They are objects inasmuch as they are 
essential elements of policy formulation. They are to be included as essential to the 
function of participation as insertion. Citizens as subjects of policy are the authors 
of policy rather than instruments of its formulation. Where citizens are the subjects 
of policy formulation, i.e. they are not inserted into existing structures and systems, 
but rather have at least the possibility (exercised or not) of challenging the current 
systems and structures. The reformulation of the state/citizen relationships and 
their roles explored in Chapter Three suggests that citizens may have become 
subjects of policy but only partially.  
They become (at best) subjects of policy, but not subjects of social 
determination. The policies that they are allowed to influence are 
located within an unquestioned and unquestionable context of 
capitalism, of private property and profit and all that flows from that. 
(Holloway, 2011, no pagination) 
Political struggles may have been successful in their demands for greater inclusion 
but less so in terms of demands to transform the political sphere. They may have 
won the right to play the game but they did not succeed in changing the rules of 
the game itself. 
Newman and Tonkens (2011) neatly illustrate the ambivalence vis-a-vis the 
struggles of social movements’ demands for greater participation and changing 
conceptions of citizenship. They outline the ways in which the emphasis on 
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participation contained within it new constructions of the notions of ‘citizen’ and 
‘citizenship’, and how this can be seen as both a success and a subversion leading 
to neutralisation of these movements and their demands.  
There are valid reasons to argue that active citizenship can be considered a 
response to such claims, and as such represents the crowning achievement of the 
work of new social movements. Many issues that a few decades ago were 
considered private and thus hardly issues of public deliberation have been brought 
into the public domain. Governments have come to recognise the importance of 
citizen participation and choice, ... ‘Choice’  and ‘empowerment’ have often 
become seamlessly coupled, ... New issues as well as new topics have been 
included as issues of public importance, and citizenship itself –  its inclusions and 
exclusions as well as its rights and duties –  has become the focus of extended 
political attention (Newman and Tonkens, 2011, p.10).  
From a different perspective [W]e might suggest that active citizenship 
is not the triumph but rather the ultimate disowning or even devouring 
of social movements. The term active citizenship itself is an invention of 
policymakers, and the ideals of social movements, it can be argued, 
have been appropriated and adapted for policy purposes, leading to 
new strategies of responsibilisation or incorporation. That is, the idea of 
active citizenship is used to discipline rather than liberate and empower 
citizens. (Cruickshank, 1990, no pagination, cited in, Newman and 
Tonkens, 2011, p.10) 
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Neoliberalism has been able to minimise or to neutralise threats to its dominance 
through both state intervention and the inclusion of new social groups. Other 
tactics included making concessions, which importantly did not disrupt the overall 
ideology or goals of neoliberal ideology, to aggrieved and dissatisfied groups. In 
addition, it co-opted demands and ideals potentially harmful to it in such a way 
that they came to bolster and support the dominant ideology rather than threaten 
it. Neoliberalism is revealed as elusive, and sometimes contradictory and/or 
paradoxical. It defies definition as it is not static and cannot be pinned down; it is 
inherently dynamic, changing, adapting and reacting. There may be common 
aspects among many forms of neoliberalism. Whatever similarities and differences 
the different forms may have, all of them continually mutate. The policy and 
practice of neoliberal governments are informed not just by underlying principles 
but by oppositional claims. These oppositional claims are variously subverted by 
neoliberalism or manage to reform it in some way.  
Chapter Three sought to illustrate the development of a new construction of the 
relationship between the state and the electorate, where the electorate are not 
simply passive recipients of state policy and rhetoric and, if not active, then are at 
least complicit in the reproduction of dominant ideology and power structures. In 
fact, the emphasis on greater civic engagement encouraged citizens to become 
involved in material practices that would reinforce ideology and policy. 
The active citizen is invited, cajoled and sometimes coerced to take on 
a range of responsibilities for the self, for the care of others and for the 
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well-being of communities. S/he is offered a range of opportunities to 
participate in a devolved and plural polity as well as to exercise choice 
in the expanding marketplace of care and welfare services. (Newman 
and Tonkens, 2011, p.9) 
Neoliberalism's emphasis on participation did promote and open new avenues to 
facilitate greater civic engagement. However, the recognition and inclusion of 
previously excluded or marginalised groups and voices were legitimised only when 
expressed as a particular citizen - the responsible and active citizen. Rather than the 
claims and identities gaining legitimacy in their own register, they are assimilated 
into new constructions of the citizen, and it is via their rearticulation in a discourse 
of the responsible and active citizen that their legitimacy and inclusion is secured. 
Newman and Tonkens (2011) illustrate the way in which the focus on ‘active 
citizenship’ entails ‘a focus that transforms older meanings of citizenship and that 
seeks to incorporate (or at least rework) older struggles’ (ibid., p.9). 
Gramsci famously articulated the way in which dominant ideology can and will 
adapt to threats and demands made to and of it. However, the goal is not to meet 
these demands so much as to neutralize them, which may include granting certain 
concessions, in order to secure its continued dominance. ‘Political projects such as 
the 'Third Way' or the 'radical center' clearly express this ideal of creating a state 
apparatus sensitive to some extent to social demands, but which operates as an 
instrument of demobilization’ (Laclau, 2001, p.3). The shift from the neoliberal 
hegemony of the 1980s to a Blairite form, a more participatory social democratic 
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form of neoliberalism, is here understood not as a fundamental ideological shift 
away from neoliberalism, or any fundamental changes in principles, but rather as 
neoliberalism adapting to demands to ensure its continued dominance. This, again, 
is not domination by force or coercion so much as domination by change. 
While enabling new forms of participation and articulating the state–civil 
society relationships in potentially democratising ways, there is also a flip 
side to the process. To the extent that new governance arrangements 
rearticulate the state-civil society relationship, they also redefine and 
reposition the meaning of (political) citizenship and, consequently, the 
nature of democracy itself’ (Swyngedouw, 2005, p.1991). 
The recent emphasis on participation has shifted the sphere of politics away from 
the state and towards the social. Noting the shift in focus from the proper role and 
function of the state to the proper role and function of the citizenry, we should be 
wary of theories and policies based on and justified by ‘sociological claims about 
the novel condition of contemporary society... [rather than] moral claim[s] about the 
nature of society and the distribution of resources’ (Finlayson, 1999, p.271). The 
former being characteristic of governance-beyond-the-state and tend towards the 
depoliticisation of essential political issues. It warns against a trend that displays a 
lack of attention paid to the state, its role, its function, and as the site of political 
struggle. Mouffe (2005) connects the move to a politics ‘beyond left and right’, the 
explicit aim of Third Way politics, with the shift from government to governance 
and the associated shift from political and normative debates about the way things 
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should be to discussions of technical solutions to specific problems based on 
claims about the way the world is, claims which are put forward as beyond dispute.  
Today many politicians and their ideologies have removed the politics from 
'politics'. There are no longer ‘left’ or ‘right’ policies but only ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
policies implemented by technocratic administrations; 'the unchallenged 
hegemony of neoliberalism represents a threat for democratic institutions’ (Mouffe, 
2000, p.6). 
Her concern is that we now live in a post political (and therefore post democratic) 
climate. The argument here is that while participation may have the ability to have 
positive democratic impact it will not necessarily do so. The stronger claim being 
that the recent emphasis on participation within contemporary neoliberalism may 
have realised some goods but far from enhancing democracy it has, in many ways, 
actually served to diminish democracy in that it serves to reinforce a hegemony 
which prohibits the possibility of alternatives.  
Noting the progressive and radical roots of demands for greater participation, 
whether in deliberative theory or in the demands and practices of social 
movements, neoliberalism’s emphasis on participation is understood as a reaction 
of the dominant hegemony (i.e. neoliberalism) to criticism (i.e. counter-hegemonic 
movements in both theory and practice). Neoliberalism’s incorporation of 
participation stripped it of its more progressive and radical elements; participation 
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came to be about inserting citizens into systems and structures rather than a 
vehicle for citizens to challenge the systems and structures themselves. This section 
has explored the journey of participation from being part of radical critique to 
becoming a mainstay of orthodox policy. The growing emphasis on participation is 
revealed as a process of discursive re-articulation of existing discourses and 
practice. The question of hegemony is always about articulation and disarticulation 
of existing symbolic material (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Mouffe, 1979; 1988). This 
process may be progressive but is not necessarily so (Mouffe, 2011).  
5.24 The social construction of reality 
For Gramsci, ‘hegemony was conceived as an ongoing struggle to define the world 
in accordance with dominant groups and classes’ (Martin, 1998, p.166). For 
Boltanski (2015), there is a continual struggle over symbolic domination in order to 
define the world where we willingly commit acts of symbolic violence in order to 
secure semantic safety in a chaotic and messy social life which is fragile and 
contradictory. Based on the contingency of reality, Boltanski (2011) explores the 
way in which we are presented with a necessity that is not a necessity, i.e. created 
and maintained by institutions and society which are in fact contingent. He 
explores the way in which this presented necessity appears not to be constructed 
and maintained by institutions, but appears to be given (Boltanski, 2011). This 
reflects Laclau and Mouffe's (2001) discourse theory reading of Gramsci where the 
construction of hegemony is a form of non-necessary necessity which appears as 
the reality rather than one contingent reality amongst many. For Boltanski (2015), 
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everyday actors are not brutalised but appeased by a too real reality and critique 
struggles to get a grip on reality, because reality appears as not institutionally 
created. 
Chapter Three illustrated the way in which state discourse created a new political 
settlement which contained new roles and responsibilities for the state and the 
citizenry. The Third Way, perhaps the most dominant form of social democratic 
participatory neoliberalism, explicitly presents us with a new reality. It constructs the 
proper role and function of the State and citizen/citizenry. It presents us with a 
contingent construction of ‘the common good’ and ‘the people’ which 
masquerades as a necessity. The nature and form of participation asserts roles and 
responsibilities, for the state and the citizen/citizenry and is thereby constitutive of 
the relationship between them. In doing so, the articulation of participation 
contains within it a claim on the position and the meaning of citizenship and 
thereby the very nature of democracy. Various conceptions of participation are then 
not only a description of various ways in which citizens may (or may not) be 
involved but are also determiners of and/or determined by specific ontologies and 
normative claims. 
For the anti-essentialists, the mediation of representation is inescapable; we cannot 
escape representation, and representative democracy is not second or even the 
best but rather the only possible form of democracy, for example, Laclau (2000). 
‘The people’ and ‘the will of the people’ are constructed out of a process of 
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representation (Laclau, 2000). Participants are constituted through a process of 
representation; it is through a process of representation that identities and groups 
are formed on behalf of which claims and interests can be expressed (ibid). 
‘[P]olitico-hegemonic articulations retroactively create the interests they claim to 
represent’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.xi). It is through this process that the 
represented is brought into existence. This undermines the idea that participation 
is superior to representation. Participation cannot enable a more direct and 
immediate way of expressing the will of the people than representation as 
participation is itself a form of representation. ‘The elimination of all representation 
is the illusion accompanying the notion of a total emancipation’ (Laclau, 2000, p.
143). Dismissing appeals to immediacy, the anti-essentialist argument reveals the 
constitutive nature of representation, that is, it denies that identities and demands 
are out there somewhere to be revealed, but rather they are constituted by a 
process of representation.  
[T]he function of the representative cannot be purely passive, 
transmitting a will constituted elsewhere, but that it has to play an 
active role in the constitution of that will. And so the name representing 
that collective will is never the passive expression of any previously 
achieved unity. On the contrary, the name retroactively constitutes the 
very will that it claims to represent.… 
That is why representative democracy is not a second best, as Rousseau 
thought, but it is the only possible democracy. Its insufficiencies are 
actually its virtues, as it is only through those insufficiencies that the 
visibility of the gap between universality and particularity — without 
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which democracy is unthinkable — can be recreated. (Laclau, 2000, pp.
144-145) 
One consequence of this is that, in order to have greater meaningful participation, 
we actually need more representation. If we could express our will directly, that is 
through participation, then we would no longer need representatives but rather 
administrators and managers. Politicians have abdicated their responsibility to 
represent ideology, principles and crucially ‘the people’ and ‘the common will’. 
The question is not ‘more or less participation?’ nor is it ‘participation or no 
participation?’ but rather ‘what form of participation will have a positive democratic 
impact?’ Democratic politics is about groups, group claims, and group interests; it 
is about the formation of ‘the people’ and ‘the collective will’. Democracy cannot 
function on the basis of individual claims and preferences; it is predicated on some 
idea of a community. In democratic politics, these groups are represented by 
representatives. The plurality and diversity of contemporary societies are not 
adequately represented either in terms of quality or quantity. The quality of our 
existing political representatives is lacking, at least in part due to them remodeling 
themselves as managers of individual preferences, preferences which are revealed 
to them via the introduction of a host of participatory practices to facilitate greater 
civic engagement. If we could express our will directly, that is through participation, 
then we would no longer need representatives, but rather administrators and 
managers. Politicians have abdicated their responsibility to represent ideology, 
principles and, crucially, ‘the people’ and ‘the common will’. They now present 
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themselves as managers capable of, and ethically responsible for, implementing 
the policy choices of the individual. Not only is this not possible, but it also makes 
a mockery of representative democracy. We are left with a representative 
democracy in name but without representatives. In terms of quantity, what is 
represented is limited and does not adequately reflect the ideas, aims, claims and 
views associated with contemporary plural and diverse societies; this limitation is 
due in great part to the prevailing common sense of neoliberalism, which 
delegitimises, neutralises and/or co opts alternatives. Third Ways are particularly 
well placed to do this as, having placed itself in the middle of the political 
spectrum, it can more easily appease demands from both Left and Right than 
others towards either end of the spectrum. Neoliberalism’s emphasis on 
participation is revealed as a process of discursive re-articulation of existing 
discourses and practice. The introduction of participatory practices means that 
citizens are not simply complicit in the hegemonic project but actively reinforcing it 
via material practices.  
5.25 The crisis of representative democracy 
More than desirable or justifiable, participation was regarded as a political antidote 
to address the crisis of representation and legitimacy faced by contemporary 
democracies. Representative democracy may be in crisis, but is this a crisis of 
representative democracy itself or a crisis of the current institutions of 
representative democracy? If it is the former, then the answer would seem to lie 
with theorists like Hardt and Negri (2004) and social movements like the 
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Indignados, who advocate a withdrawal from, rather than engagement with, 
representative democracy. However, if we accept the above argument that 
representative democracy is in fact the only possible form of democracy then the 
solution would seem to lie in a reconfiguration of the current systems of 
representative democracy. Many have suggested that the introduction of greater 
civic engagement will have a positive democratic impact and that this is the way to 
reconfigure representative democracy, address the crisis and render representative 
democracy more democratic. However, the above illustrates that representation is a 
prerequisite for participation which undermines the idea that we can express our 
will and preferences directly which is one of the biggest arguments for 
participations ability to enhance representative democracy. Mouffe (2000; 2015) 
has argued that as a consequence of a post-political landscape ushered in by Third 
Way thinking and politics, many groups no longer feel represented. 
If the crisis of representative democracy is understood as a crisis of representation 
(i.e. citizens no longer feel represented by their so called representatives) then this 
would suggest that the solution to the crisis is to increase representation in terms 
of both quality and quantity. For the most part social movements, theory and policy 
now all believe that giving greater voice to citizens will have a positive democratic 
impact. However, questions remain about the best way for these voices to be 
heard, i.e. directly or via representatives. The above discussion suggests that 
simply adding more participation to representative democracy is unlikely to have a 
deep democratic impact. Rather we need to be thinking about the system of 
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representative democracy as a whole and the relationships between representation 
and participation.  
Conclusion 
Various authors have explored the way in which ‘the intellectual projects and 
political struggles of the Left in the second half of the twentieth century… have 
become complicit to the agenda of neoliberal capitalism’ (Azmanova, 2012, p.1). 
The second part of this chapter argued that participation has suffered a similar fate. 
In order for participation to maintain its critical edge and political potency, both in 
theory and in practice, the term must be reclaimed and its relationship with 
representation be acknowledged and explored in more detail. 
Neoliberalism’s turn towards participation is understood as a reaction of the 
dominant hegemony (i.e. neoliberalism) to counter-hegemonic movements in both 
theory and practice. Neoliberalism’s incorporation of participation stripped it of its 
more progressive and radical elements; participation came to be about inserting 
citizens into systems and structures, rather than a vehicle for citizens to challenge 
the systems and structures themselves. Neoliberalism's emphasis on participation 
addressed a set of more traditionally left-wing contestations around citizen power 
and ability to make decisions. Participation was claimed as a tool to deepen 
democracy but the way in which it manifested tended to prohibit this. It subverted 
claims for participation and transformation by inserting more people in existing 
systems and structures.  
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If, as many argue, participation can help strengthen and deepen democracy, as it 
allows more groups to have more voice, it must be accompanied by an increase in 
representation. Participation is not superior to representation, nor should we be 
thinking of the two in terms of ‘either/or’. Representation is constitutive and 
inescapable. If we want more groups to have more voice we need to be thinking 
about ways in which these groups are constituted and represented. 
Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) is a very detailed study of France but they suspect 
that what they uncovered is part of a more general trend (Boltanski, 2002). This 
project has focused on the UK but again it is likely that UK is an example of a 
general trend, geographical differences will impact on specifics but the trend 
remains the same. Clearly this could only be confirmed by an in depth study of 
other countries. The theory aspect of the importance of hegemony and its 
relationship with counter hegemony is obviously not France or UK exclusive. 
Conclusion 
This project has told the story of the inception of PB in Brazil and its subsequent 
translation to the UK. Emerging from the demands of a diverse set of social 
movements in 1970s and 1980s Brazil, PB became a formal process. It was part of a 
new way of governing, emerging in Brazil as the country transitioned from an 
authoritarian to a democratic regime. Taken up and championed by the PT, the 
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development of PB within Brazil was inextricably linked to the ways in which the PT 
evolved and especially the party's transition from social movement to a political 
party. PB in Brazil developed and matured into a process that was attractive to a 
broad range of diverse actors. This matured process, no longer rooted in the 
political demands of left-wing social movements, was a relatively neutral process. It 
made only the minimal demand that citizens be given some say in budgetary 
decisions. This is minimal compared to PB’s radical roots. The idea that citizens 
should be more involved in what was previously the exclusive domain of the state 
had become commonplace, but that citizens should have a say in financial 
decisions was a specific form of citizen involvement which went far beyond 
traditional methods of consultation, and was also a step beyond even the more 
progressive ideas around citizen involvement at the time. The development and 
maturing of PB within Brazil coincided with more general trends in thinking. The 
two were inextricably linked. There was a growing appreciation and 
acknowledgement, in theory, policy and practice, of ‘the knowledge of the masses’ 
and there was increasing recognition of potential goods, both political and 
economic, that could be achieved through greater citizen involvement; by the start 
of the twenty-first century, these had acquired the status of common sense. This 
lead to the development of more social democratic forms of representative 
democracy. The economic orthodoxy of neoliberalism was accompanied by a 
political orthodoxy of social democratic representative democracy which 
emphasised the importance of greater citizen involvement. It was into this climate 
that PB was translated into the UK. In Britain, PB and other participatory initiatives 
 325
do illustrate an alternative form of governance and do go some way to creating a 
new form of relationship between the governed and the governors. However, 
unlike PB in Brazil, PB in the UK did not influence or change the narrative around 
participation but rather was incorporated into it. 
In the telling of this story several arguments were tested and developed: 1) 
participatory practices are overdetermined; context is an important determining 
factor 2) participation can take many forms and attention needs to be paid to acute 
differences in kind in both theory and practice, 3) a triangle can help illustrate the 
attractiveness of PB and aid general categorisation of the myriad processes which 
go under the name of PB and 4) greater attention needs to be paid to the 
relationship between participation and representative democracy; it may be true 
that it is greater representation that is required, and that participation is not a 
panacea. 
1. Participatory practices are overdetermined 
There are many factors, not least institutional design, that determine the shape and 
form practices take and the associated potential they hold. The discursive 
environment of their operation also affects their potential and will have an impact 
on the design process itself. This project explored two particular contexts in Brazil 
and the UK. It looked at the specifics of these contexts. The discursive environment 
of the UK was particular, but it was also emblematic of more general trends. While 
the specifics will differ, it is likely that similar observations could be made in 
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different countries, particularly in Europe and the US, which bear more general 
resemblance to the UK than either China or Africa. Whatever the particularities, 
context matters, and it will have a determining impact on participatory practices. 
While here only PB was investigated, the same arguments could be made for any 
participatory practice. The concrete impact of context on any given practice will be 
case specific. Indeed the analysis here was restricted to just two, rather than all, UK 
processes. The difference in particularities vis-a-vis concrete practices is only likely 
to be magnified when the practices take place in different geographies and at 
different times.   
2. Participation: Important differences in kind 
There are many different types and forms of participation. Despite the relatively 
recent emphasis on it, there is a long history of thought and debate around aims 
and types of participation. It is not clear that the recent popularity of participation 
exhibits a resolution of old tensions. The types of participation put forward in 
theory and practice display important differences in kind. The main three forms 
explored here were transformation, inclusion and insertion. The emphasis placed 
on participation by the New Labour government tended towards insertion. 
Accordingly, PB in Manton and Tower Hamlets possibly exhibited some extension 
of inclusion, but ultimately they were forms of insertion and as such held minimal 
democratic potential. The recognition that participation may take the form of 
insertion is important because it illustrates and explains how, contrary to popular 
belief, participation can actually diminish democracy. Transformation, inclusions 
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and insertion certainly do not exhaust the types and forms of participation. There is 
a need for greater work on and understanding of the concept of participation itself.  
3. A Triangle 
In addition to arguing that we need to think more about participation, it was 
suggested that a triangle could help situate PB processes in relation to the Porto 
Alegre exemplar process. The triangle put forward is in no way meant to replace 
the more detailed and specific criteria for PB put forward by a variety of academics 
and practitioners. The triangle was borne out of a recognition and acceptance that 
many processes that call themselves PB simply do not meet even the most basic 
criteria. The triangle is simple and flexible. It helps us to understand not just the 
different forms a process may take but also why PB became so attractive to such a 
diverse range of actors. In order for the triangle to be of use, the meaning of the 
three corners, radical politics, resource distribution and neoliberalism must be 
made clear. The corners were understood in one way here, however, the definitions 
of all terms may be changed and used in other ways.  
4. Participation and Representative Democracy 
Having told the story of PB’s translation to the UK, this project took a more 
reflective turn and looked at what the story could tell us about the relationship 
between participation and representative democracy. Despite the current 
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popularity of participation and concerns that representative democracy is in crisis, it 
does not seem likely that representative democracy is going to disappear 
completely any time soon. The relationship between representative democracy and 
participation is complex; there is not, as some would seem to suggest, a simple 
equation where ‘representative democracy + participation = deeper representative 
democracy’. Nor is it a simple binary, i.e less representation and more participation 
will make for deeper democracy. Indeed, Chapter Five illustrated the way in which 
we cannot escape representation and that participation itself cannot occur without 
prior representation. The so-called crisis is understood to be a crisis of the current 
institutions of representative democracy, rather than a crisis of representative 
democracy itself. As the diagnosis dictates the treatment, this suggests that we 
need to look at, to understand, and to change the current institutions rather than 
abandon representative democracy altogether. In order to render representative 
democracy more democratic, we need to explore different forms of participation 
and their relationship with the aims and goals of increased civic engagement. 
These aims will have a determining impact on the design and implementation of 
practices, which itself impacts on the democratic potential any given concrete 
practice will have. There is a rich literature on representative democracy, and also 
on participation, but the relationships between the two are still in need of much 
more attention. Contestation itself is not a necessary requirement, but the 
possibility of contestation is. As Mouffe (2005, 2013) cautions, without this 
possibility we are at the end of politics and the end of democracy. We may now 
have both vote and choice but effectively we still have no voice.  
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Currently political representation lacks both quality but more importantly it lacks 
diversity. Many no longer feel represented by our representatives, this is why we do 
not engage, and this makes the term representative a misnomer. It makes a 
mockery of representative democracy, as we no longer have representatives, but 
only managers of choices and preferences; these choices and preferences in turn 
are limited by the prevailing hegemony.  
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List of Interviewees 
Full transcripts and/or recordings of formal interviews are available upon request. 
Names are given when the interviewee gave permission and when the interviewee 
wished to remain anonymous letters are used.  
Yves Cabannes Emeritus Professor in Development Planning, University  
  College London. He is an urban Planner and activist   
  specializing in urban and municipal governance. He was   
 senior advisor to the International Centre for Urban    
 Management, CIGU, Ecuador, and the Municipality of    
 Porto Alegre, Brazil (International Network on     
 Participatory Budgeting and Municipal Finance). 
Jez Hall  Member of PB Unit, Member of PB Partners and Member 
  of CPI. Leading UK PB Practitioner 
Shazia Hussain Service Head Culture, Learning and Leisure,    
  Communities Localities & Culture, Tower Hamlets    
 Partnership. Lead on the introduction, implementation    
 and evaluation of PB in Tower Hamlets 
Richard Edwards       Head of Mantons Pathfinder, Director of Manton   
  Community Alliance, a Neighbourhood Management   
  Pathfinder and lead in the planning, implementing and   
 evaluating of PB processes in Manton. He is a founder    
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 board member and trustee of the National Association for   
Neighbourhood Management.  
Interviewee A  PB Partner 
Interviewee B  Senior member of PB Unit 
Interviewee C  Senior member of PB Unit 
Interviewee D Member of PB Unit 
Interviewee E  Member of MCA. Involved in the planning, implementing  
  and evaluating of PB processes in Manton 
Interviewee F  Senior member 1 of Tower Hamlets Partnership   
   Department of Communities Localities and Culture.  
   Involved in the planning, implementing and evaluating of  
  PB processes in Tower Hamlets 
Interviewee G Junior member Tower Hamlets Partnership Department of   
 Communities Localities and Culture. Involved in the    
 planning, implementing and evaluating of PB processes in   
Tower Hamlets 
Interviewee H  Senior Member 2 of Tower Hamlets Partnership    
  Department of Communities Localities and Culture.   
  Involved in the planning, implementing and evaluating of   
 PB processes in Tower Hamlets 
Interviewee I   Senior Adviser at the Department for Communities  
   and Local Government 2000 – 2006 
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Interviewee J    Senior Civil Servant. Senior member of The   
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